[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]
The ongoing tiff between the United States and Russia over Georgia has far less to do with Georgia than it has to do with mounting Russian revanchism and Russia’s concerns about what is happening in its “near abroad,” the 14 former Soviet Republics, and in its former “satellites,” their seven former East European Socialist “allies.”
Compelled as they are by their history, the Russians will pay dearly for their compulsive incursion into Georgia and for their threats against Poland. How that works out remains to be seen, but at minimum, their Georgian adventure will precipitate a worldwide re-evaluation of Russia’s goals and tactics that will not be favorable to Russian interests.
All that aside, America has vital interests in a viable, non-hostile Russia and for that reason, we need to be very cautious and thoughtful in how we deal with them on these emotional issues.
Russia’s concerns are historical, going back to the early days of the Russian Empire. As with most empires, Russia has a long history of armed conflict with most of its “near abroad” and many others, including its former satellites. This reality has led, understandably, to a high level of Russian anxiety and paranoia. They have always viewed the outside world with grave suspicion.
During the Cold War, the Soviets complained constantly about the “capitalist encirclement” of the USSR, and they were right. We surrounded them with NATO and SEATO from Europe to East Asia. They in turn, had their “near abroad” and European satellites as buffers against Western encirclement.
That could and probably should have ended with the USSR’s demise, but by 2004, we had added 10 former Soviet properties, all seven former Soviet satellites and three former Republics, to NATO. Russia saw this as pure provocation. NATO was once again encircling Russia, and, as NATO looked more and more threatening to them, they returned to the more traditional and aggressive geopolitical tactics of both Soviet and Imperial Russia.
It should be noted here that Russia’s historical behavior has added to this unsettling mix. Small countries that for ages have existed precariously on the periphery of an aggressive Russia are understandably nervous about what appears to be the resurgence of Russian geopolitical ambitions.
In the post-Soviet world, Poland, Georgia and the Czech Republic, small, vulnerable countries on the fringe of Russia, as well as the seven others that have joined up with NATO, have sought big power protection. They would all like to maintain their democracies and their territorial integrity. Their long and bitter experiences have taught them that when it comes to Russian geopolitical imperatives, big power protection is mandatory. NATO led by America is that big power.
There is a great deal in the balance here. There is the fate of a democratic Georgia threatened by Russian regime change. There are the Georgian pipelines, the only petroleum pipelines from Central Asia to the West that are not controlled by Russia. There is the message that Russia is sending to its former territorial appendages in the “near abroad” like Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics, that they must not flirt with the West or NATO. Finally, there is the Missile Shield and NATO.
The real question here is what we see as the future role of NATO. The Russians see it as simply a continuation of the Cold War, with essentially unchanged goals. In that respect, at least as long as it remains primarily a military organization, NATO is and will remain a provocation to the Russians. It’s hard to see how a still militarized NATO, built for the Cold War, has any viable role today other than to intimidate Russia.
The same is true of the “Missile Shield” to be deployed initially in the Czech Republic and Poland. Despite concrete assurances to the contrary (remember Russian paranoia), the Russians see our explanation that it is designed to defend the United States against nuclear missiles (as yet non-existent) from nuclear armed rogue states (also as yet non-existent) as a fiction designed to cover its real target which they see as Russia. This has resulted in an intemperate Russian threat against Poland. With talk of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO, Russian paranoia has hit high C and prompted the Georgian invasion.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia today does not represent a strategic threat to the United States. We need to decide if there is anything positive to gain from continuing policies that do little other than provoke the Russians. Yet we continue to do just that with the Missile Shield and NATO.
Perhaps we are still punishing Russia for its role in the Cold War. Perhaps our concern is based on the resurgence of a powerful Russia, fueled by its oil wealth and pursuing what we think of as its old imperial goals. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that Russia seeks world domination as it did in Soviet times. It is more interested in protecting its own turf and “near abroad.”
As a result of our current Middle East adventures, America today has little diplomatic leverage in the world. We can shout and threaten all we want, but the Russians know we are toothless and that they can do pretty much what they like. With our military totally committed elsewhere, all we have are our nukes – not a terribly flexible asset.
Lacking any credibility or flexibility, a continuing American struggle with Russia is not in our own interest. For many reasons, not the least of which is safeguarding Russian nuclear warheads from the rogue states and terrorists we fear, we have long hoped to see Russia integrate into the West. Yet we continue to provoke them with these policies, making such integration far less likely.
Unless we seek further confrontation with, or humiliation of Russia, bringing Georgia into NATO would rank as sheer stupidity, to be matched only by continuing to aggressively pursue the questionable “Missile Shield” in Eastern Europe, or by failing to demilitarize NATO.
It’s one thing to be tough when you have muscle; it’s another thing when all you have is flab.
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who worked in East and West Europe and the Middle East, primarily against Soviet targets. He lives in Williston.
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