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Originally published in The Rutland Herald

Commentary

May 27, 2015

Much of Northwestern Iraq is now under ISIS control. Shia Iraq is losing its war with Sunni ISIS. Hawkish American conservatives and neocons demand that we re-invade that country and solve its problems. Others less bellicose tell us that we must increase our military presence there to the tune of about 1000 troops, concentrating on advising the Iraqis on how to beat ISIS. Moderates generally are not eager to see any US military involvement in the region, preferring to let the antagonists work out their own problems.

Today’s Iraq was the creation of colonial British occupation in the period 1918-1958, when they captured and then governed that region. For over 600 years, Iraq has been a part of some other state, so the agglomeration of Shia, Sunni and Kurds into one state was new to the region. It was a purely British decision and was made solely for the advantage and profit of that nation. It had nothing to do with the difficult national, sectarian and tribal realities that have always existed in the region.

After a more than a decade of the 2003 American invasion and occupation of the so-called “state of Iraq”, there are few sentient Americans who are not aware of the deep-seated, historical animosities that exist between Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Modern Iraq has existed as a unified political entity only under repressive governance. Once we removed Saddam Hussein, the genie was truly out of the bottle. Since that moment in 2003, the inevitable, unimpeded slide of Iraq into civil conflict has reflected the national, sectarian and tribal forces in conflict in that “country”. It is difficult to think of Iraq as a modern state. It is more like three states in perpetual conflict.

Historical reality started to rule Iraq immediately after our invasion. The Sunnis, from whom the ruling, pre-invasion Baath Party had sprung, were stunned to learn and refused to believe that they were not the majority and not in charge. With US backing, the Shia, who had always been the numerical majority, were delighted to take over and even things up with the Sunnis who had repressed them for so long. The Kurds, the largest national grouping in the world without a country, decided it was time that they governed themselves and have been quietly doing so ever since.

In May 2003, the Bush administration implemented a program of de-Baathification during which they stripped the Iraqi army of most of its Sunni leadership, turning it into a Shia-dominated organization. This was one of the major causes of the Sunni-led insurgency that was conducted against the American military and the Shia Iraqi government after 2003. Ultimately, it has provided many of the Iraqi Sunni members of ISIS.

Americans, including the Obama Administration, who now search for further and deeper involvement in Iraq are now seeking a way for us to overcome the odds and wrest from hostile control that part of Iraq lost to ISIS. The consensus within our government is that we will have to work through the Shia government of Iraq to accomplish our goals there.

The problems here are endless. Much of ISIS is made up of the Iraqi Sunnis who lost their “country” to the Shia after 2003. Their hatred of the Shia is historical, deep and recently exacerbated. The jihadi volunteers they are welcoming from the Maghreb, from elsewhere in Islam and from the West, are all Sunnis.

The Shia Iraqi government has two choices available to take on ISIS: First, use their army, which is Shia-dominated and despised by virtually all the Sunnis in the North and West and, second, use the Shia militias which for the past decade have been killing Sunnis throughout Iraq. If anything, they are even more despised than the Shia in the Iraqi army.

Sunni ISIS has invaded Iraq and Shia-run Syria. There are virtually no Sunnis in the region who will fight alongside the Shia Iraqis against ISIS. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the philosophical home and strongest supporter of fundamentalist views like those of ISIS. So, where is the regional Sunni entity that will vanquish ISIS? It’s not in evidence. Only Shia are apparently willing to take them on.

These realities in Iraq are not new. True to historical form, only Shia Syria, Hizbollah and Iran want to take on Sunni ISIS. Are they to be our new and probably only allies if we once again put US boots on the ground? Is that not ironic? How will regional Sunni neighbors, our longtime allies, take that?

Do we have any idea what we are doing?

 

 

 

The Syrian Gamble

Rural Ruminations

by Haviland Smith

 

Before we adopt a new Syria policy, a quick review might be helpful in better understanding the endless confusion that rules over the situation in that region today.

Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turks make up about 72% of the Syrian population, Shia 13% and Christians about 10%. The Syrian government, its military and economy under Bashar Al Assad are dominated by the Alawites (Shia). Minority Alawites and their allies run everything important in Syria.

The current civil war in Syria began in the Spring of 2011 with the establishment of the Free Syrian Army, a group of Syrian Army defectors who are roughly 90% Sunni.

This struggle has been something of a proxy war with Iran (Shia) and Yemen (Shia) the main supporters of the Assad (Shia) regime with outside help from Russia. Arrayed against them in support of the rebels are Jordan, Saudi Arabia (the birthplace of Sunni fundamentalism), Turkey and Qatar (both Sunni) along with France, Britain and the US. The sectarian violence has spread to Lebanon where Hezbollah (Shia) has allied itself with the Assad regime and, additionally, fought with Lebanese Sunni groups.

ISIS began life as a fundamentalist Sunni organization. In effect, ISIS is a criminal organization populated by thugs for whom there are no rules of decency. Given sufficient exposure, it is highly likely that ISIS will completely alienate the Sunnis in Northern Syria and Western Iraq, as there is nothing in the Koran (as it is seen by the vast majority of its adherents) that justifies the murderous activities in which they have continuously been involved. Shia Iran is ISIS’ foremost committed enemy. Whose side are we on?

In addition, we have the new Iraqi army which is now being trained by the United States, but which has been referred to as “not so much an army as a vast system of patronage”. The Army, beholden as it is to the Shia government of Iraq, excludes from its ranks any Iraqi who might be opposed to that government. The army is widely said to have been infiltrated by local militias and foreign insurgents, resulting in secular killings and operational failures. It is, to all intents and purposes an inefficient, albeit Shia, operation. Further, current reporting indicates that much of the anti-ISIS opposition comes from Shia militia from Iraq. Do we want our boots on the ground with them?

Then we have the Kurds who are the largest ethnic group (28,000,000) in the world without a country and whose people are spread out over Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. They are estimated to represent 15-25% of the total population of Turkey. Even though they are Sunnis, like the Turks on whose land so many Kurds live, they are viewed with grave suspicion by the Turks as ongoing threats to the sovereignty of Eastern Turkey. In fact, they do find time to kill one another on a fairly regular basis. Whom do we support?

So we have this incredible mélange of ethnic and sectarian Middle Easterners involved either directly or indirectly in the Syrian insurgency. It is impossible at any given time, to predict just how they will react to the wide variety of scenarios that exist for the future. They are hardly the sort of allies that the US is used to and from whom we could possibly profit. Who are our friends? Our enemies?

Counterterrorism doctrine promotes police work, intelligence collection and Special Forces operations, never military. No matter what the Administration says, Syria is not a counterterrorism problem. It is a counterinsurgency problem. Some Americans openly promote American troops on the ground in Syria. US military doctrine dictates that in fighting an insurgency the occupying force must have one combatant on the ground for every 20-25 residents of the country involved. Even with all the Syrians who have left their country, there are probably around 22 million left. That would mean a force of 440-550,000 troops. Are we up to that? Who will pay for it?

And then there is the other reality. We have learned from our invasion of Afghanistan that if you overlook the rules and put American troops on the ground fighting against an organization that even the local residents hate, you present those residents with a dilemma. Do they support the invading Americans or do they support an indigenous group that they otherwise would hate? Our experience in Afghanistan and Iraq give us a pretty clear answer to that question.

These realities will not change simply because our policy makers want them to. And then, what is our goal? Even if we are successful in bringing down ISIS, what then?

We are so over our heads here!

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Wages of Fear

Originally published in the Rutland Herald and the Barre Times-Argus

 

If one looks back carefully at the post-9/11 period here in America, all related governmental activities are claimed to have been undertaken in the name of increasing the safety of the American people.

For its part, the press, probably because of the ceaseless demands of a 24 hour service, has been on top of any story that smacked of danger, terrorism or counterterrorism, to the point where terrorism was clearly their priority topic.

After 9/11, our lives were touched, not necessarily positively, by legislation on immigration, deportations, tourism and border security. Then, think of the NSA, warrantless wiretaps and covert intrusions into our lives. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act has turned air travel into a nightmare for passengers and cost us additional billions of dollars.

And consider the Patriot Act, which many believe has unnecessarily complicated the Federal response to terrorism and created counterproductive duplications and levels of authority.

In 15 years, over 250 governmental agencies were created or reorganized. Over 1200 government agencies and just under 2,000 private companies are now involved in counterterrorism.

And on the military side, estimates are that our military invasions in the Middle East have cost us multiple trillions of dollars. Apparently any money spent on counterterrorism is well-spent!

But then we are continually reminded that these post-9/11 defenses have prevented all serious terrorist attacks against us.

Yet, we have paid heavily in other ways. We have lived in an ongoing climate of fear and concern about future terrorism attacks here at home. If you don’t believe this, just look at the US press coverage of the terrorist attack on the publication “Charlie Hebdo” in Paris. It is, to say the least, pervasive.

