• Home
  • About

Rural Ruminations

OpEd pieces by a retired CIA station chief.

Feeds:
Posts
Comments
« Nation-building easier said than done
When Biden speaks, duck and cover »

Afghanistan makes Iraq look easy

August 8, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog.]

A former CIA station chief writes that Obama and McCain should think again if they believe nation-building in Afghanistan can be achieved without an enormous cost in blood and treasure. History suggests otherwise.

Both Barack Obama and John McCain appear to believe that the pacification and rebuilding of Afghanistan is a national imperative. But if they think Iraq has been complicated, just wait till they sink their teeth into Afghanistan.

If we have learned nothing else from Iraq, it is that pacifying and rebuilding a country with ethnic and confessional differences and problematic neighbors is anything but a cakewalk. And indeed, the similarities between Afghanistan and Iraq are striking. Also, as in Iraq, today’s problem in Afghanistan is not terrorism; it is a hostile entity, the Taliban, which we defeated in 2002 and which has since morphed into an insurgency against us and the government we installed in its place.  Terrorist organizations hardly ever win anything significant — though insurgencies almost always do.

The differences between the two countries, however, suggest the challenge in Afghanistan is even greater. Where Iraq is fairly flat, Afghanistan is mountainous — perfect for an insurgency and terrible for conventional warfare.  Afghanis display characteristics common to many mountain people: They are basically unconquerable and ungovernable.  They are Middle East versions of the Hatfields and the McCoys.  They are brave, bellicose, fiercely proud, loyal to their clan, tribe or family, wildly independent, and have a highly developed sense of honor.  They are normally armed to the teeth, ready to fight, and they are good at it, having spent millenia fighting each other and themselves.

Even if it becomes possible to defeat the Taliban insurgency, Afghanis are not ideal candidates for pacification or nation-building.  Foreigners have tried and failed many times. The British tried off and on from 1839 to 1919. Between 1979 and 1989, the Soviets committed well over 100,000 troops there.  They lost 15,000 soldiers and whatever favorable image they had in the world. And it cost them billions of dollars, which almost certainly played a role in the demise of the USSR in 1991.

As a people, Afghanis are not terribly interested in being ruled by anyone outside their own tribe or clan, let alone their nation.  The have tried that before.  If our goal in Afghanistan is to pacify the country, or bring them democracy and free enterprise, we should think again.

Pakistan, Pashtuns and Poppies

One of the starkest realities we face in Afghanistan is the fact that almost half the population is Pashtun – 13 million souls located in southern Afghanistan.  The same Pashtuns total 28 million in contiguous Northwest Pakistan – about one sixth of the overall Pakistani population.

The Taliban is overwhelmingly Pashtun.  Pakistani Pashtuns have long supported and supplied the Afghan Taliban.  In addition, the Taliban has always been supported by the Pakistani intelligence service and to this day, there remains much active support in Pakistan for the Taliban.

Any real attempt to crush the Taliban in Afghanistan will necessarily involve their supply lines and suppliers in nuclear Pakistan.  At this moment, the Pakistani government seems incapable of or disinclined to get involved with our Pashtun problem in Northwest Pakistan.  This creates a de facto safe haven for the Taliban in Pakistan.  To our peril, we may well find it impossible to solve the Afghan problem without getting more heavily involved in Northwest Pakistan. But if we alienate that country sufficiently, we could end up creating a brand new, nuclear-armed enemy.

Poppy production now accounts for half of Afghanistan’s annual national income of $8 billion. Eighty percent of that opium is grown in Pashtun territory and the Taliban now gets around 40% of its income from the opium trade.  Afghanistan’s poverty is a real issue here and, legal or not, opium is an important crop.  Eradication would bring increased poverty and hardship.  Switching poppy farmers to other crops won’t be easy.

And all of this in Afghanistan, a country which is traditionally and inherently corrupt.

Not Really a Military Problem

As in the case of Iraq, our problem in Afghanistan is only superficially a military problem.  Under the surface are crucial economic, religious and political issues.  If we do ramp up in Afghanistan, it is going to be wildly expensive because, in the end and even after military success, we are going to be back in the long, drawn-out, expensive business of pacification and nation building in a country that will not be easily or naturally united.

We had best be prepared for these realities, and given our total lack of preparedness for a similar situation in Iraq, it must be carefully thought through.  We are not dealing here with post-war Germany or Japan.  We are dealing with a Muslim country in which people think their Islamic-based system of governance is perfectly OK.  There may be discontent in Afghanistan, but it is not with Islam.

We have little going for us here and changing Afghanistan will be an incredibly expensive, dangerous and difficult task, if it can be accomplished at all.

