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[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus]


A nation-state is by definition a political, geopolitical, cultural and/or ethnic entity which derives its internal legitimacy through national consensus.

Since today’s Iraq was first established after the First World War by western imperial interests and modeled on the concept of a nation-state, relative stability has been maintained there through repressive governance.

That has been necessary because there has never been enough common interest among the diverse religious, sectarian and ethnic groups in the geographic area called “Iraq” to find government by consensus.  The concept of nation-state has existed only  geographically, never politically, culturally or ethnically.

As a “country” characterized by centuries-old, deep, sectarian and ethnic divisions, Iraq does not have the kind of citizenry that is suited by belief, culture, experience or history to make consensus government prosper. One hundred years of repressive internal indigenous governance, plus almost 400 years of previous Ottoman rule, have not created an electorate that is prepared for anything remotely resembling self-governance, let alone democracy.

Iraq, as now configured, is a poor bet for successful self-determination.  Its people hold little in common.

According to the existing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between America and Iraq, all remaining US forces will have to exit Iraq by December 31, 2011.

Room for negotiation on our final departure date is contained within the SOFA, but it seems unlikely that there will be political will in Iraq to make any changes.

The powerful Shia leader, Moqtada al-Sadr is currently studying religion in Iran.  He continues to command the Mahdi Army which fought very effectively against our troops, particularly in 2004. Al-Sadr has just replied to Secdef Gates’ recent suggestion that the SOFA might be extended.

He first organized a massive march by tens of thousands of his followers in Baghdad.  He then indicated very clearly that any SOFA extension is unacceptable, saying that if it were changed, “The first thing we will do is escalate the military resistance activity and reactivate the Mahdi Army …… Second is to escalate the peaceful and public resistance through sit-ins”.

This statement has already had a major impact on the sitting Maliki coalition government.  The Sadrists are part of that Maliki coalition.  Their only apparently inflexible condition, one that has brought them in and out and back into that coalition, has been strict adherance to the SOFA. If U.S. troops are not totally out of Iraq by December 31, 2011, not only will he gin up the old Mahdi army with all its fractious implications, he will also withdraw support from the Maliki Government and thus precipitate its fall.

This will leave Iraq without a government and at the mercy of the Mahdi army which would probably turn out to be the dominant military organization in Iraq and which is not particularly friendly to the concept of Iraqi democracy or even statehood, except on its own terms.  There is so little appetite in Iraq for this scenario that change in the SOFA and the continued presence of US troops in Iraq is short of zero.

Implosion is certainly a nightmare scenario for Iraq and only slightly less so for the US.  Without sufficient ability to keep law and order, as Saddam and the US have done over the past 30+ years, present day Iraq is more than likely to fracture into its component parts – Sunni, Shia, Kurd. That process will attract all kinds of attention from the region.  Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and particularly Iran all have major stakes in any Iraqi outcome.

The only real issue is whether or not the neighbors are prepared to initiate and support hostilities against their rivals.  This seems unlikely, but no one really knows.

What is clear is that, without some sort of effective power center, which has historically been repressive, Iraq will be unlikely to be able to maintain internal stability and is likely to fracture into its component parts.

More importantly, given the sub rosa reality of a deeply divided Iraq, that is precisely what is likely to happen whenever we leave, whether in nine months, nine years or nine decades!  With or without Al-Sadr in the government, Iraq will face the future with inadequate internal control.

At the end of this year we will leave because we have no leverage to change the situation.  Rather than fruitlessly pursuing SOFA changes, we should spend the rest of the year working to make our departure as minimally threatening to regional stability as possible.


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[Originally published in American Diplomacy]


What we are seeing today in the Arab World is at least partly the result of underlying ambivalence in US foreign policy since World War II. During that period we have vacillated between a “realist” foreign policy that purports to reflect our national interests and an “idealist” policy that purports to reflect our higher values. Changes in administrations, and thus policy, have resulted in a practical, observable ambivalence.

The success of any country’s foreign policy lies at least partly in its consistency and in the ability of other nations to “read” that policy on a long-term basis. In that regard, an ambivalent policy is absolutely the hardest to read and deal with.

During the Cold War, there was little misunderstanding between America and the Soviet Union. Both sides understood the other’s policies. The Soviets understood that we were committed to containment and that Mutually Assured Destruction was an absolute. We both believed that if we were to get too aggressive, those policies would go into effect, resulting in a nuclear holocaust.

It’s a pretty straightforward issue for a country to identify its national interests both at home and abroad. Those reflect the country’s economic, cultural, political and social goals. In short, they represent the reason for the existence of the state.

