[Originally published in the Valley News.]
Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Leslie Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, have suggested a new approach to the growing and deteriorating situation in Iraq. In a recent op-ed in The New York Times, they propose that America drop its current policy of working to install democracy in Iraq and adopt one that encourages the formation of a loose federation of Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish states or republics with a capital in Baghdad.
There is little point in going over all the reasons why Bush administration policy is failing to achieve any of its goals in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. That has been done ad nauseum. We are where we are. Whether we should be there or not is really relevant only to historians.
Iraq is a creation of colonialism. There is nothing about it that stems from a natural political, tribal or religious experience or evolution. It is there because it suited someone else to create it, and it is highly unlikely that it will hold together except by dint of colonial or dictatorial force. It was not designed to function under any other circumstances.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that every component part of the internal Iraqi struggle for power has supporters and opponents outside the country who are likely to intervene to protect their own interests.
Does this appear like an impossible situation? Absent some as-yet-unidentified power prepared to impose peace on Iraq, it is. The religious and ethnic realities that existed before our invasion of Iraq have not been and cannot be changed by the power of prayer (or even rational discourse).
The Biden-Gelb proposal suggests that a group of surrounding nations and interested parties – Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia – get together and accept responsibility for guiding the successful march of the warring Iraqi components toward peace. This group, in turn, would be “encouraged” by Western governments in its trek toward peace.
A force of regional “interested parties” cannot succeed because in its inclusiveness it brings with it all the issues that create and maintain instability inside Iraq, and all of that on a grander and far more dangerous scale.
The last thing the Turks want is an autonomous Kurdish entity on their southeast border. They assume, probably correctly, that this would destabilize their own country, presenting the millions of Turkish Kurds with an alternative to their current second-class status in Turkey.
The Iranian government would likely view southern Iraq, the oil-rich section of the country where their co-religionists predominate, as a desirable acquisition in a chaotic post-American-withdrawal world. In addition, Iran has not forgotten the war waged against it by Saddam’s Iraq.
The Sunnis and their outside protectors would be tempted to play the role of spoilers, as the Iraqi Sunnis will have lost not only their long-time disproportionate political power in Iraq, but also their claim to most of Iraq’s oil.
In simple terms, the Biden-Gelb plan comes up against the same set of hard, immutable realities that made our poorly thought out invasion of Iraq so prone to failure. It has a less than equal chance for success.
So, where does all this leave us? Only a dictator or a 21st-century imperial power can solve this issue. As was the case in Vietnam, this war can be won, but not on a timetable that is likely to be politically acceptable here at home.
Considering that most of the rest of the world regards the situation in Iraq to be the result of our own arrogance and destructive policies, there is little chance that we ever will be able to find or create an entity to take on our role in moving Iraq in the direction so naively championed by the Bush administration. With our half-hearted troop commitments, we have lost our chance to find a constructive solution on our own. What is far more likely is a slow slide into civil war (if we are not already there), which could easily lead to a broader religious, ethnic and political armed conflict in the region.
When the U.S. electorate shows insufficient support for this first application of the Bush administration’s policy of pre-emptive unilateralism, it will be time to seriously consider a “cut and run” strategy. This is what we ultimately did in Vietnam. At that point, the American people can look upon this episode as a lesson given by the Republicans and George Bush on the exercise of American power in foreign affairs!
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston, Vt.
