[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]
The Soviet Union joined the “nuclear club” in 1949. From that point until the demise of the Soviet Union some 40 years later, America and the Soviets, at the height of their international rivalry, managed to avoid nuclear annihilation.
During the Cold War, the U.S. policy used to counter Soviet geographic expansionism was called containment. It was our policy to “contain” the Soviet Union within the boundaries of what later became the Warsaw Pact nations.
Part of that containment policy was called MAD. They had the bomb, we had the bomb. Each side knew that if it used its bomb, it would be annihilated in retribution — mutual assured destruction. As power-hungry, brutal and paranoid as the Soviet leadership was, they were not suicidal, and MAD probably saved the planet from nuclear devastation.
What, then, makes Iran such a different problem? We coped successfully with a far more dangerous situation with the Soviet Union for four decades. It really did have the military wherewithal to be an existential threat.
An effort has been made to portray Iran as an existential threat to the United States. How can that be when it has no bomb today and, even if it did, has no way to deliver it to the United States? One day we are told that Iran has given up its nuclear weapons development program. Then, days later, we are told that it is going full-tilt. What is the truth and why does it matter?
In the interest of a real examination of the subject, let’s stipulate that Iran is developing the bomb. In fact, in that dangerous part of the world, given the historical animosities between Iranians and Arabs and Shia and Sunnis, and under constant threat of military action from the United States and Israel, it is not hard to understand why the Iranians would want it. With the bomb already in the hands of neighbors Pakistan, India and China, they have even more motivation.
So, they are going ahead with the bomb. Why are they doing that? They are doing that because having a bomb is the ultimate lever of power, and staying in power is what today’s Iran is all about. Whether it is the ayatollahs, the Revolutionary Guard or the current political leadership, their obsessive aim is to maintain their grip on power. Given the hostile realities of their neighborhood, they correctly see the bomb as a critical component in that quest.
At 77 percent, Iranians are highly literate. They have a long and distinguished history. They know who they are, and they believe they should have more influence in their neighborhood than has been granted them since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. But remember, they are not suicidal.
Iran was a player in the Cold War and understands how the West dealt with the Soviet threat. The Iranians understand MAD. They know that if they were to acquire the bomb, any use they might make of it — say, against Israel or some other American friend in the region — would result in the obliteration of their country.
In short, like all other members of the nuclear club, they know that the bomb is useful only as a threat. It is essentially useless as a weapon because its use leads inevitably to annihilation.
That is the knowledge that makes MAD feasible: Iran is a nation run by intelligent people who do not want to lose power, but who also do not want to be destroyed. Having the bomb is one thing, using it is another.
This is precisely the kind of situation that is made to order for a successful containment policy in which the salient feature is mutual assured destruction. The difference is that in the case of Iran, there is no “mutual.” We have all the hardware on our side and even if Iran chose to do so, which is highly unlikely, it would take it endless decades to get to the point where it could even effectively challenge, let alone destroy, us.
Finally, Iran knows full well that any unprovoked attack against Israel would amount to an attack against us, with all its horrendous consequences for Iran.
There simply is no reason for us to attack Iran and endless reasons, like our vulnerable presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, for us not to.
Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.