Foreign policy in any given country at any time is a reflection of either the national interests of that country, or the values of its peoples. It is where the two are combined or conflated that troubles begin. In a purely logical way how can you have a consistent foreign policy that is based on national interests and on higher values when changing from a liberal to a conservative administration? The two are far too often in conflict!

There are essentially two distinct approaches to foreign policy. First, a “realist” foreign policy places national interests and security above ideology, ethics and morality. The second or “idealist” school posits that foreign policy must reflect the ethical, moral and philosophical values of the country.

Under Woodrow Wilson, “Idealist” foreign policy did not accomplish what it was designed to do which was to eliminate wars in Europe after WWI. As a result, there have been modifications, which have approached the problem by creating international mechanisms like NATO, the UN, and GATT. That seems to be working a bit better as we have not had a third world war in Europe.

Since the Second World War, the United States has bragged increasingly about American “exceptionalism” – the notion that our system is superior to any other in the world. The backbone of that claim lies in our liberal democracy where “liberal” is defined, inter alia, as “favorable to or in accord with concepts of maximum individual freedom possible, especially as guaranteed by law and secured by governmental protection of civil liberties.” Exceptionalism has been the basis of our “idealist” foreign policies. We have had a foreign policy that sporadically has been based on our own principles, but also on our national interests. Unfortunately, foreign policy is at its worst when it vacillates between “realist” and “idealist.”

One of the biggest complaints that Arabs have about US policy is the fact that we have traditionally supported, or at best turned a blind eye to some of the most brutal dictatorships in the world. Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Iran, the list goes on and on. The history of the post-WWII Arab world is littered with dictators or autocrats. Did we support them because we liked the stability they provided? Or was it their oil, or their support for us in the Cold War, or their grudging tolerance of our Palestine policy? Never mind that it was at the cost of freedom for their peoples.

The Arab League

So there we were, supporting and selling the ideals of liberal democracy while at the same time doing everything undemocratic that we possibly could. We were in the throes of the most “realist” period of foreign policy imaginable. We did what was in our national interest, but not what we said we were all about morally, ethically and philosophically. And we did that for an Arab world that did not fail to see just how hypocritical we really were.

Then, the “Arab Spring” hit Tunisia. Faced with mounting evidence of Arab discontent, we have turned 180 degrees to a new “idealist” foreign policy in which we have sought to support all of those peoples in Islam on whom we had turned our back during our “realist” period. We also turned on all those undemocratic leaders we had supported for 75 years!

Are we offended that so many states in the Arab World are upset with us; or that they are apparently going their own way without our counsel; or that we have almost zero credibility and less than zero influence in the region?

We are paying the price for the vagaries of foreign policy inconsistency. Over the decades, we have tried to sell Arabs a bill of goods. Claiming an “idealist” foreign policy, we have said that we represent an exceptional, liberal democracy that should be the envy of the world and a model for its further development. At the same time, we employed a “realist” foreign policy that, in our ongoing reaction to emerging Arab yearnings for self-determination, is being show to have supported every evil thing in Arab life that we have claimed to oppose.

We have been playing both ends shamelessly against the middle and we have now been caught. There are good and bad things about both the “idealist” and “realist” schools of foreign policy. If we were as powerful and macho as we like to think we are, the “realist” policy might be an option. Given today’s world, it is not and for a power on the wane, “idealist” has its advantages. The true “shining city on the hill” requires no aggressiveness, no hypocrisy, only that we look and behave like a liberal democracy!

Obama’s “idealist” foreign policy in the Arab World now stands in direct contradistinction to the “realist” policies of George W. Bush and we are accused of hypocrisy. It would appear that our Obama foreign policy has completely replaced that of Bush. The question of which of those policies has the greater chance of success is not the pragmatic issue today. That issue is pretty straightforward: What will be the practical effect of this changeover from “pragmatic” to “idealist”?

Much of the Arab World is what it is today because of its exposure to western Imperialism during the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. During those times, western imperial powers created “states” to suit their own needs. Consciously or unconsciously, they bunched inherently hostile tribal, ethnic and religious groups into single states. That resulted in the creation of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, to mention only those now actively bedeviling us, states that contained within them enough hostility to remain perpetually in a precarious state of instability and thus, perhaps more easily governed. In some of those states, leadership was taken over by minority groups that could only govern repressively.

Incidentally, those are precisely the kinds of states to which Al Qaida is attracted.

So, the Arab World is composed of many “states” that up until now have been governable only through repression. That is the region into which we have so naively intruded. Apparently, we have either been disinterested in the realities of the region, or contemptuous of them. With American political leadership that believed so strongly in our exceptionalism, we thought we could be successful despite those realities!

Of course, the verdict is not yet known. Perhaps Arab self-determination will lead to some sort of governance that will be acceptable to such diverse and hostile local groupings. Or Perhaps ancient animosities will prevail.