On CNN, Wolf Blitzer exclaimed excitedly, “What a story this is”! For its part, just about every conceivable element of the Federal government is exhorting us to “be vigilant!”

A charitable soul would say that all the legislation passed, all the money spent, all the press coverage has been designed to somehow make us more safe. But it has also made us more afraid and more malleable, which is the goal of the terrorists. Nothing could possibly have made them more happy!

There is an alternate theory available that also fits all the facts of the past 15 years. That is that it has been a conscious aim of US Government, an aim augmented almost inadvertently by the US press, to keep Americans on edge about the imminent threat of terrorism.

When fear is a dominant factor in peoples’ lives, people change. They are more tolerant of policies they would normally never accept. They will put up with the loss of basic Constitutional and human rights for any sort of increased sense of personal security. In a “fearful” society, the people are more docile, more ready to accept a diminution of their rights.

What makes it all the more worrisome is that the Paris attack has brought a chorus of voices from our legislators which, if nothing else, have energized our press and their fellow politicians into fits of coverage.

In this context, it might be well for Americans to remember the judicious advice of Benjamin Franklin who admonished pre-revolutionary Americans that “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” (Franklin for the Pennsylvania Assembly in its Reply to the Governor -11 Nov. 1755)

So, there is a move afoot, either spontaneous or, more likely, quietly encouraged by government and energetically pursued by the press, to persuade us that terrorist disaster is just around the corner. One of our august Senators just suggested that attacks like Paris could come as often as weekly!

Just what does our government mean when it encourages our “vigilance?” Are we to profile people we take to be Muslims? If so, what do they really look like? Are we to report to the authorities activities that we as uninformed and inexpert individuals decide are dangerous or suspicious by people we think might be Muslims? Should we keep an eye on the Mosques?

But then, if we are truly interested in the whys and wherefores of Middle East terrorism, and if we do not fear the truth, we might even take the time to ask ourselves honestly why the situation exists as it does.   What roles have our Middle East polices and our military invasions played in the Muslim view of and policies toward America? If we can’t do that as a nation, we will forever be vulnerable to the kind of fear that now grips the West.

 

 

 

Originally published in the Rutland Herald and the Barre Times-Argus

During the Cold War, America and the USSR spent vast resources on the non-aligned world. Preeminent in that world were the countries of the Middle East. They were important because they produced much of the world’s crude oil and because control over that resource represented an incredibly powerful economic weapon. Both the Soviets and their Western competitors actively sought influence and control in that region.

Clearly, from 1945 until very recently, it was in the critical national Interest of the United States to maintain its influence in the Middle East. We needed the oil and we needed stability in the region.

“National interest” is defined in many ways, most of which focus on matters that are crucial to the wellbeing of any given state and often argue for military intervention.

Much has changed since our 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, America had a reasonably positive reputation in the Middle East. Today, less than one-in-five Palestinians, Egyptians, and Jordanians offer a favorable opinion. In the past ten years, polls have shown that roughly 75% of Muslims have an unfavorable view of the US Government, believe the US goal in the region is to weaken and divide Islam, and condemn American attacks that harm civilians. A like majority approve attacks on American troops in the region and favor the goal of getting America to withdraw all its troops from Islamic countries.

And this is in the face of a Muslim population, over 85% of which does not support Al Qaida, share its views or approve its methods!

In today’s world, an organized proficient terrorist organization does not need to hold land for terrorist training and planning. They can plan and carry out operations from any decent sized metropolis in the Western world. The real dangers reside in the angry minds of self-motivated crazies like those who have recently struck in Canada. They are not military problems. They are problems that can only be contested with intelligence and law enforcement assets.

The simple act of putting American uniforms on the ground in Islam has completely changed realities there. Instead of combatting terrorism, we have been forced to challenge and fight those who have wanted to change governance in their countries. Add to that our ongoing use of air power with all its unintended consequences. This has inevitably resulted in local populations supporting their own, whether the Taliban in Afghanistan or ISIS in Syria/Iraq, rather than the foreign invader and occupier, thus creating insurgencies for us to deal with.

In post war, post colonial Islam, we had two preeminent foreign policy goals, the maintenance of stability and control of the oil. In a Cold War setting, in a region where we were constantly contested by the Soviets, that policy made sense because it was in our national interest.

But what about today?

