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Little check on military influence

December 19, 2010 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Over the 40 years of its existence, there has been endless examination of, and commentary on, the efficacy of and prospects for our all-volunteer military force.

At the onset of the discussions in the early 1970s, it was said that the all-volunteer force could not be sufficiently effective and efficient, as it would inevitably draw on the most economically disadvantaged and poorly educated members of our society. There were issues of pay and overall costs, as well as the contention that our fighting capability would suffer.

There is very little on the record today that supports any of the early concerns about the all-volunteer force. Today’s soldiers are equally as trainable as their draft-era predecessors. In addition, they are better disciplined and present far fewer morale problems.

Although the cost of this fighting force has continuously risen, the equipment provided to it has improved at a remarkable rate, and its volunteer soldiers have proven capable of evolving into a highly technical force.

By all counts and analyses, they are a formidable fighting force, allegedly the best this country has ever produced, probably the best in the history of the world.

So, if there is a problem, what exactly is it?

The change to the all-volunteer force has diminished the ability of the American people to have much of any influence on the formation of military policy in this country, particularly in the short run. Some will say that this is a very good thing and that warfare policy should be left to the military, the White House and the Congress.

Others, particularly those who remember the Vietnam War and who are carefully observing our attempts at disengagement in Iraq and Afghanistan will say that the all-volunteer force diminishes the only direct, day-to-day potential for influence that citizens have on our war-fighting policies.

In Vietnam, major input toward ending our involvement came from fact that virtually every American voter had relatives, friends and neighbors in Vietnam. It was personal for all of us and when it looked as if President Johnson was never going to get us out of the endless abyss that was Vietnam, the protests began, the people were heard and we finally departed.

More recently, in Iraq and in our second invasion of Afghanistan, we have seen two different administrations do pretty much what they wanted to do with the all-volunteer force because most Americans didn’t have a dog in the fight. Unlike Vietnam, too many of us don’t know anyone who is there, so there is no cohesive opposition to the endless prolongation of those wars.

In addition and despite the fact that there was a great deal of well-founded skepticism about those invasions here at the time, the administrations in power were able to steamroller the Congress because, among other things, there was no counterpressure from the voters.

We now have a highly proficient and successful all-volunteer force with educated, intelligent military leadership. The attitude of those leaders is, as it should be, “we can do the job if you give us the time and resources to succeed.” The only problem with that is that those leaders are loathe to take into consideration the historical realities that exist in the countries where they seek to do battle.

With the exception of Gen. Shinseki, who warned against the Iraq invasion plan and lost his job as a result, our military leadership has not acknowledged either historical Iraq realities or the realities of internal U.S. politics and economics. In Afghanistan, Gen. Petraeus, in the face of harsh economic realities and a growing antiwar sentiment at home, has insisted that with time and resources, he can win. “Only” a decade or so more! And we have never been told what “win” really means.

In short, in the face of difficult realities, the military seems programmed to insist that they can win, whether that claim is feasible or not. And that’s what we pay them to do. However, given that fact, it is really important that the military run only our military operations, not our policies. Policy must be in the hands of our civilian leadership and for that to work properly, we must keep our electorate involved, aware and empowered. The all-volunteer force does not facilitate that process, but rather shortcuts it by not providing enough engaged constituents in the general civilian population to sufficiently effect policy. As politically difficult as it might seem to do, we need to discuss a return to some form of universal service.

If, because of our exclusive reliance on our all-volunteer force, there is only military-based input on policy, without balance from our American civilian population, we could be mired in wars forever.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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