What we can safely say right now is that it is the United States that has let this genie out of the bottle. With that genie has gone the old stability that was maintained, to our net advantage, without the consent of the governed. And stability is a primary requirement for progress.

In a country governed by idealism, that was almost certainly the right thing to have done. However, the world under discussion here is neither idealistic nor democratic. If history offers wisdom, it is difficult to see how things will improve, either for us, or for the peoples of the Arab world.

If one eliminates repressive rule, as we are now so fervently advocating, the only way to stability lies in consensus and self-determination, neither of which seems like a logical winner in the religiously, ethnically and tribally divided and hostile Arab world.

Finally, what does our new “idealist” foreign policy portend for the future? Will we broaden our humanitarian mission to other countries where the citizens are threatened by their governments? There certainly are a lot of them around the world. How does China fit into that? North Korea? Syria? And what about all similar countries in Africa?

Just what will our criteria for involvement be? Precisely what will cause us to intervene? Will we say it has to be something important, like oil or the end of a hateful dictatorship we really don’t like? Or will we stay flexible and only intervene when it suits us politically?

Talk about slippery slopes!

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. A graduate of Dartmouth, he served in the Army Security Agency, undertook Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

 

Website:

https://rural-ruminations.com/

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Originally published in the Rutland Herand and Barre Times-Argus

Many American independents voted for Barack Obama in 2008 because they thought he was the smartest Democrat available. They put him in office. Given what we were facing in the aftermath of the incredibly profligate and counterproductive Bush presidency, smarts were what were needed.

Many voters figured he was smart enough to successfully lead the Democrats against what was bound to be a single-minded, ruthless Republican onslaught intent on retaking power in Washington.

Many in the political center hoped in 2008 that Obama understood that he was taking over the helm of a Democratic Party on the cusp of a particularly virulent philosophical and political war with the Republicans. They hoped he would provide the kind of leadership required to protect moderates from the core beliefs and philosophies of the American social, economic and political extremes.

Unfortunately, he has done none of this. He has sailed blithely into his presidency as if it were simply another Ivy League old-boy’s session, persuaded that well-intentioned people would surround him in Washington and that reason would prevail.

Well, guess what! Washington is not populated by reasonable people. It is run by power-hungry career politicians who don’t fret about bending the rules and who sleep well when they break them.

This is not a loving family picnic. In fact, it is a no-holds-barred, bare-knuckle fight to the political end. For today’s Republicans, that means consigning the Democrats to the political trash bin for as long as humanly possible, preferably forever.

It’s wonderful and touching to hear Democrats tell us about taking care of the disadvantaged, the elderly and the sick. But that’s not a viable strategy for 2012. That’s a plan that sold in the past when times were far different and we had the luxury of being willing to stick to our core principles and beliefs.

Now, given our economic and fiscal realities, it’s all about jobs and money and if you look closely, you will see that while the Republicans are offering new and radical ideas for change, the Democrats, under Obama’s leadership, are offering today’s status quo. Unfortunately for them, the preservation of our entitlement programs, as written, is not going to be a winner in 2012.

It is inconceivable that the leader of the Democratic Party would simply continue to preach compromise when the Republicans are prepared to do and say anything, however outrageous or unprincipled or half true, that will weaken his chances for re-election and make his party even more irrelevant.

So, in the interim, and lacking any brilliant, innovative or hopeful new proposals or initiatives from the supine congressional Democrats, what can Obama do? So far, under his leadership, all the Democrats are doing is trying to maintain as much of the status quo as possible. Without attendant prosperity and economic well-being, that is not the basis for a viable election campaign.

Before the 2012 elections, the president needs to convince his supporters that he is not a dilettante sitting on the sidelines, waiting for his political enemies to “compromise.” He needs to come up with his own concrete initiatives that will address the country’s existential issues, rather than waiting to react negatively to provocative Republican proposals.

He and his party might start with concrete proposals for the modification of Social Security and our other increasingly economically non-viable entitlement programs, to make them capable of surviving this century in ways consistent with his party’s principles.

Could Democrats propose an entirely new, infinitely more equitable approach to taxation?

Our military establishment, designed to fight the great land wars of the 20th century, is poorly designed to fight the kinds of struggles that now face us. If we had the right model, which Democrats could design, it would not only be far more effective, but would cost us billions, perhaps trillions less than our present military establishment. In light of our national interests and financial situation, can we afford not to change?

In that context, could we consider wholly new proposed policies for terrorism and for the Middle East to replace those that have failed us for years? By any rational measure, we are not heading for successful conclusions to our ongoing adventures in that region.