The Arab Spring gave Muslims the hope of self-determination. The problem in the region is not only that there is no history of that, but that stability and order have been maintained in the past by repressive governance. And if we are to understand Muslim attitudes towards us, we have to realize that they deeply resent the fact that those repressive governments were maintained in power by US Cold War policies. Unfortunately, stability, where it exists today, is still largely dependent on repression.

Add to that our ongoing attitude and policy toward Palestinians, our tolerance of Israeli settlement activities, our military invasions of the region, and our precipitous fall from favor in Islam becomes more clear.

And what of oil? With its newfound focus on shale, the United States has now surpassed Saudi Arabia in crude oil production.

The resources that are needed to fight movements like ISIS, Khorasan, Hizbollah and other fundamentalist Muslims groups, belong to the countries where they are active. If Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Maghreb and the Gulf states feel threatened, it will and should be up to them to provide the military power needed to combat them. It is not and should not be our fight because it is not in our national interest.

So, how can we find a “national interest” in present and future military activity in Islam? The simple answer is that we can’t. It is far wiser that we concentrate on intelligence and Special Operations – both of which are acknowledged to be the most effective tools against terrorism.

The worst mix in the world is the conventional US military trying to deal with terrorism on foreign soil. It will only, inevitably make matters worse morphing terrorism into far more difficult and expensive to contest insurgencies, as it already has in the Middle East.

 

 

 

 

 

Dealing with ISIS

Originally published in  SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS

With its meteoric military rise, its leadership, management and financing, the newest terrorist scourge facing the world is ISIS.  Operating in what is clearly a political vacuum in northeast Syria and western Iraq and benefitting from the studied indifference of most of the Muslim world, Isis is clearly on a roll.

The chaos in the Middle East and the broader Muslim world is largely the result of a combination of incredibly bad United States military/foreign policy decisions and the concomitant disintegration or destruction of all those elements, both good and bad, that were in place and maintaining order in the region before we invaded Iraq in 2003.

And in the midst of all of this chaos, Americans are coming slowly to the realization that ISIS presents us with real, long run, existential problems and that we probably have absolutely no idea how to deal with this situation at the moment.

Our problem in policy formulation on this issue is also of our own making.  It comes as a result of the same horrendous decision to invade Iraq, for that invasion created two new realities for us.

First, it has made more than half of the U.S. population extremely wary about any further military involvement in the Islam.  We are war-weary to the extent that virtually no policy proposal for dealing with ISIS has failed to mention the guarantee that there will be no U.S. boots on the ground.

Secondly, that Iraq invasion, coupled with our endless stay in Afghanistan, has virtually guarantees that the re-commitment of American troops in uniform will have a unifying anti-American effect on Muslim populations, even though the radical ISIS is viewed with horror by most of those local populations.

If you doubt that, look first at the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2003 which was driven largely by the fact that when the locals were faced with a choice between foreigners (Americans) and locals, they decided to back their own.  Or, look at the way Sunnis in Syria and Iraq, heavily influenced by hostile, unaccepting Shia governments in Baghdad and Tehran, have tolerated, even joined with ISIS in its fight for power.   The fact is that, particularly in Islam, given any need to choose between foreigners and locals, it is a rare thing that the foreigners will be favored.  All one has to do to understand that is read the history of the region.

So, what are our policy options?  The attitudes of both American and Muslim citizens toward the American military establishment, basically rule out the effective reintroduction of U.S. troops into the area, even if we had the necessary resources to do it.  Yet, if ISIS is to be neutralized, it will not be done without ground forces.  It’s not just the ISIS soldiers, it is the larger question of denying them control of the territory over which they now preside in Iraq and Syria.

Then we have Kurdish and Iraqi troops.  The problem there, accepting that they are ill-equipped, ill-trained and relatively ineffective, is that there are historical political reasons to worry about such confrontations.  We have ages old Kurdish/Turk frictions.  Additionally, any Iraqi army of the future is going to be Shia dominated in a struggle with Sunni ISIS.  That scenario bears the strong possibility that a Shia-Sunni conflict ultimately could easily embroil the entire region.

Needing foot soldiers and ruling out all non-Muslims, we are left with the rest of the Muslim world.  Note that none of them have so far rushed into the fray against ISIS, either because they are frightened to be seen to do so, because they prefer them to the alternative, or might even actually support them.  Why else would the Iraqi Sunnis, who are among the more secular Muslims, support a bloodthirsty bunch of zealots who want to install the most conservatively radical sectarian government imaginable? Perhaps as a counterbalance to Iraqi Shia forces?

