• Home
  • About

Rural Ruminations

OpEd pieces by a retired CIA station chief.

Feeds:
Posts
Comments
« Why is the U.S. being so provocative toward Russia?
Real Change Means Democrats in Charge »

Redefining success in Iraq

September 21, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

In this election season, much is made of the surge. What is not clear in this ongoing discussion, and what is rarely discussed in the context of the surge, is its original purpose. It is not whether the surge has succeeded militarily (it has, and wildly so), but whether its far more important non-military goals are likely to be achieved. That is, conservatively speaking, the $3 trillion question.

The surge was undertaken against prevailing public opinion, congressional approval, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group findings, the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Just about no one wanted it.

Grudging approval of the surge by those contrary elements was reached using the argument that the president needed a strategy that would bring decreased violence and with it the opportunity for political reconciliation. In 2007, after more than four chaotic years in Iraq, the president needed a policy that would provide the opportunity for “success” – defined as Iraqi political reconciliation.

Most Democrats, including Sen. Barack Obama, and some Republicans, including Sen. Chuck Hagel, opposed the surge. Most Republicans, including Sen. John McCain and one Democrat, Sen. Joe Lieberman, supported the surge.

There is little reason to argue about the military success of the surge, for it has been extraordinary and as such, a great credit to our armed forces. Violence is way down, and that is precisely what the president sought when he undertook the surge.

The problem here is that today’s American politicians, who for purely political reasons want or need to be associated with success, are touting the undeniable military success of the surge as its ultimate goal. That is the case with McCain and all those Republicans and Democrats who have supported the Iraq war over the years. Needing the political capital brought by success, they have redefined the word: They no longer speak of national political reconciliation in Iraq, only of military success.

However, there are other factors involved that have nothing whatsoever to do with the surge, but which have had a major calming effect in Iraq.

Apparently our people in Iraq have developed methods that have allowed them to assassinate ranking members of al-Qaida. They have done that to the point where al-Qaida has been substantially weakened.

Further, Muqtada al-Sadr has unilaterally suspended his Sadrist Shia militia attacks on American forces and on his Shia and Sunni rivals. This has had a major calming effect in the country.

The Kurds have simply withdrawn into their historic lands, in effect creating a de facto Kurdistan. They participate in the al-Maliki government, but their only real purpose is to consolidate their post-Saddam gains in furtherance of their own autonomy.

Last, but perhaps most important, in 2007, American forces in Diyala and Anbar provinces began a program called the Sunni Awakening which has enlisted Sunni militias, some 80,000 strong, into the fight against their former allies, al-Qaida. We have paid, armed and trained these militias, which had formerly fought side by side with al-Qaida against our forces. They have been most effective.

The result has been that a diminished al-Qaida fights us alone; the Sunnis are allied with us and not killing us or Shia; and the main Shia militias have withdrawn from the battlefield, at least for the moment. These elements alone have probably had at least as much to do with the drop in violence as the surge.

However, the purpose of creating this lull in violence was to establish an environment conducive to reconciliation between Iraq’s traditionally warring factions. That has not happened.

Under the best of circumstances, such reconciliation is extremely difficult and improbable. These people really hate each other and if past is prologue, will live peacefully only under smotheringly oppressive rule. Turn them loose, as we have, and all those centuries-old animosities come to the surface.

Despite the lull in violence, all the old issues remain. The al-Maliki government has so far failed to schedule critical national elections. In a curious way, the Sunni Awakening turnabout represents an additional threat to the peace. The al-Maliki government is not only Shia, but highly partisan. It is wildly suspicious of the other ethnic and religious groups, the Kurds and the Sunnis. Unless the al-Maliki government integrates those Sunni militias into the army and police, which it has persistently refused to do, they will represent the potential for increased, severe future Sunni on Shia violence.

Certainly if that happens, the Shia Sadrists will re-evaluate, further weakening the prospects for reconciliation. Thus, all of the elements which caused the instability before the surge are intact, or even strengthened and waiting to protect their own interests against the others’.

However successful, if the surge does not enable an Iraqi national reconciliation, it will not “succeed.” There is not much history that argues for that ultimate success.

Share this:

  • Twitter
  • Facebook

Like this:

Like Loading...