The Democrats look bereft of helpful ideas. They propose nothing new, preferring to cling to past programs that, even they will acknowledge, need to be modified to survive. They are being beaten to the draw every day by a hungry, purpose-driven, unprincipled Republican Party that has far more on its agenda than a re-do of Social Security.

That’s the kind of situation that can best be reversed by presidential leadership and we haven’t seen much of that coming from this White House.

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Originally published in the Herald of Randoph

The popular uprisings and protests in the Middle East that began in December 2010 and America’s reactions to them have left many wondering precisely what our policy is in that region and what motivates it.

Of course, years of established policy have left to the Obama administration only bad options today.  There really is nothing they can do that is both practical in the sense that it forwards our national interests and is, at the same time, consistent with what we claim to be our basic national principles.

Over the years, our policy has been driven neither by pure pragmatism, nor by pure ideology.  It has been an admixture of the two and that dichotomy has not been to our advantage.  In fact, we are viewed in the region as hypocritical, seen, for example, in our overthrow of the democratically elected Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953.

What were the factors that drove our Middle East policies after the Second World War?  First, we were either dismally or willfully ignorant of realities in Islam.  We seldom let facts on the ground get in the way of or influence our chosen policies.

During Cold war, we felt it necessary to keep as many nations as possible on our side and aligned against the Soviet Union.  Thus, even in the aftermath of years of Imperialism in the region, we found it pragmatically necessary to make whatever accommodations were necessary to maintain the support of the autocratic, repressive and corrupt Middle East regimes that had replaced the imperialists.  Democracy, what’s that?

The creation of a democratic, Zionist Israel and our decision to support literally whatever they felt they needed to do in support of their national goals, left us, ultimately, in the same ambivalent boat of pragmatism vs. idealism.  In the face of UN vetoes, and international rulings on, for example, the illegality of the ongoing west Bank settlement program, America edges ever further into the arena of hypocrisy.

Additionally, we have stationed our foreign American troops on Islam’s holiest ground and fought wars that have killed Muslim civilians – very much taboo under the Koran.  With all of our strident talk about bringing Democracy to Islam whether they want it, need it or not, we have turned into the twenty-first Century Crusaders.  That really means something in Islam.  Even though the first Crusades were in the 11-12th Centuries, no one in Islam forgets them!

We have seen three wars fought between Arabs and Israelis.  The Palestinians have endless shelled Israel and Israel has invaded Lebanon and Gaza to suppress them.

The very nature of the Muslim Middle East with its Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian splits, Its multiple ethnic rivalries, tribalism, corruption, bellicosity and political instabilities, introduces realities which we cannot control and poorly understand.  As a nation, we are sadly lacking in our grasp of the complexities that dominate the Middle East, making the creation of rational foreign policy illusive at best. In addition, we have the constant negative and confusing intrusion of internal American politics into the formation of foreign policy.

Add oil into this volatile mixture in a time of rising international demand and shrinking resources, and any observer will begin to see the problem for U.S. policy makers.

Rami Khouri, an Arab-American educator and commentator, recently wrote perceptively and accurately that “……..Washington has become a marginal player in much of the Middle East, largely as a consequence of its own incompetence, inconsistency, bias and weakness ….”

Our past foreign policy inconsistencies, our decline of influence in the Middle East and our ongoing activities have put us in the position of alienating someone, somewhere, every time we make a policy decision.

Informal polling shows about half the Arab “street” in favor of Western involvement with the Libyan rebels, while the other half are suspicious of western intentions.  Our “allies” in the region like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and the Gulf states, along with those whom we do not support like Syria and Iran, are very nervous about our involvement in Libya, fearing it might catalyze their own peoples.  Ongoing tendencies toward self-determination even have the Chinese worried.

The larger question here is what the result of these rebellions will be.  Will they spread further to places like Saudi Arabia where we have far more at stake?  How will we react to that?  Then, what will evolve in Tunis, Egypt and Libya?  Will we see stability?  Will the outcomes be in our favor?

The genie is out of the bottle and we are without significant influence!

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Democracy and Islam

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Let’s start out by agreeing that, whatever its faults, the liberal democracy that exists here in the United States ranks among the best forms of government that ever have been invented by mankind. In a nutshell, it goes to the yearnings that almost all people have for control over their lives and destinies.

Those yearnings are not the sole province of Americans. They are shared by most others around the world, ranging broadly from Western Europe where liberal democracies are in place, through the rigid, repressive regimes of the Middle East and North Africa, and on to Iran, China and North Korea. It also includes countries that lie somewhere in between those extremes, like Russia, Venezuela and Cuba, where one or more of the necessary pillars of democracy — a constitution, free elections, freedom of the press and the rule of law — are missing.

With totalitarianism under the gun in North Africa and the Middle East, American and Western politicians and pundits are calling for “democracy” for all those people. And wouldn’t it be nice if we could simply wave our magic wand and install our liberal democracy in those countries? Perhaps not.