We need to keep trying to find Muslims who disagree enough with ISIS to fight against them.  Barring such an unlikely find, we need to arm anyone – Kurdish, Iraqi or Shia – who wants to fight against them.  We need to keep US military uniforms completely out of the fray, but we might be well-advised to get ready for a protracted, completely covert or clandestine struggle against ISIS which would involve our intelligence resources as well as our black, paramilitary operational capabilities.

Or we can pretend there is not a real threat and wait until they hit us, which, absent meaningful U.S. involvement, they most certainly will do at some point in the future.

First published in the The Rutland Herald

 

Commentary

 

By Haviland Smith

 

Make no mistake about it, what we are watching in Iraq today is the direct result of our invasion of that country in 2003, an invasion that was conceived and carried out either because the Bush administration did not understand realities in that country and region, or because it chose to overlook them for its own political reasons.

 

Either way, uninformed or arrogant, the result we are watching today was a foregone conclusion from the start.

 

The net effect was that we liberated Iraq’s inherent violence.

 

Iraq, like so many other countries that languished under the boot of European imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, was never a real country. In fact, Iraq, with its populations of Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis jammed into one country without their consent, is about as hopeless a choice for a country as exists anywhere. Over the centuries, since 6,000 B.C., what is now called Iraq has been a part of 18 empires, most of them foreign.

 

Since 1920, when its modern boundaries were established, Iraq has been ruled by the British Empire, by its own monarchy and then from 1968-2003, by the Baath Party dictatorship under Saddam Hussien. From 2003 until 2011, the United States was the effective ruler of Iraq through our own military establishment.

 

Iraqis have virtually no experience with self-rule. For roughly 8,000 years, they have been ruled by their own monarchies and dictators or by foreigners. That might be hopeful if they shared any real harmony in their ethnic and religious makeup with their Muslim neighbors. But they do not.

 

Iraqi Kurds total about 4 million of the 30 million Kurds who are spread out through the Middle East. Having settled in what is now northeastern Iraq over 4,000 years ago, and as an Indo-European people, they are hardly unfamiliar with the realities of living within Islam.

 

In fact, despite the fact that they have kept their language, most Kurds have been converted to some form of Islam by their Muslim neighbors. Further, the geographic reality of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is mountainous and defensible, added to their foreign ethnicity, has never made true Kurdish integration into Arab Iraq possible. The Kurds are tough, independent and perpetually in search of a greater Kurdistan. They have remained part of Iraq because they were forced to.

 

The other major impediment to Iraqi self-rule was the split between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the early 7th century. Their differences are sufficiently profound to guarantee a lack of any harmony between them. This has most recently been seen in the absolute rule of the Baath Party (Sunni) over the Shia. Even though the Sunnis were and are in the minority of the Iraqi population and the Shia were and are the majority.

 

Sunni rule over Iraq since 1968 can only be described as brutal and repressive. The differences between them generated from the 7th century have been sharply exacerbated by the brutal rule of Saddam Hussien.

 

And, of course, the U.S. military replaced Saddam Hussein as the repressive rulers of Iraq, thus earning the animosity of the great majority of the Iraq people.

 

So, there you have it. Iraq is a “country” at war with itself. Its diverse residents have long been waiting for the opportunity to unify into independent Kurd, Shia and Sunni groups. It is an almost perfect candidate for partition and reassembly into three or more parts. The problem clearly is that they all want to rule, and none of them wants to be ruled — the perfect circumstances for the creation of new countries in what was Iraq.

 

It is unreasonable to believe there is a future for self-government in a single Iraq. The extraordinary current performance of the Iraq army in deserting en toto in the face of a vastly inferior attacking force tells the story, the outcome and the future. The Sunni private will not take orders from the Shia lieutenant.

 

There will be no peace between these Iraqi factions until all of them can get some sort of satisfaction — most probably in the partition of the “country.” Any attempt by any entity, particularly one which is not indigenous to the region, such as the United States, to thwart or influence such an outcome by force, is only going to make the situation longer lasting and worse than it already is.

 

If there ever was a fight that wasn’t ours, this is it, even though our invasion started it.

 

 

 

Originally published in The Rutland Herald

 

Commentary

 

‍By Haviland ‍SMITH

 

The United States Government has now committed military and intelligence assets to the search for the Nigerian children kidnapped by Boko Haram, a group of Muslim fundamentalist militants affiliated with al-Qaida.

