Rural Ruminations

Originally published in the Herald of Randoph

The popular uprisings and protests in the Middle East that began in December 2010 and America’s reactions to them have left many wondering precisely what our policy is in that region and what motivates it.

Of course, years of established policy have left to the Obama administration only bad options today.  There really is nothing they can do that is both practical in the sense that it forwards our national interests and is, at the same time, consistent with what we claim to be our basic national principles.

Over the years, our policy has been driven neither by pure pragmatism, nor by pure ideology.  It has been an admixture of the two and that dichotomy has not been to our advantage.  In fact, we are viewed in the region as hypocritical, seen, for example, in our overthrow of the democratically elected Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953.

What were the factors that drove our Middle East policies after the Second World War?  First, we were either dismally or willfully ignorant of realities in Islam.  We seldom let facts on the ground get in the way of or influence our chosen policies.

During Cold war, we felt it necessary to keep as many nations as possible on our side and aligned against the Soviet Union.  Thus, even in the aftermath of years of Imperialism in the region, we found it pragmatically necessary to make whatever accommodations were necessary to maintain the support of the autocratic, repressive and corrupt Middle East regimes that had replaced the imperialists.  Democracy, what’s that?

The creation of a democratic, Zionist Israel and our decision to support literally whatever they felt they needed to do in support of their national goals, left us, ultimately, in the same ambivalent boat of pragmatism vs. idealism.  In the face of UN vetoes, and international rulings on, for example, the illegality of the ongoing west Bank settlement program, America edges ever further into the arena of hypocrisy.

Additionally, we have stationed our foreign American troops on Islam’s holiest ground and fought wars that have killed Muslim civilians – very much taboo under the Koran.  With all of our strident talk about bringing Democracy to Islam whether they want it, need it or not, we have turned into the twenty-first Century Crusaders.  That really means something in Islam.  Even though the first Crusades were in the 11-12^th Centuries, no one in Islam forgets them!

We have seen three wars fought between Arabs and Israelis.  The Palestinians have endless shelled Israel and Israel has invaded Lebanon and Gaza to suppress them.

The very nature of the Muslim Middle East with its Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian splits, Its multiple ethnic rivalries, tribalism, corruption, bellicosity and political instabilities, introduces realities which we cannot control and poorly understand.  As a nation, we are sadly lacking in our grasp of the complexities that dominate the Middle East, making the creation of rational foreign policy illusive at best. In addition, we have the constant negative and confusing intrusion of internal American politics into the formation of foreign policy.

Add oil into this volatile mixture in a time of rising international demand and shrinking resources, and any observer will begin to see the problem for U.S. policy makers.

Rami Khouri, an Arab-American educator and commentator, recently wrote perceptively and accurately that “……..Washington has become a marginal player in much of the Middle East, largely as a consequence of its own incompetence, inconsistency, bias and weakness ….”

Our past foreign policy inconsistencies, our decline of influence in the Middle East and our ongoing activities have put us in the position of alienating someone, somewhere, every time we make a policy decision.

Informal polling shows about half the Arab “street” in favor of Western involvement with the Libyan rebels, while the other half are suspicious of western intentions.  Our “allies” in the region like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and the Gulf states, along with those whom we do not support like Syria and Iran, are very nervous about our involvement in Libya, fearing it might catalyze their own peoples.  Ongoing tendencies toward self-determination even have the Chinese worried.

The larger question here is what the result of these rebellions will be.  Will they spread further to places like Saudi Arabia where we have far more at stake?  How will we react to that?  Then, what will evolve in Tunis, Egypt and Libya?  Will we see stability?  Will the outcomes be in our favor?

The genie is out of the bottle and we are without significant influence!

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Let’s start out by agreeing that, whatever its faults, the liberal democracy that exists here in the United States ranks among the best forms of government that ever have been invented by mankind. In a nutshell, it goes to the yearnings that almost all people have for control over their lives and destinies.

Those yearnings are not the sole province of Americans. They are shared by most others around the world, ranging broadly from Western Europe where liberal democracies are in place, through the rigid, repressive regimes of the Middle East and North Africa, and on to Iran, China and North Korea. It also includes countries that lie somewhere in between those extremes, like Russia, Venezuela and Cuba, where one or more of the necessary pillars of democracy — a constitution, free elections, freedom of the press and the rule of law — are missing.

With totalitarianism under the gun in North Africa and the Middle East, American and Western politicians and pundits are calling for “democracy” for all those people. And wouldn’t it be nice if we could simply wave our magic wand and install our liberal democracy in those countries? Perhaps not.

