[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]
One result of the ongoing presidential campaign is that the two issues of “success in Iraq” and “success of the surge” have become so conflated that many Americans have no idea that the two are totally separate matters.
John McCain has backed the surge from the onset. In fact, he was one of those who sought such a military strategy well in advance of its implementation. The surge, as a purely military operation, has gone a long way toward accomplishing the goal of bringing civil stability, or a lessening of violence, to Iraq.
The problem, which is exacerbated by disingenuous political campaigning, lies in confusing the success of the surge with ultimate political success.
Unfortunately, the real problem does not end, but rather begins with the success of the surge, and the outcome of the subsequent process of reconciliation is far from clear. If real political reconciliation were likely to come from our continued military presence in Iraq, then our best bet would be to persevere. However, the end result is unlikely to be favorably influenced by our continued presence there. In fact, as this is strictly an internal Iraqi problem, there is little we can do to help in any positive way. Our absence might be the best contribution we could make.
The surge was never sold by the military as an end in itself. Virtually all of our military leaders have said that there could not be a military solution to the problems in Iraq. The surge, in their minds, was designed to provide the civil stability and lessening of violence needed to permit the Iraqis to settle their differences and reach agreement on the future course of their country.
That goal has not been reached.
The reason this kind of agreement is difficult in Iraq is a function of the largely negative influence that 18th and 19th century Western colonialism had on that country and on the region as a whole. Many of the “countries” in the region are products of British or other colonial imperatives. The boundaries and ethnic/religious composition of these “countries” were configured to benefit the British Empire, certainly not the locals on whom they were imposed.
So in Iraq we have Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, Persians, Armenians, Shia, Sunnis, and Christians to name but a few.
That diversity, replete as it is with its ages-old rivalries and hatreds, is why the process is so difficult. To reach the kind of agreement needed for lasting political stability, each competing political, ethnic and religious group will have to voluntarily relinquish some of its individual interests and imperatives in favor of a greater national compromise.
The fact that the Shia are by far the largest group in Iraq and have long suffered at the hands of the previously ruling Sunnis is the kind of reality that makes turning Iraq into a real country such an ephemeral quest.
In the ongoing election process, John McCain has said clearly and repeatedly that he wants to leave timing to the “commanders on the ground.”
He has also said that success in Afghanistan is inextricably tied to success in Iraq.
Barack Obama wants to leave Iraq in 16 months. In addition, he wants immediately to begin planning for the transfer of troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, where he sees them as badly needed and where he believes our real interests lie in the struggle with terrorism.
The Iraqi government, reflecting the will of the Iraqi parliament and people, would like us out by 2010, a date compatible with Sen. Obama’s 16-month withdrawal plan.
The real issue here, which is not being examined in the press or public forums, is that we need a reasonably accurate estimate of what is likely to happen when our forces are no longer in Iraq in sufficient numbers to maintain civil stability and whether or not a prolongation of our presence will have a positive or negative effect on that outcome.
The fact is that there will be either a peaceful transition to a new nation state, or unrest, competition and possible civil strife. The immutable here is that our continued stay in Iraq is likely to have little positive effect on that transition — it is a home-grown issue. In fact, if we stay longer, the Iraqis are likely to tire even more of us and become more inclined to support any insurgencies that might arise against us.
Short of a repressive, hundred-year, American occupation, we can’t save the Iraqis from themselves.
Haviland Smith, a Williston resident, is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.
Rural Ruminations 