 

 

For a wide variety of reasons, it would seem that the U.S. government has learned virtually nothing from its experiences throughout the past 14 years in the Middle East.

 

 

There seems, appropriately, to be a general consensus here that when we decide to get involved in what are essentially military or counterterrorist affairs abroad, it will be only because we are able to establish a direct connection to our own national interests.

 

 

In this regard, there are two points of view on the meaning of the term “national interests,” one of which goes far beyond the universally accepted notion that in any given event, nations should act only in ways that accrue to their own advantage. Today, we deal with the regular “realists,” who wish to implement only foreign policies that strengthen their state, but we also must deal with the “idealists,” who seek to inject morality into foreign policy or to promote multilateral solutions, which, many “realists” believe, given “foreign input,” would weaken the state.

 

 

And these are differences well worth considering. But they are not the only issues to consider.

 

 

If the U.S. government thinks it got in over its head in the Middle East (which it certainly appears to have done), then wait till it figures out how much easier it is to do the same in Africa.

 

 

The Middle East was and always has been a morass of competing national, tribal and sectarian interests. Given the policies of our government after 9/11 and the abject failures created by those policies , it is really difficult to understand how we could possibly have gone in the chosen direction we took there. But unfortunately for us and our national interests, we chose a course that ended up as complete disaster for us, despite the fact that there was expertise in U.S. governmental, academic and educational worlds that knew exactly what the situation was in the Middle East and that we should not under any circumstances, react as we eventually did. They lost. America lost.

 

 

Unfortunately for us, there is a far more pressing reality that affects our “national interest.” It is snugly vested in the fact that our unfinanced involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus our subsequent economic breakdown, have put is us in a uniquely negative position.

 

 

We are the unilateral world power that is going broke. We do not have the resources to continue to be the free world’s unilateral policeman. We have an entire nation that needs fixing: Our roads and bridges are falling apart, our electrical grid desperately needs attention, our schools continue to fail us in that they do not produce a product that is well suited for this new world we now occupy. In short, there isn’t much of anything here in America that does not require major financial input.

 

 

The Bush administration paid for its adventures in the Middle East with a national credit card. The Obama administration has continued that practice. Our Congress is not willing to spend one penny on our infrastructure unless the needed finances are taken out of some other national program. Infrastructure repairs will be financed only at the cost of social programs. Yet those who give our infrastructure short shrift are, in many cases, the same congressmen who chose to finance Afghanistan and Iraq with credit. Will they do the same as we move more deeply and broadly into involvement in Africa?

 

 

Quite frankly, any involvement in Nigeria is insane. If we are to use moral imperative as our rationale for intervention, there will be no end to our involvement in matters that have nothing to do with our real national interests. The net result of such policy will be the further impoverishment of our truest contemporary national interests, which are largely connected with our decaying infrastructure.

 

 

And what do we hope to accomplish with such involvements? What help can we give? We can only pray that our intelligence organizations have not been spending a great deal of time and money on Nigeria when there are any number of countries and issues that are far more important to us. In addition, a dozen of our military personnel are not likely to materially alter facts on the ground in Nigeria. The best we can hope for is that Boko Haram will swap those girls for prisoners held by the Nigerian government and that is likely to happen whether we load our guns or not.

 

 

 

   ‍Haviland ‍Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in eastern and western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Originally published in the Valley News

Ukraine is in ferment. Roughly one-half of the population (largely the half that populates western Ukraine) is in favor of joining up with Western Europe and most of the rest of the world both politically and economically.

 

The other half, which populates the eastern side of Ukraine and contains most of Ukraine’s nearly 8 million ethnic Russians, favors joining Russia. Western Ukraine is largely Roman Catholic, where the east is Russian Orthodox.

 

Does that sound vaguely familiar? Well, it should, because it is really nothing much more than a replay of the Cold War. Vladimir Putin, the old KGB colonel, has never given up on the Soviet theme of hegemony in their “near abroad” — those countries that abut their borders.

 

With a population of almost 50 million, Ukraine is high on the list of countries he would like to see return to mother Russia. In fact, what is clearly a major initiative on the part of Russia in Ukraine can logically be expected, should Russia succeed, to refocus the same sort of attention on the other countries in Eastern Europe that slipped out from under the Soviet/Russian yoke with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

 

It seems highly unlikely that Russia will interfere directly and overtly in the ongoing Ukrainian struggle. The events of 1991 probably ended Russia’s option for that kind of direct military intervention in its old Eastern European domain, and current realities in the West would make such a move fraught with danger for the Russians.