The problem is that most of the citizens of those Islamic countries don’t have the foggiest idea what “democracy” really is, and there’s a good possibility that if they did, they might not be so keen on importing it into the Islamic world.

All they really know is that they don’t like what they have — Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya — and that they like the idea of being able to get more freedom, more control over their lives.

But there are a lot of conflicts involved in importing “democracy” into Islam. The Quran is a complete blueprint for life. It tells the believer everything he or she needs to know to lead an appropriate life. Much of that instruction, however, is essentially incompatible with the ideals of liberal democracy.

The root of the problem lies in the fact that in Islam, God determines the laws through the Quran, shariya and hadith. Under strict interpretation, man has only limited license to interpret those laws. Under shariya law, all aspects of life — religious, political, economic, social and private — are predetermined. There is little room for man to intervene.

Then there are practical matters like the extremes of stoning people, cutting off hands as punishment and the overall treatment of women. The extent of adherence to Islamic law depends on the time and place. Some modern Islamic democracies like Turkey and Indonesia have opted not to enforce all those laws. Other Islamic countries, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, have stuck to the traditional interpretation of Islam, which can hardly be called democratic.

What this means today is that we may not do anyone any service by calling for the “democratization” of Islamic countries. In the long run, the inhabitants of those countries may decide that democracy is incompatible with their Islamic ideals. All we know for sure about the stirrings of discontent in the Arab world is that the people in those countries know what they don’t want. They don’t want Arab dictatorships and the concomitant suppression of their own needs and desires. From that we can infer that what they do want is control over their lives and destinies.

When we preach about the virtues and advantages of our democracy, all we are saying is that it works for us. We seldom stop to think that it works for us largely because we have been at it for almost 250 years. We are comfortable with it.

The democracy that many Muslims seek is essentially unknown to them. They have never lived it or worked at it, as we have. It is simply an idealized goal for them. Given that reality, perhaps we should consider what we really want for these peoples.

That seems pretty straightforward. What we want for them is the right for them to choose whatever system of government they wish through the democratic process of free elections. That process is called self-determination, which is a word that does not prejudice the outcome of the process. All it says is that any people would be allowed to determine the kind of government under which to live.

In Islam that may very well turn out not to be democracy as we know it in America, but if those peoples and the region are to find any sort of stability, self-determination is the only practical way they have to reach it.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

In the last few months, we have seen the underpants bomber trying to blow up a plane in the US, as well as an attempt to use computer printer cartridges for the same purpose. The origin of these activities lies in the same country where the successful attack on the USS Cole was carried out in 2000—Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

Last year, a CIA analysis said that al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a far worse threat to U.S. security than is its parent organization in the hills and caves of Pakistan. This is completely consistent with the ongoing diffusion of authority, the “McDonaldization of Al Qaida Central,” to outlying affiliates like AQAP.

Apart from the Cole incident, what do most Americans know about Yemen? First up, they should be aware of the uncanny similarities it has with Afghanistan.

Almost as large as Texas, Yemen consists primarily of mountainous desert which is described as even tougher than the Afghan mountains. Its blazing sun is said to have been the reason that the Roman legions left after one attempt, giving up any thought of conquering Yemen.

The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the region for centuries, never really controlled Yemen, nor did the British Army when it occupied southern Yemen from 1937 to 1963. Yemen is not an hospitable place for foreigners.

It is not simply the terrain that makes Yemen such a problem. It is a country of 20 million people, most of them armed to the teeth. According the CIA Factbook, it is the poorest country in the Arab world, with 40% living below the poverty line, some 50% of the country illiterate and 35% unemployed. The population is projected to double to 40 million over the next 20 years.

According to the Yemeni Times, the problem gets more complicated for U.S. policy-makers because “the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh remains weak outside the capital, lacking in resources and credibility, and riddled with corruption.”

Southern secessionists, a Shiite rebellion in the north and civil wars between north and south characterize recent Yemeni history. Constantly in turmoil, Yemen is a poor bet for any kind of stability and a welcoming place for AQAP.

Adding to that, past incidents involving American drone attacks that have killed primarily civilians have fostered widespread belief, with eager help from AQAP, that the United States is responsible for all of Yemen’s misery and problems.

Oil accounts for about a third of Yemen’s GDP. It is expected to run out in 10 years and no thought has been given to an oil-free future.

It uses a sizable percentage of its water supply and agricultural land (less than 3% of the country) to grow the stimulant qat, which is said to bring clarity of thought. Its use used to be de rigeur prior to important tribal and governmental meetings, but its real product is only a mildly stoned population.

