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« What’s the plan in Afghanistan?
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In distant land, threads remain tangled

February 22, 2009 by Haviland Smith

[Originally posted in the Barre Times-Argus and the Rutland Herald.]

Starting before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Americans were bombarded with chapter after chapter of the Bush Administration’s definition of and plans for “success” in Iraq. They constantly told us of the near proximity of “success” if only we would “stay the course.”

The problem was that the “success” of our invasion was based on an illusory target. It started out as a campaign to find and remove WMD, then morphed to the “most important battle in the War on Terror” and ended up in a plan to “bring democracy to Iraq.” The salient issue here is that no Bush administration insider has told us why America really invaded.

Without benefit of such inside knowledge, it seems likely that the Neoconservatives on the Bush team pushed the invasion on the Administration. Those are the same Neoconservatives who prefer to function in secret, eschew diplomacy and all foreign alliances, see military force as the first weapon to be used in the conduct of foreign relations and, of critical importance, see the Middle East as the most important theater for the exercise of these policies.

Now we have the new Obama Administration which has committed itself to transparency and is currently involved in a re-examination of Afghan policy. In direct contrast to the past six years, this new openness should enable us to learn precisely what our definition of success is in Afghanistan, what our goals are and how we plan to pursue them.

Although the Obama Administration is clearly still working out its own Afghan policy, it has not yet shared any details with us. Nonetheless, realities on the ground dictate that any reexamination of current policy consider the same basic realities that have long existed in Afghanistan. Counter-narcotics, insurgency, terrorism, the rule of law, police and army training, tribalism, will all have to be considered in forming a new policy. The results should illuminate our goals and provide a definition of success in Afghanistan

To put these issues in context, it is important to understand some Afghan realities. First, Afghanistan is a very, very large country. If it were ever to be pacified, which has never happened, it would take hundreds of thousands of troops. No central government, even in Afghanistan’s best and most peaceful times, has ever pacified much more than a few of the largest cities and historically, Afghanis have been unwilling to accept even central indigenous governance.

Poppies, Pashtuns and Pakistan are another reality we must face. The Pashtun tribes and clans are both Afghan and Pakistani. They are also the Taliban who rely on poppies (Heroin) for their financing. Worse yet, Afghan farmers find poppies the most reliable and profitable available crop.

Given our modest level of success in the “War on Narcotics” here in the Western Hemisphere, it is hard to believe that we will suddenly figure out precisely what to do in Afghanistan, a culture infinitely more alien to us than that of Mexico.

Because of the pervasiveness of the Taliban, any solution will have to involve Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. The Pashtuns who are the base of Taliban power, occupy both sides of the border. By definition and in the face of the ongoing decline of Al Qaida, we will be involved in counter-insurgency rather than counter-terrorism — a far more complicated, long-lasting and difficult task.

There are two issues that complicate any hopes for any movement toward a more secular or democratic system – the rule of law and corruption. There is a long tradition of pervasive corruption in Afghanistan.

Islam already provides a legal system in the Shariya, or Muslim system of law based on the Koran, the Hadith and centuries of interpretations and precedents. Afghanis won’t look favorably on new western ideas of what its legal system ought to be.

If the recent emergence of Taliban influence in the Swat Valley in Pakistan is a harbinger of things to come, Shariya is the law of the future in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, Afghanistan is tribal in a way that makes Iraq look homogeneous. Sadly for us, tribal societies, where tribal loyalties far outweigh national loyalties, do not form cohesive or successful national armies or police forces.

Any American plan for success in Afghanistan that includes the commitment of significant numbers of additional troops will put more stress on our current military and domestic financial problems. Their mere presence in Afghanistan will encourage increased Afghan opposition to our plans and programs.

We need a new definition of “success”, one more in keeping with realties on the ground both in Afghanistan and in the United States where a disastrous economy with a murky future and a war-weary population give scant hope of being willing to support an inordinately expensive and long-lasting military campaign.

We will not make over Afghanistan into an image pleasing to us. The road to “success” in Afghanistan will be tribal and non-secular and will almost certainly involve the Taliban in some as yet unforeseen, but increasingly more significant way.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. He lives in Williston.

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