 

But then that’s not how the Russians like to operate. They are far more at home with covert, clandestine operations and provocations of the sort run so often by the old Soviet Union.

 

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the communist regime’s last-ditch effort made to keep control was to order the Soviet military into action against the demonstrations. It didn’t work because almost every soldier knew that he or she had friends and relatives among the demonstrators. In this context, it is fascinating that the only concrete warning given by President Obama on the Ukrainians was that they not commit their military establishment to the struggle. Additionally, there is little reason to believe that the Ukrainian government would be any more successful with military intervention than were the Soviets in 1991.

 

Masters that they are of provocation, it is likely that the Russians are doing everything they can to increase tension in Ukraine. It is worth noting that where the struggle started with rubber bullets, there were later live rounds in use. The demonstrators were reportedly using them against the Ukrainian authorities. But who were those demonstrators? Given what we know about Russia and its history in clandestine operations, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that there are Russian agents provocateurs on the streets firing live rounds at the Ukrainian authorities.

 

So, what is the United States to do? Clearly there is an element that feels we should get involved in any and all events where we somehow feel threatened. The real question is whether or not our involvement is in our own national interest.

 

To better judge that issue, we need to look at Russian motivation and goals. Putin would clearly like to reassemble the old Soviet East European Empire, and the best possible first step there would be to succeed in bringing Ukraine back into the Russian fold. If, for no other reason, that would encourage the Russians to think they could succeed with the rest of their reassembly project.

 

But that seems incredibly far-fetched. Ukraine is a European issue, and it seems unlikely that Western Europeans will be enthralled by the prospect of Russian success. The European Union has already entered the fray with sanctions against those Ukrainians believed to be involved in the Kiev carnage, coldly dismissing strident Russian criticism of their plans.

 

Given West European attitudes and the likely failure of Ukrainian military involvement against the demonstrators, Russian success in returning Ukraine to the fold seems highly unlikely. We can and certainly should give moral support to the European Union. Anything more that that would be crazy.

 

 

Originally published in The Rutland Herald and in the Barre Times Argus

Since November 4, 1979, when a group of Iranian students took over the American Embassy in Tehran and held its American employees captive for 444 days, America and Iran have been at total odds.

During those 34 years America and Iran have become increasingly mutually hostile.  A succession of American Presidents has instituted crippling sanctions against Iran. The Ayatollahs have responded in every way possible to make our lives increasingly unpleasant by supporting terrorism in the Middle East.  In short, both sides have done just about everything possible to maintain and even increase that level of hostility.

If you toss into the mix the important remaining countries in the Middle East, the situation becomes even more complicated.

Iran has been one of the dominant powers in the region for literally thousands of years.  With that dominance has come a sense of importance.  The Iranians believe they should be real players in their part of the world.

Iran is the largest Shia country in the Middle East.  As such, they are allied with other Shia elements in the almost 14 centuries old blood feud going on with Islam’s Sunnis. There are large Shia minorities in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The result is that there has been almost perpetual friction and occasional war between Shia and Sunni.

If you translate these realities into today’s world of P5+1 (US, Russia, China, UK, France plus Germany) negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, you will see immediately that there are a number of countries in Iran’s neighborhood who not only would not like to see Iran with the bomb, but would really like to see the country and it’s inhabitants obliterated simply because they are Shia.

Important Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia see Iran as a direct competitor for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East.  Seeing a nuclear Iran as far too powerful a competitor, they would like to have someone (read the USA and/or even Israel) bomb the Iranian nuclear capability into oblivion.

So, the biggest wild cards threatening a successful outcome to these negotiations are the Sunni components in the Middle East and the Israelis who over the past three and a half decades have been constantly threatened by Iran.

In fact, Israel’s Likud Party, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, has pulled out all the negative stops on the ongoing negotiations, telling the world, particularly the US, that the interim deal they have reached is a bad deal, with the clear implication that any negotiated deal at all would be equally bad.  In pursuing this policy they have pushed every pro-Israeli button they could reach, not only here, but also in all the P5+1 countries.

So far, it hasn’t worked as can be seen in the interim agreement just now announced.  Nevertheless, they have not given up.  It is understood that if America or the P5+1 place additional sanctions on Iran, as some American congressmen wish to do, that simple fact will abrogate any agreement.  So, there is still room for Israel to manoeuver to kill this agreement.