Poverty has made Yemen vulnerable. AQAP has found a population that is not hostile to its presence. AQAP numbers estimates range up to 500 members who can blend seamlessly into local populations. Many are said to have married into local families and are thus afforded community protection.

Yemenis have been sympathetic to radical Islam for decades. It is, after all, the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden. They joined jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and are the largest population group present at our Guantanamo detention center. Whatever they do, they are apparently always welcomed back home to Yemen.

This collection of facts and observations raises important issues about U.S. policy, not only in Yemen, but in the region as a whole. We are faced with an enemy that enjoys relative stability while it plots to carry out terrorist plots against our homeland.

We can only hope we have learned enough from our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan to know that military intervention in Yemen would only further radicalize the country, lead to a boon in AQAP recruitments and support and create a set of new problems for us.

Quite apart from our questionable ability to bear the financial costs of yet another war in the Middle East, who is to say that such an invasion would not precipitate an AQAP move from Yemen to, say, Somalia?

What is wrong here is our counterterrorism policy. We persist with massive troop commitments, when we should be thinking more about totally non-conventional, non-military solutions to the counterterrorism problems that face us in the Muslim world.

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Egypt’s Long History

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher and Harvard professor once trenchantly said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.  More often than not, that has proved to be true.

With all the excitement and promise of recent events in Egypt, what do most Americans know about that country’s past?  Probably precious little.

Evidence of early civilization in Egypt goes back to the tenth millennium BC.  The first formal system of governance in Egypt was a kingdom dating to about 3150 BC.  From then until the fourth century BC, Egypt was ruled by a series of home grown kingdoms.  Subsequently, Egypt was ruled by Greek, Roman, Persian, Ottoman, French and British occupiers, well into the 20th Century.

Modern Egyptian nationalism began in the early 20th century.  Having become a British Protectorate in 1914, they got a new king in 1917, revolted against British rule in 1919, were presented with “independence” by the British in 1922, got a constitution and a parliamentary system in 1923 and overthrew their king in a 1952 coup d’etat which led to the creation of the “Egyptian Republic”.

The Egyptian Republic of 1953 remained until President Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011.  During that period, Egypt was tightly and repressively controlled by a series of military officers:  Generals Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.  This period was punctuated by a number of significant events that further molded the country:  The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the 1967 and 1973 Wars with Israel, the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and the assassination of Sadat in 1981 which led to the accession of Mubarak.

Egypt was under military, political, or economic pressure during that entire period.  Stability, such as it was, was maintained through the military control and repression of the population.  Further, the military is still in control after all the events that have just played out in Egypt. The Sadat assassination in 1981 resulted in the declaration of Martial law, which is still in effect thirty years later.

The exposure of Egyptian citizens over the centuries to the ideals of liberal democracy has been minimal.  The preconditions for liberal democracy – fully protected individual rights and rules for lawmaking and elections, all in a framework of checks and balances – have never been enjoyed by the Egyptian people.

Egyptian military officers can be broadly classified into two groupings:  (1) Those who were trained in or by the USSR before 1970 and subsequent officers who matured under them and (2) those who were trained in or by the US and were largely uninfluenced by senior, Soviet-trained officers.

This makes it likely that, in general, younger officers would be more understanding of and interested in the ideas of western Democracy, an understanding that, given the earlier Soviet influence, would be greatly diminished in the older officer corps.  In addition, since public media are a phenomenon of the past decade, it is also likely that younger Egyptians are equally so disposed, however alien those ideas might be to their elders.  And the elders still run the country!

In addition, it is estimated that the Egyptian military is involved in between 5% and 40% of the economic activity of the country.  They are said to be involved in construction, appliance manufacture, the food industry, automobile assembly, clothing, pots and pans and tourism.  How else would Mubarak have managed to amass a personal fortune estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars?

The senior officers who are now control of the military establishment were beholden for their jobs to Mubarak.  Additionally, they are heavily involved in the economic life of their country through business ventures that make billions and billions of dollars a year.

Despite its ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity, Egypt is a country that has its divisions.  The country is now, for the moment, at least, in the hands of a military establishment  that has a vested interest in the maintenance of much of the status quo.  Economically and politically, there isn’t much they are likely to want to change, whereas recent events indicate clearly that change is the driving force for Egypt’s youth.

With luck, patience and time, Egypt may make it through what is very clearly going to be a difficult transition.  In the meantime, our administration and our politicians might better tout “self-determination” for the Egyptians, rather than pushing our ethnocentric, exceptionalist version of “democracy”.

Only real self-determination, whatever that may bring, has the potential to result in any lasting stability for Egypt.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counter- terrorism staff

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[Originally published in Nieman Watchdog.]

Seven years ago, it was neonconservatism that led to a major clash between the U.S. and Islam. Will the 24-hour news cycle cause the next one?