The problem is that most of the citizens of those Islamic countries don’t have the foggiest idea what “democracy” really is, and there’s a good possibility that if they did, they might not be so keen on importing it into the Islamic world.

All they really know is that they don’t like what they have — Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya — and that they like the idea of being able to get more freedom, more control over their lives.

But there are a lot of conflicts involved in importing “democracy” into Islam. The Quran is a complete blueprint for life. It tells the believer everything he or she needs to know to lead an appropriate life. Much of that instruction, however, is essentially incompatible with the ideals of liberal democracy.

The root of the problem lies in the fact that in Islam, God determines the laws through the Quran, shariya and hadith. Under strict interpretation, man has only limited license to interpret those laws. Under shariya law, all aspects of life — religious, political, economic, social and private — are predetermined. There is little room for man to intervene.

Then there are practical matters like the extremes of stoning people, cutting off hands as punishment and the overall treatment of women. The extent of adherence to Islamic law depends on the time and place. Some modern Islamic democracies like Turkey and Indonesia have opted not to enforce all those laws. Other Islamic countries, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, have stuck to the traditional interpretation of Islam, which can hardly be called democratic.

What this means today is that we may not do anyone any service by calling for the “democratization” of Islamic countries. In the long run, the inhabitants of those countries may decide that democracy is incompatible with their Islamic ideals. All we know for sure about the stirrings of discontent in the Arab world is that the people in those countries know what they don’t want. They don’t want Arab dictatorships and the concomitant suppression of their own needs and desires. From that we can infer that what they do want is control over their lives and destinies.

When we preach about the virtues and advantages of our democracy, all we are saying is that it works for us. We seldom stop to think that it works for us largely because we have been at it for almost 250 years. We are comfortable with it.

The democracy that many Muslims seek is essentially unknown to them. They have never lived it or worked at it, as we have. It is simply an idealized goal for them. Given that reality, perhaps we should consider what we really want for these peoples.

That seems pretty straightforward. What we want for them is the right for them to choose whatever system of government they wish through the democratic process of free elections. That process is called self-determination, which is a word that does not prejudice the outcome of the process. All it says is that any people would be allowed to determine the kind of government under which to live.

In Islam that may very well turn out not to be democracy as we know it in America, but if those peoples and the region are to find any sort of stability, self-determination is the only practical way they have to reach it.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

In the last few months, we have seen the underpants bomber trying to blow up a plane in the US, as well as an attempt to use computer printer cartridges for the same purpose. The origin of these activities lies in the same country where the successful attack on the USS Cole was carried out in 2000—Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

Last year, a CIA analysis said that al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a far worse threat to U.S. security than is its parent organization in the hills and caves of Pakistan. This is completely consistent with the ongoing diffusion of authority, the “McDonaldization of Al Qaida Central,” to outlying affiliates like AQAP.

Apart from the Cole incident, what do most Americans know about Yemen? First up, they should be aware of the uncanny similarities it has with Afghanistan.

Almost as large as Texas, Yemen consists primarily of mountainous desert which is described as even tougher than the Afghan mountains. Its blazing sun is said to have been the reason that the Roman legions left after one attempt, giving up any thought of conquering Yemen.

The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the region for centuries, never really controlled Yemen, nor did the British Army when it occupied southern Yemen from 1937 to 1963. Yemen is not an hospitable place for foreigners.

It is not simply the terrain that makes Yemen such a problem. It is a country of 20 million people, most of them armed to the teeth. According the CIA Factbook, it is the poorest country in the Arab world, with 40% living below the poverty line, some 50% of the country illiterate and 35% unemployed. The population is projected to double to 40 million over the next 20 years.

According to the Yemeni Times, the problem gets more complicated for U.S. policy-makers because “the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh remains weak outside the capital, lacking in resources and credibility, and riddled with corruption.”

Southern secessionists, a Shiite rebellion in the north and civil wars between north and south characterize recent Yemeni history. Constantly in turmoil, Yemen is a poor bet for any kind of stability and a welcoming place for AQAP.

Adding to that, past incidents involving American drone attacks that have killed primarily civilians have fostered widespread belief, with eager help from AQAP, that the United States is responsible for all of Yemen’s misery and problems.

Oil accounts for about a third of Yemen’s GDP. It is expected to run out in 10 years and no thought has been given to an oil-free future.

It uses a sizable percentage of its water supply and agricultural land (less than 3% of the country) to grow the stimulant qat, which is said to bring clarity of thought. Its use used to be de rigeur prior to important tribal and governmental meetings, but its real product is only a mildly stoned population.