Remember, Iran is desperate to end the sanctions.

There is one critical fact must be kept in mind.  If the opponents of this impending peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear problem are successful and Iran proceeds to develop a bomb, then the only alternative policy for the P5+1 is to militarily attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Will the difficult nature of the target require boots on the ground?

First, it has not been proven that Iran even has a nuclear bomb program at this time.  Many western analysts, including many of our own, have agreed on that. In addition, the Ayatollah has issued a fatwa (prohibition) against it.

Second, there is absolutely no guarantee that Iran’s nuclear facilities can be destroyed.  They are largely bunkered far under ground giving them high-level protection.  In addition, their heavy water reactor in Arak, which will produce plutonium useable in atomic weapons, will soon be un-bombable as it’s destruction would widely spread lethal radioactivity.

There is no such thing as a perfect agreement, but this one looks pretty favorable for the US.  The Iranian program will be stopped at a point of our choosing. All of the concessions we have made can be unilaterally reinstated if we feel the Iranians are not keeping their end of the bargain.  Further negotiations will continue with the aim of negotiating away any Iranian ability to create nuclear weapons.

A final thought:  The Iranians are anything but stupid.  The bomb is only valuable if it is not used.  They know that if they were to create and use a bomb, their country would be wiped off the map.

 

Originally appeared in The Rutland Herald

It’s hard to believe that anyone save the most rabid republicans, could have watched the goings on in the White House over the past few weeks and not be horribly disappointed in what has been revealed.

 

In less than a month, we have been informed that President Obama was unaware of the fact that the NSA was listening to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphone, as well as the phones of thousands and thousands of other friends and allies, or that the Affordable Care Act’s internet roll-out in early October was facing crippling problems and that more related problems would be revealed almost daily thereafter.

 

Something is gravely wrong here.  Either the President/White House is lying, or it is not in control of the Executive Branch of our government.  Either way, the situation is unacceptable.

 

The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) is President Obama’s most important legislative initiative.  It may well prove to be the foundation of his presidential legacy.  Given those facts plus the energy and attention he has paid to Obamacare and its implementation, the premise that he was not aware of the problems well in advance is simply unacceptable.  If he was aware, then his action in going ahead with the roll-out before it could be a guaranteed success was incomprehensible and inexcusable.

 

Of course, the other possibility is that the President’s staff did not keep him informed on the incipient problems.  If that’s true, then heads should roll, but none have.  How could a President sit idly by and not be intimately involved in his most important legislative initiative?

 

The third possibility is that the President simply does not have control over either the White House or the Executive Branch.  That could only be explained by the White House’s lack of experience in Washington.  For a President to be successful in this country he and his staff have to be on top of everything of any importance that’s going on in the government, particularly any issues that are directly threatening to the President himself.

 

Which brings us to Mr. Snowden, the former NSA contractor, and his revelations about American electronic intercepts.  First, for those readers who see him as some sort of admirable or heroic whistle blower, it seems more likely that his efforts will prove to be highly traitorous.   Only time will give us a definitive answer, but there is every likelihood that what he has done will prove to be one of the most devastating reverses ever suffered by our intelligence community.  In the process of telling our enemies precisely what we do, he will aid them immeasurably in helping them defeat our efforts to protect ourselves.

 

The first question one must ask is how an employee of a private US firm which contracted to the NSA got such incredibly broad access to extremely sensitive information.  At a minimum, existing clearance and access procedures need to be carefully examined by our security experts.

 

The root issue here is not when the President got to know about NSA’s programs, the issue is whether or not he was ever informed at all.  If he was informed, say about Chancellor Merkel, then he most certainly should have put a halt not only to that effort, but to all other efforts targeting the leadership of our important foreign allies.  When it comes to risk vs. gain, there would seem to be little argument in this and other similar cases in support of gain.  Only a President could make that kind of judgment.

 

The other possibility, however remote, is that his staff was aware of these NSA programs and chose not to inform him.  If that proves to be the case, then the responsibility still lies at the foot of the President. The first question any incoming President has to ask the leaders of his intelligence community is whether or not they are doing anything at all that, if made public, could seriously damage our security or our standing in the world.  At that point, risk vs. gain kicks in and any president is left with the choice of whether or not to continue the program.

 

In one month, we have seen two such programs, one that has damaged the President and the other our standing in the world.  As the President himself has said, quoting Harry Truman, “The buck stops here”.  And it really does.  And in doing so, it has made the President and the White House look like amateurs.