What has most set the United States apart from its fellow liberal democracies in Western Europe over the nine years since 9/11 has been our acceptance and integration of Muslims into American life.

That essentially benign and welcoming attitude, fortified by our history of encouraging immigration and our principled Constitution, has been the main reason we have not suffered the kinds of terrorist attacks that have plagued countries like Britain and Spain, where attitudes have been less than welcoming.

All that now seems to be changing. Virulently anti-Muslim groups are trading on the fears of the largely uninformed American population by aiding and abetting anyone who wants to join or ramp up the hue and cry against Islam. Recent national focus on the Islamic Center in lower Manhattan and new mosques in Tennessee and the Midwest, as well as attacks on mosques around the country, all seem to be stirring up the pot.

The situation has gotten so out of hand that we are now being warned by the president, the secretary of state and even our favorite General Petraeus that a continuation of this anti-Islamic rhetoric and activity will gravely damage the United States throughout the Islamic world, particularly in those regions where we have committed our military power – Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, etc.

Of course, these warnings of calamity to come are precisely the same warnings given to the Bush administration by the State Department, by our favorite general of that moment (Eric Shinsheki), by the CIA and by countless Middle East experts and observers during their ramp-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Despite those warnings, President Bush, inspired by an extremist neocon vision of democratization through unilateral preemptive war, invaded Iraq. The Muslim world was inflamed.

Just as those warnings seven years ago proved to be prophetic, today’s warnings are likely to come true as well. But the media doesn’t have to make things worse.

Last week’s threatened burning of Korans by an obscure group of 50-odd, fundamentalist Christian radicals in Florida would never have gotten any attention anywhere were it not for the eager complicity of today’s American media which, in its endless, ongoing quest to fill the news for 24 hours of every day, took an otherwise insignificant story and ballooned it into a crisis.

In this case the media’s drive to manufacture stories could have resulted in additional American deaths abroad or, if Muslim integration in this country suffers, even at home.

No one questions the media’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech, but that right brings with it some responsibilities, which were in no way met by the coverage of this woeful Florida preacher’s antics.

Could it be that the media’s need to manufacture conflict will be the source of America’s next great clash with the Muslim world – this time, perhaps, within our own borders?

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[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

Over the past decade, we have heard constant calls from the White House for the spread of our “democracy” around the world. Webster defines democracy as “1 a : government by the people; especially : rule of the majority b : a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections”.

Therefore, what is being pushed as our export item is “majority rule”. However, our own Founding Fathers viewed “majority rule” as synonymous with “rule by the rabble” and wanted no part of it.

In fact, neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution contains any mention of “democracy”. It is absent because the Founders thought of “democracy” as something to be avoided.

What the Founders were really supporting were the liberal underpinnings that were needed to support a system which functioned on the basis of free elections, without the peril of rule by a non-benevolent majority. They were not talking about “liberal” in contrast to “conservative”, but rather about the nature of our organizations and attitudes.

The Webster definition of “liberal” that is relevant here is: “of or constituting a political party associated with ideals of individual, especially, economic freedom, greater individual participation in government, and constitutional, political, and administrative reforms designed to secure these objectives”.

Those liberal underpinnings—laws, behaviors and the belief structures that govern individual behavior—are the foundation of the system the Founders wanted to create. All of these underpinnings are critical to the establishment and success of liberal democracy.

The other critical element is the existence of a supporting constitution. That constitution has to protect individual rights, establish rules for elections and lawmaking, guarantee a free press and create an independent judiciary. Those things must be guaranteed if any liberal democracy is to succeed.

A liberal democracy with the appropriate rules, as envisaged by the founders, is the primary means that the citizenry has to protect itself against the state. If it is properly designed, it will not only do that, but it will guarantee the same protections to all its citizens, unlike the European systems from which it evolved.

The reason the founders shied so strongly away from “democracy” is because they realized that unless those liberal underpinnings were in place, functioning and ingrained in the national psyche, there was little hope that the evils of democracy or mob rule could be contained. For that to happen, those liberal underpinnings had to enjoy not only a successful history in the country, but the general acceptance of the population as well.

There are a lot of reasons why today’s ongoing talk about spreading democracy is counterproductive and self-delusional. When we say that is our goal, what we are really saying is that all that’s needed for democracy is free elections.

We make no mention of the requirement for liberal preconditions to take hold before there is any hope for liberal democracy. So, as we have just now done in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we say we have pulled off “free” elections and that everything is OK because of that. Democracy is on the march!

The main problem with this is that “democracy” exists in many places where, although elections are in place, none of the necessary liberal underpinnings are in sight. Look at just about any one-party, self-designated “democratic” government in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America or Asia, where “free” elections are how the decision is made who rules. There are dozens of states like Cuba, Venezuela, Singapore, China and Russia that hold regular elections but nevertheless cannot be called liberal democracies.

Exporting “democracy” to a state that has no liberal underpinnings is ultimately likely to consign that state to a perpetual absence of liberal democracy. Mob rule never voluntarily gives up its power. Thus, the simple goal of wishing and trying, as we have for the past decade, to “export democracy” in the absence of the critical liberal preconditions, probably will prove to be terminally damaging to the worldwide development of liberal democracies.

The successful promotion and nurturing of the critical liberal preconditions that necessarily precede the establishment of liberal democracies is probably impossible in many parts of the world, almost certainly in Islam. Yet, we persist. Our export of democracy and subsequent inevitable involvement in nation-building in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, where we judge “success” based on the existence of free elections, is almost certainly doomed to failure.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe and the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. He is a former long time resident of Brookfield who now lives in Williston.

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[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

There is a major difference between the conduct of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Critical to the process is correctly identifying the problem and then using the appropriate tools to combat it.

Terrorism has rarely if ever been defeated with military power. Historically, the best tools to use against it are police and intelligence organizations. They are often successful.

Insurgencies have rarely been defeated. This is particularly true when the insurgents are being fought by a foreign government as with the French in Algeria and Indonesia, with the British in Aden, Kenya, Cyprus and Malaysia and with us in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Even under the best circumstances, as in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers, who began their insurgency in 1976, were only defeated in 2009 and then, if truly defeated, by the Sri Lankan government itself!

We went to Afghanistan in 2001 to deal with a terrorist threat. We destroyed the Al Qaida camps and put them on the run. We did serious damage to their hosts, the Taliban. We were still fighting terrorism.

When we invaded Iraq in 2003, there was absolutely no terrorism involved in the equation. We won a brief war and then entered into a counterinsurgency. The insurgents were joined by a terrorist group under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who had managed to coalesce a number of Kurdish Islamists and foreign fighters around him. They were ultimately recognized, if somewhat reluctantly, by Al Qaida Central as Al Qaida in Iraq.

They came to Iraq because they were attracted by a target-rich environment that gave them a perfect training ground and recruiting tool for future militants, as well as increased fundraising potential. They worked within the framework of the Iraqi insurgency against US forces. The primary US strategy in Iraq was to conduct a counterinsurgency operation.

By 2009, a number of spontaneous developments had calmed the situation in Iraq, permitting us to refocus on Afghanistan, which, we were told by both Bush and Obama, was the primary scene of the struggle with terrorism.

Yet, Afghanistan 2009 and 2010 is another US counterinsurgency in which our conventional forces have no involvement with counterterrorist operations—simply because Al Qaida has left Afghanistan, primarily for Pakistan and abroad.

What brought us to the Middle East was our concern about terrorism, yet our military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with insurgency.

Counterinsurgencies, however carefully they are run, are magnets for the recruitment and training of terrorists and for fundraising on their behalf. Just look at our recent missteps in Afghanistan and the numbers of noncombatants killed.

Our struggle is for hearts and minds. In fact, moderates, the overwhelming majority of Muslims, hold the key to the success or failure of Al Qaida and militant Islam. Whoever wins them over will win the battle. Moderates are potentially the most effective enemy of and counterbalance to the fundamentalists.

Everything we do in our counterinsurgency operations has the potential to make our struggle with terrorism more difficult because it has the potential to alienate moderates. The mere presence of the US military, let alone their counterinsurgency operations, represents an advantage for Al Qaida that it simply could not create on its own.

The facts that rankle all Muslims include: US military presence in the Muslim world, with the concomitant occupations; the killing of Muslims; US support of repressive and despotic regimes; and the unbalanced US approach to the Palestine problem. These facts all remain, yet all can potentially be changed, particularly and most simply our military approach.

The question is, when and why did we decide that it was OK to run counterinsurgency operations when our original motivation was solely to deal with terrorism? Precisely what do we hope to accomplish with this approach?

We can disengage militarily. The internal US political response to this strategy is a repetition of the “failed state” argument, which holds no water. Terrorists don’t need failed states and they have proven it in Europe and the U.S. Furthermore, there is every indication that the Taliban has had it up to the ears with Al Qaida and would never permit them to re-open in Afghanistan.

If we were to address those problems enumerated above and created by our policies in the Muslim world, we would cut the legs from under Al Qaida and all the other Muslim fundamentalist terrorist groups simply because they would lose the support, even the grudging tolerance, of moderate Muslims.

That’s why Al Qaida approved so strongly of the Bush approach and of the Obama adoption of the Bush strategy.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. A longtime resident of Brookfield, he now lives in Williston.

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