Poverty has made Yemen vulnerable. AQAP has found a population that is not hostile to its presence. AQAP numbers estimates range up to 500 members who can blend seamlessly into local populations. Many are said to have married into local families and are thus afforded community protection.

Yemenis have been sympathetic to radical Islam for decades. It is, after all, the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden. They joined jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and are the largest population group present at our Guantanamo detention center. Whatever they do, they are apparently always welcomed back home to Yemen.

This collection of facts and observations raises important issues about U.S. policy, not only in Yemen, but in the region as a whole. We are faced with an enemy that enjoys relative stability while it plots to carry out terrorist plots against our homeland.

We can only hope we have learned enough from our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan to know that military intervention in Yemen would only further radicalize the country, lead to a boon in AQAP recruitments and support and create a set of new problems for us.

Quite apart from our questionable ability to bear the financial costs of yet another war in the Middle East, who is to say that such an invasion would not precipitate an AQAP move from Yemen to, say, Somalia?

What is wrong here is our counterterrorism policy. We persist with massive troop commitments, when we should be thinking more about totally non-conventional, non-military solutions to the counterterrorism problems that face us in the Muslim world.

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher and Harvard professor once trenchantly said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.  More often than not, that has proved to be true.

With all the excitement and promise of recent events in Egypt, what do most Americans know about that country’s past?  Probably precious little.

Evidence of early civilization in Egypt goes back to the tenth millennium BC.  The first formal system of governance in Egypt was a kingdom dating to about 3150 BC.  From then until the fourth century BC, Egypt was ruled by a series of home grown kingdoms.  Subsequently, Egypt was ruled by Greek, Roman, Persian, Ottoman, French and British occupiers, well into the 20^th Century.

Modern Egyptian nationalism began in the early 20^th century.  Having become a British Protectorate in 1914, they got a new king in 1917, revolted against British rule in 1919, were presented with “independence” by the British in 1922, got a constitution and a parliamentary system in 1923 and overthrew their king in a 1952 coup d’etat which led to the creation of the “Egyptian Republic”.

The Egyptian Republic of 1953 remained until President Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011.  During that period, Egypt was tightly and repressively controlled by a series of military officers:  Generals Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.  This period was punctuated by a number of significant events that further molded the country:  The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the 1967 and 1973 Wars with Israel, the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and the assassination of Sadat in 1981 which led to the accession of Mubarak.

Egypt was under military, political, or economic pressure during that entire period.  Stability, such as it was, was maintained through the military control and repression of the population.  Further, the military is still in control after all the events that have just played out in Egypt. The Sadat assassination in 1981 resulted in the declaration of Martial law, which is still in effect thirty years later.

The exposure of Egyptian citizens over the centuries to the ideals of liberal democracy has been minimal.  The preconditions for liberal democracy – fully protected individual rights and rules for lawmaking and elections, all in a framework of checks and balances – have never been enjoyed by the Egyptian people.

Egyptian military officers can be broadly classified into two groupings:  (1) Those who were trained in or by the USSR before 1970 and subsequent officers who matured under them and (2) those who were trained in or by the US and were largely uninfluenced by senior, Soviet-trained officers.

This makes it likely that, in general, younger officers would be more understanding of and interested in the ideas of western Democracy, an understanding that, given the earlier Soviet influence, would be greatly diminished in the older officer corps.  In addition, since public media are a phenomenon of the past decade, it is also likely that younger Egyptians are equally so disposed, however alien those ideas might be to their elders.  And the elders still run the country!

In addition, it is estimated that the Egyptian military is involved in between 5% and 40% of the economic activity of the country.  They are said to be involved in construction, appliance manufacture, the food industry, automobile assembly, clothing, pots and pans and tourism.  How else would Mubarak have managed to amass a personal fortune estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars?

The senior officers who are now control of the military establishment were beholden for their jobs to Mubarak.  Additionally, they are heavily involved in the economic life of their country through business ventures that make billions and billions of dollars a year.

Despite its ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity, Egypt is a country that has its divisions.  The country is now, for the moment, at least, in the hands of a military establishment  that has a vested interest in the maintenance of much of the status quo.  Economically and politically, there isn’t much they are likely to want to change, whereas recent events indicate clearly that change is the driving force for Egypt’s youth.

With luck, patience and time, Egypt may make it through what is very clearly going to be a difficult transition.  In the meantime, our administration and our politicians might better tout “self-determination” for the Egyptians, rather than pushing our ethnocentric, exceptionalist version of “democracy”.

Only real self-determination, whatever that may bring, has the potential to result in any lasting stability for Egypt.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counter- terrorism staff