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Related

Posted in Afghanistan |

  • Search all posts

  • Newest Posts

    • TRUMP AT WAR WITH AMERICA
    • WHERE IS THE WORLD HEADED?
    • Democratic socialism and the coming election
  • Posts by Category

    • Afghanistan (34)
    • CIA (23)
    • Democracy (7)
    • Egypt (6)
    • foreign policy (104)
    • Gulf (1)
    • Insurgency (3)
    • intelligence (22)
    • Iran (18)
    • Iraq (44)
    • ISIS (1)
    • Israel/Palestine (27)
    • Lebanon (2)
    • Libya (2)
    • Middle East (60)
    • Military Polilcy (8)
    • NATO (1)
    • Pakistan (2)
    • Revolution (2)
    • Russia (20)
    • Syria (11)
    • terrorism (53)
    • Uncategorized (25)
    • United States (88)
    • Yugoslavia (4)
  • Posts by Date

    • March 2020 (2)
    • February 2020 (1)
    • September 2019 (2)
    • August 2019 (5)
    • February 2018 (2)
    • January 2018 (1)
    • December 2017 (1)
    • October 2017 (1)
    • September 2017 (1)
    • June 2017 (1)
    • May 2017 (2)
    • April 2017 (1)
    • March 2017 (2)
    • February 2017 (3)
    • January 2017 (1)
    • November 2016 (1)
    • October 2016 (1)
    • June 2016 (4)
    • February 2016 (1)
    • December 2015 (1)
    • October 2015 (1)
    • September 2015 (1)
    • August 2015 (4)
    • May 2015 (1)
    • March 2015 (1)
    • February 2015 (1)
    • November 2014 (1)
    • August 2014 (1)
    • June 2014 (1)
    • May 2014 (1)
    • February 2014 (1)
    • December 2013 (1)
    • November 2013 (1)
    • August 2013 (3)
    • July 2013 (1)
    • June 2013 (1)
    • May 2013 (1)
    • March 2013 (4)
    • February 2013 (2)
    • January 2013 (2)
    • December 2012 (2)
    • November 2012 (1)
    • October 2012 (1)
    • September 2012 (2)
    • August 2012 (1)
    • July 2012 (1)
    • June 2012 (1)
    • May 2012 (1)
    • March 2012 (4)
    • February 2012 (1)
    • January 2012 (1)
    • December 2011 (1)
    • November 2011 (3)
    • October 2011 (3)
    • September 2011 (2)
    • August 2011 (2)
    • July 2011 (2)
    • June 2011 (3)
    • May 2011 (3)
    • April 2011 (4)
    • March 2011 (3)
    • February 2011 (2)
    • January 2011 (4)
    • December 2010 (3)
    • November 2010 (3)
    • October 2010 (2)
    • September 2010 (4)
    • August 2010 (3)
    • July 2010 (4)
    • June 2010 (4)
    • May 2010 (3)
    • April 2010 (2)
    • March 2010 (4)
    • February 2010 (3)
    • January 2010 (6)
    • December 2009 (4)
    • November 2009 (3)
    • October 2009 (3)
    • September 2009 (3)
    • August 2009 (1)
    • July 2009 (4)
    • June 2009 (4)
    • May 2009 (3)
    • April 2009 (3)
    • March 2009 (4)
    • February 2009 (4)
    • January 2009 (6)
    • December 2008 (4)
    • November 2008 (2)
    • October 2008 (3)
    • September 2008 (6)
    • August 2008 (5)
    • July 2008 (7)
    • June 2008 (2)
    • May 2008 (5)
    • April 2008 (2)
    • March 2008 (3)
    • January 2008 (1)
    • December 2007 (1)
    • November 2007 (3)
    • September 2007 (2)
    • August 2007 (2)
    • July 2007 (2)
    • June 2007 (2)
    • May 2007 (1)
    • April 2007 (1)
    • March 2007 (2)
    • February 2007 (1)
    • January 2007 (1)
    • December 2006 (1)
    • November 2006 (1)
    • September 2006 (1)
    • August 2006 (1)
    • July 2006 (2)
    • June 2006 (1)
    • May 2006 (3)
    • April 2006 (1)
    • February 2006 (1)
    • January 2006 (1)
    • November 2005 (1)
    • September 2005 (1)
    • August 2005 (1)
    • June 2005 (1)
    • April 2005 (1)
    • March 2005 (1)
    • January 2005 (2)
    • December 2004 (1)
    • November 2004 (1)
    • September 2004 (1)
    • August 2004 (1)
    • May 2004 (1)
    • April 2004 (2)
    • November 2003 (1)
    • October 2003 (1)
    • August 2003 (1)
    • June 2003 (1)
    • February 2003 (1)
    • January 2003 (2)
    • December 2002 (1)
    • January 2002 (1)
    • November 2001 (1)
    • September 2001 (1)
    • August 2000 (1)
    • January 2000 (1)
    • August 1999 (1)
    • May 1999 (1)
    • August 1998 (1)
    • April 1997 (1)
    • August 1996 (1)
    • July 1995 (1)
    • January 1995 (1)
    • September 1994 (1)
    • March 1994 (1)
    • October 1992 (1)
    • July 1992 (1)
    • February 1992 (1)
    • August 1991 (1)
    • February 1991 (1)
  • Videos

    • Haviland Smith: VPT Profile
    • The Impact of the U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
  • RSS

    • RSS - Posts
  • Blog Counter

    • 6,723 pages viewed

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

WPThemes.


Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
  • Follow Following
    • Rural Ruminations
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • Rural Ruminations
    • Customize
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Copy shortlink
    • Report this content
    • View post in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
%d bloggers like this: