[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]
During the seven years since the attacks of 9/11, America has gone through a difficult learning process in dealing with international terrorism. That experience has done little to help us address the problem in any positive, meaningful way. Quite the contrary, our policies over those years have done serious damage to American national interests.
The only immutable in dealing with terrorism is to maximize your friends and minimize your enemies. America’s departure from a “rational,” pre-2000, foreign policy that valued international friendships, to a neoconservative policy of pre-emptive unilateralism that rejects diplomacy, has resulted in the loss of friendships and prestige, both of which are critical in addressing international terrorism.
Under an Obama administration, a new approach to terrorism on the domestic front might well start with the abolition of all of those mechanisms that have kept the American public on edge since 9/11. We should abolish color-coded terrorism warnings and the constant hyping of the terrorist “threat” which, in the aggregate, serve primarily as a hedge against the still unlikely prospect of a repeat 9/11.
From there, we should revisit the Patriot Act and do away with all of those elements which have been sold to us as “increasing our security,” but which in reality diminish or abrogate our civil rights.
Benjamin Franklin correctly said, “They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” In reality, “safe” countries are not free and “free” countries are not safe. It is up to us to decide whether or not we are better off in the aggregate for the loss of our liberties, remembering that once surrendered, they are difficult to reacquire. Has a sense of safety, however illusory, been worth that loss?
Vesting our domestic counterterrorism responsibility in the FBI is a real problem. The entire culture of the FBI is directed toward law enforcement. They are extremely competent in that task because it is consistent with their charter. The problem with counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism operations, two disciplines that have major similarities, is that you can’t run such operations successfully with a statutory law enforcement mentality.
Counterterrorism in America is looked at as a law enforcement problem and so it is. But, particularly in the early stages of any terrorist operation, it is also very much an intelligence problem and thus totally at odds with the precepts of law enforcement. We should have something more like MI5, the British internal intelligence organization.
In the murky world of intelligence, the organizations that collect intelligence should be permitted to send only thoroughly evaluated, finished intelligence to their White House customers. Such customers should never be given access to raw intelligence, as they are today, as it can be extremely confusing, contradictory and even deceptive.
Our overseas activities and policies are just as important as our domestic counter-terrorism activities and much can and must be done to improve those efforts.
An end to a foreign policy of “preemptive unilateralism” and a return to our old “rational” policies will have the immediate effect of improving our diplomatic relations with most of the rest of the world, particularly those friends who have been so alienated by post-9/11 U.S. policies. That, in turn, will bring the potential for improvements in our liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security services, without whose willing cooperation the struggle with terrorism cannot be won.
Terrorism, whether directed against a local population, a local government or a foreign occupier, is by its nature a movement that lacks local support. Anything we can do to drive a wedge between terrorists and their neighbors, as we have between Sunnis and al-Qaida in the “Awakening” program in Iraq’s Anbar Province, will serve us well and can most effectively be accomplished with assistance from foreign governments and their intelligence and security services.
Our public face to the world is a direct reflection of what we do and say. “Bring ’em on” makes us look cocky and arrogant. The braggadocio with which we alternately dehumanize and belittle the Muslims may make some of us feel better, but is directly counterproductive to our goals for dealing with terrorism.
Equating all Muslims with terrorists is not only inaccurate, it is demeaning and infuriating for mainstream, moderate Muslims who hold the key to our success in combating fundamentalist terrorism. Such responses and the concomitant publicity and press coverage are the mother’s milk of terrorist organizations. They thrive on such publicity and wither without it.
Military action against terrorism is unlikely to succeed. Terrorism is mostly a law enforcement and intelligence problem. A recent Rand Corporation study examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. During that period, 398 of those groups have ceased to exist. Forty-three percent (171) of those that ended were absorbed into the political systems of the countries in which they operated, while 40 percent (159) were defeated by police activities. It is most significant to note that only 7 percent (28) of those groups were defeated by military action.
There is a rising dialog in and out of government on the perils of increasing U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, particularly given the Taliban/al-Qaida safehaven in Pakistan. The new administration should consider these arguments, despite the president-elect’s commitments during the election campaign.
Finally, we must more clearly define, rather than conflate, terrorism and insurgency. In order to develop successful strategies against insurgency and terrorism, we will have to treat the two totally differently. What will succeed with terrorism is unlikely to succeed with insurgency.
If we continue to fail to discriminate between terror and insurgency, as we have generally failed to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will create more problems than we solve, aiding terrorist recruitments and support and alienating the moderates whose opposition to terrorism we need so badly.
It matters a great deal what you call these movements. The label you give them will determine the nature and extent of local and international support you gain for your program and will, if it is to be successful, dictate the strategy and tactics you use against your enemy.
Our first seven years of dealing with terrorism can only be viewed positively if we recognize our errors and move on to totally new policies.
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counter-terrorism Staff.
