[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]
America is fighting two mutually contradictory battles in Iraq. We are fighting against an Iraqi insurgency that wants us out of Iraq, and we are fighting against al-Qaida in Iraq which wants us to stay because they came there after our invasion to kill our troops and foment chaos and that can only be continued if we stay. That alone is a pretty good reason for us to get out.
The Bush White House, Sen. John McCain, the prospective Republican presidential nominee, and other supporters of the administration’s Iraq policy have identified our goal in Iraq as “victory.” “Victory” is defined as the defeat of terrorism and the insurgency; the creation of a peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure state; the evolution of Iraq as a partner in U.S. foreign policy goals on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and weapons proliferation; and as an economic and political example to the region of all that is good about democracy.
A policy of promoting regional stability would be far better. Our military approach to both Iraqi terrorism and its insurgency will bring only further instability. Real stabilization will necessarily involve seeking a viable political solution for Iraq, requiring the participation of the neighborhood in the process. The neighborhood does not seek a regional conflict, yet as long as we are involved militarily there, we are so totally bereft of diplomatic power that none of those neighbors will participate with us in seeking and implementing the kind of solution that will be acceptable to all concerned. Our departure from Iraq, however, is the only course that can provide an opportunity for such a solution, as well as an opportunity to seek solutions to other Middle East problems.
Anyone who accepts the likelihood that not even a militarily successful surge will bring a voluntary resolution of Iraq’s internal sectarian and ethnic issues, will understand that the same civil conflicts that the surge is successfully suppressing today will simply wait until we have departed Iraq and then come to the forefront again. These animosities are so ancient, so ingrained, that they have not disappeared over the centuries and will not for centuries to come. Whether we leave now or in 10 years, the same potential for conflict will be there.
The Bush administration has spoken often of the coming “long war” against terrorism. As long as we continue with their tactics, which rely first and foremost on the neocons’ beloved application of military instead of diplomatic power, it will indeed be a long war – perhaps decades long.
Our pursuit of “victory,” as defined above, through the “surge” has brought us three new realities: We cannot totally prevent the chaos and killing regardless of how successful the surge proves to be; we have lost all of our diplomatic flexibility (we are essentially alone in this struggle and will remain so as long as we remain in Iraq); and the primary beneficiaries of our policy are, and will continue to be, Iran and al-Qaida.
The “surge” currently under way, however militarily successful, is unlikely to lead to political stability and far more likely to cause further destabilization. As integral parts of our surge policy, we tacitly acknowledge and support a level of autonomy for the Kurds which will likely lead ultimately to conflict between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in the north. Further, we are supporting all sides in the ongoing low-key civil war. We are arming Sunni tribal militias in the Awakening program, but neglect to employ them as promised, leaving a group of battle-hardened fighters whom we have armed and who are not only angry the Shia and the Kurds, but at us as well. Meanwhile, we ignore southern Iraq where Shia militia battle over oil and power and where competing Shia groups are so fractious that they can’t even carry out elections within their own sect!
The policies that make the surge militarily successful weaken us in our struggle with terrorism. Historically, when terrorist movements are left to run their course they tend to last around a dozen years. The good news about them is that, unlike insurgencies, which rarely lose, terrorism never seems to win. Terrorism is a short-term, dramatically violent irritant. It has never warranted having a war declared on it.
Unfortunately, in our struggle with al-Qaida, we are proceeding precisely as bin Laden would have wished. He must daily thank Allah for the ongoing U.S. policy against him, because, without our invasion and occupation, al-Qaida was in the process of deterioration. It is now reinvigorated.
We have made Israel and any other regional government not favored by al-Qaida more vulnerable by enabling the battlefield training of additional cadres, some of which will head south toward Palestine when Iraq is over. Others may look more closely at Saudi Arabia and Egypt or at the Muslim regions of the old USSR. Wherever they go, they represent a destabilizing factor.
Terrorist organizations cannot survive unless local populations support them. In Iraq, a recent focus of al-Qaida in Iraq has been to foment secular and ethnic chaos by purposefully killing Shia and pinning it on Sunnis or Kurds – or any permutation of that theme. The Iraqis are acutely aware of this. The minute we leave Iraq, the Iraqis will turn on this al-Qaida faction as the Sunnis have already begun to do in Anbar province.
Even more profoundly, however, we have changed the dynamic of the Arab/Persian rivalry for primacy in the Gulf in favor of Iran by removing the two most viable counterbalances to Iran, the Taliban and Iraq. Iran is now a real regional player to our detriment. We have taken the lid off the Sunni-Shia schism leading to secular strife in Iraq. But, the worst consequence of this invasion has been that we have seriously strained our old international friendships and alliances, particularly and most importantly, the Atlantic Alliance. Our invasion of Iraq is so strongly disapproved of by our former allies that they are unwilling to help us deal with our Middle East issues at a time when we simply cannot cope on our own.
So, we have no diplomatic flexibility in Iraq. We are essentially alone in this struggle and will remain so as long as we remain in Iraq. The only way to gain the flexibility that will enable us to at least set new goals and pursue them is to withdraw from Iraq. Until we do withdraw, our only influence on the region will be limited by our military power which already is seriously strained. If we listen to our own generals, our ability to wage ground warfare is already seriously threatened by the demands on our troops in Iraq.
Finally, anti-Americanism is on the rise everywhere. We are viewed as hypocritical by most of Islam and much of the world. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, waterboarding, renditions, the CIA gulag and the abrogation of civil rights at home are but a few of the irritants. Furthermore, the anti-American pot will surely be kept boiling by press coverage of the coming military tribunals at Guantanamo.
The neighborhood really does not want a regional conflict. As soon as we are out of Iraq, America should gain the potential to become a convening authority for a regional discussion on Iraq’s future. As long as we are in Iraq militarily, lacking any sort of diplomatic influence, we will not be allowed to play that role.
The Koran provides a complete blueprint for a life which is very different from a life led under democracy. Many if not most observant Muslims find no reason to seek changes in their way of life. In the interim, we might do well to replace “democratization” with “self-determination,” a term which has fallen into disuse under the Bush administration. Why indeed should people not have the right to choose their own form of government, whether “democratic” or not? Forcefully “spreading democracy” exacerbates Muslim concerns about a new crusade. If Muslims are ultimately to turn toward democracy, it will not be because it was forced on them, it will be because they see some real advantage in that form of government.
We will do far better to once again become a “shining city on the hill.” That will require that we give up all those activities instituted in response to Sept. 11, which have diminished us in the eyes of the world. The United States once more has to be a country worth emulating and that means restoring America to its pre-Sept. 11 world reputation.
Any new policy for dealing with Iraq, the Middle East, Islam or terrorism needs to start with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, a complete change in our goals and tactics in the Middle East, the rebuilding of broken bridges to our old allies and the renunciation of our policy of pre-emptive unilateralism. Only then will we be able to begin to identify strategies and achieve goals that are in our national interest in the region.
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.
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