Related

Posted in Iraq |

  • Search all posts

  • Newest Posts

    • TRUMP AT WAR WITH AMERICA
    • WHERE IS THE WORLD HEADED?
    • Democratic socialism and the coming election
  • Posts by Category

    • Afghanistan (34)
    • CIA (23)
    • Democracy (7)
    • Egypt (6)
    • foreign policy (104)
    • Gulf (1)
    • Insurgency (3)
    • intelligence (22)
    • Iran (18)
    • Iraq (44)
    • ISIS (1)
    • Israel/Palestine (27)
    • Lebanon (2)
    • Libya (2)
    • Middle East (60)
    • Military Polilcy (8)
    • NATO (1)
    • Pakistan (2)
    • Revolution (2)
    • Russia (20)
    • Syria (11)
    • terrorism (53)
    • Uncategorized (25)
    • United States (88)
    • Yugoslavia (4)
  • Posts by Date

    • March 2020 (2)
    • February 2020 (1)
    • September 2019 (2)
    • August 2019 (5)
    • February 2018 (2)
    • January 2018 (1)
    • December 2017 (1)
    • October 2017 (1)
    • September 2017 (1)
    • June 2017 (1)
    • May 2017 (2)
    • April 2017 (1)
    • March 2017 (2)
    • February 2017 (3)
    • January 2017 (1)
    • November 2016 (1)
    • October 2016 (1)
    • June 2016 (4)
    • February 2016 (1)
    • December 2015 (1)
    • October 2015 (1)
    • September 2015 (1)
    • August 2015 (4)
    • May 2015 (1)
    • March 2015 (1)
    • February 2015 (1)
    • November 2014 (1)
    • August 2014 (1)
    • June 2014 (1)
    • May 2014 (1)
    • February 2014 (1)
    • December 2013 (1)
    • November 2013 (1)
    • August 2013 (3)
    • July 2013 (1)
    • June 2013 (1)
    • May 2013 (1)
    • March 2013 (4)
    • February 2013 (2)
    • January 2013 (2)
    • December 2012 (2)
    • November 2012 (1)
    • October 2012 (1)
    • September 2012 (2)
    • August 2012 (1)
    • July 2012 (1)
    • June 2012 (1)
    • May 2012 (1)
    • March 2012 (4)
    • February 2012 (1)
    • January 2012 (1)
    • December 2011 (1)
    • November 2011 (3)
    • October 2011 (3)
    • September 2011 (2)
    • August 2011 (2)
    • July 2011 (2)
    • June 2011 (3)
    • May 2011 (3)
    • April 2011 (4)
    • March 2011 (3)
    • February 2011 (2)
    • January 2011 (4)
    • December 2010 (3)
    • November 2010 (3)
    • October 2010 (2)
    • September 2010 (4)
    • August 2010 (3)
    • July 2010 (4)
    • June 2010 (4)
    • May 2010 (3)
    • April 2010 (2)
    • March 2010 (4)
    • February 2010 (3)
    • January 2010 (6)
    • December 2009 (4)
    • November 2009 (3)
    • October 2009 (3)
    • September 2009 (3)
    • August 2009 (1)
    • July 2009 (4)
    • June 2009 (4)
    • May 2009 (3)
    • April 2009 (3)
    • March 2009 (4)
    • February 2009 (4)
    • January 2009 (6)
    • December 2008 (4)
    • November 2008 (2)
    • October 2008 (3)
    • September 2008 (6)
    • August 2008 (5)
    • July 2008 (7)
    • June 2008 (2)
    • May 2008 (5)
    • April 2008 (2)
    • March 2008 (3)
    • January 2008 (1)
    • December 2007 (1)
    • November 2007 (3)
    • September 2007 (2)
    • August 2007 (2)
    • July 2007 (2)
    • June 2007 (2)
    • May 2007 (1)
    • April 2007 (1)
    • March 2007 (2)
    • February 2007 (1)
    • January 2007 (1)
    • December 2006 (1)
    • November 2006 (1)
    • September 2006 (1)
    • August 2006 (1)
    • July 2006 (2)
    • June 2006 (1)
    • May 2006 (3)
    • April 2006 (1)
    • February 2006 (1)
    • January 2006 (1)
    • November 2005 (1)
    • September 2005 (1)
    • August 2005 (1)
    • June 2005 (1)
    • April 2005 (1)
    • March 2005 (1)
    • January 2005 (2)
    • December 2004 (1)
    • November 2004 (1)
    • September 2004 (1)
    • August 2004 (1)
    • May 2004 (1)
    • April 2004 (2)
    • November 2003 (1)
    • October 2003 (1)
    • August 2003 (1)
    • June 2003 (1)
    • February 2003 (1)
    • January 2003 (2)
    • December 2002 (1)
    • January 2002 (1)
    • November 2001 (1)
    • September 2001 (1)
    • August 2000 (1)
    • January 2000 (1)
    • August 1999 (1)
    • May 1999 (1)
    • August 1998 (1)
    • April 1997 (1)
    • August 1996 (1)
    • July 1995 (1)
    • January 1995 (1)
    • September 1994 (1)
    • March 1994 (1)
    • October 1992 (1)
    • July 1992 (1)
    • February 1992 (1)
    • August 1991 (1)
    • February 1991 (1)
  • Videos

    • Haviland Smith: VPT Profile
    • The Impact of the U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
  • RSS

    • RSS - Posts
  • Blog Counter

    • 6,188 pages viewed

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

WPThemes.


Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
  • Follow Following
    • Rural Ruminations
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • Rural Ruminations
    • Customize
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Copy shortlink
    • Report this content
    • View post in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
%d bloggers like this: