Rural Ruminations

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Over the 40 years of its existence, there has been endless examination of, and commentary on, the efficacy of and prospects for our all-volunteer military force.

At the onset of the discussions in the early 1970s, it was said that the all-volunteer force could not be sufficiently effective and efficient, as it would inevitably draw on the most economically disadvantaged and poorly educated members of our society. There were issues of pay and overall costs, as well as the contention that our fighting capability would suffer.

There is very little on the record today that supports any of the early concerns about the all-volunteer force. Today’s soldiers are equally as trainable as their draft-era predecessors. In addition, they are better disciplined and present far fewer morale problems.

Although the cost of this fighting force has continuously risen, the equipment provided to it has improved at a remarkable rate, and its volunteer soldiers have proven capable of evolving into a highly technical force.

By all counts and analyses, they are a formidable fighting force, allegedly the best this country has ever produced, probably the best in the history of the world.

So, if there is a problem, what exactly is it?

The change to the all-volunteer force has diminished the ability of the American people to have much of any influence on the formation of military policy in this country, particularly in the short run. Some will say that this is a very good thing and that warfare policy should be left to the military, the White House and the Congress.

Others, particularly those who remember the Vietnam War and who are carefully observing our attempts at disengagement in Iraq and Afghanistan will say that the all-volunteer force diminishes the only direct, day-to-day potential for influence that citizens have on our war-fighting policies.

In Vietnam, major input toward ending our involvement came from fact that virtually every American voter had relatives, friends and neighbors in Vietnam. It was personal for all of us and when it looked as if President Johnson was never going to get us out of the endless abyss that was Vietnam, the protests began, the people were heard and we finally departed.

More recently, in Iraq and in our second invasion of Afghanistan, we have seen two different administrations do pretty much what they wanted to do with the all-volunteer force because most Americans didn’t have a dog in the fight. Unlike Vietnam, too many of us don’t know anyone who is there, so there is no cohesive opposition to the endless prolongation of those wars.

In addition and despite the fact that there was a great deal of well-founded skepticism about those invasions here at the time, the administrations in power were able to steamroller the Congress because, among other things, there was no counterpressure from the voters.

We now have a highly proficient and successful all-volunteer force with educated, intelligent military leadership. The attitude of those leaders is, as it should be, “we can do the job if you give us the time and resources to succeed.” The only problem with that is that those leaders are loathe to take into consideration the historical realities that exist in the countries where they seek to do battle.

With the exception of Gen. Shinseki, who warned against the Iraq invasion plan and lost his job as a result, our military leadership has not acknowledged either historical Iraq realities or the realities of internal U.S. politics and economics. In Afghanistan, Gen. Petraeus, in the face of harsh economic realities and a growing antiwar sentiment at home, has insisted that with time and resources, he can win. “Only” a decade or so more! And we have never been told what “win” really means.

In short, in the face of difficult realities, the military seems programmed to insist that they can win, whether that claim is feasible or not. And that’s what we pay them to do. However, given that fact, it is really important that the military run only our military operations, not our policies. Policy must be in the hands of our civilian leadership and for that to work properly, we must keep our electorate involved, aware and empowered. The all-volunteer force does not facilitate that process, but rather shortcuts it by not providing enough engaged constituents in the general civilian population to sufficiently effect policy. As politically difficult as it might seem to do, we need to discuss a return to some form of universal service.

If, because of our exclusive reliance on our all-volunteer force, there is only military-based input on policy, without balance from our American civilian population, we could be mired in wars forever.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

There have long been theories that there is a predetermined sweep to history that is not subject to human input. History develops according to objective laws over which we have no control. In other words, history will happen irrespective of what we poor humans would like to engineer.

If you then consider the Marxist dialectical concept of “historical materialism,” you will learn that Marx believed that man can make history only within the limits set by the existing conditions of the society in which he lives.

This is clearly a philosophical argument. It has existed in various forms for centuries and will continue as long as we inhabit the earth. It is not the purpose here to enter substantially into that philosophical fray.

On the other hand, things happen in the world, particularly in our American world, that make one wonder precisely why we Americans continue to repeat the same things over and over when each action has successively and observably failed.

Why, since World War II, has America gotten itself into Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan when in each case there have been powerful contemporary arguments that doing so was not going to end in anything we could possibly call success? What is there about us as a nation that seems to predispose us to this sort of activity?

Some of the answer to this question lies in the world’s view of us. Since World War II, we have been viewed with increasing suspicion around the world. Our Cold War enemies were in the struggle with us for economic, geopolitical and philosophical reasons. They had their friends and allies, and we had ours. At least in the case of the United States and our allies, we were pretty well united in our belief that we were facing a truly evil power. That community of belief brought us together with our allies in ways that managed to overcome or set aside the inherent differences that existed between us.

Our friends followed us into Korea and tolerated us in Vietnam, both part of the Cold War. What has changed in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the foreseeable future is that this is no longer a bipolar world, which forces countries to take sides. In this new multipolar world, it’s every man for himself, and that makes it increasingly difficult for us to get others onto our side.

Look at our attempts to get China to support our policies and goals today in Iran. Or consider Pakistan’s ambivalence toward the Taliban. It simply isn’t in their national interest to buy into our goals.

To foreigners, America is increasingly looking like a willfully ignorant, insensitive, self-centered bully whose interests do not coincide well with those of the rest of the world.

On the other hand, some of the answer lies in our view of the rest of the world. As a nation, we are blissfully unaware of how the world sees us. We are mired in our notions of our own exceptionalism, which tells us that everything about us is better than anywhere or anything else: Our Constitution and way of life are the best; our social, political, military and economic structures and systems are superior. For most Americans, it is perfectly fine, even imperative for us to want to bring the wonders of our systems to everyone in the world, whether they seek it or not.

Although many Americans really do understand these new realities, it is unfortunate that for reasons probably rooted in our geography and past history, many if not most of us are blissfully unaware that the rest of the world may not love us or wish to emulate us or is even tolerant of what is really our benevolent desire to share with them the bounties of our system. We just don’t get it.

Maybe the determinists have put their finger on the pulse in the wrong way. Perhaps the only force that predetermines what is to happen historically and over which we have no control amounts only to ignorance on the part of ill-informed leadership around the world.

Certainly we could have avoided the downside of all of our recent invasions if we had listened to the better-informed experts in this country — those who told us unequivocally that, based on reality and history, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan would provide far less than successful results for America.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

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