Rural Ruminations

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

The good news for President Barack Obama on his Afghan decision is that, along with those predictable Americans who routinely favor military solutions to foreign policy problems, a solid number of Americans are prepared to wait and see if his plan will work.

The bad news is that there is a vocal group of Americans who are terribly disappointed, even angry, that the president has decided to up the ante in Afghanistan, committing tens of thousands of additional troops and treasure to what they think is a conflict that cannot be “won.”

So, you’re either with him or against him. The problem is that there is hardly any discussion going on about the plan and its viability, or of any alternate plans. One would think that for an administration that prides itself on its deliberative processes, both of those issues are worth public examination.

The best we can hope for is that we can get out of Afghanistan at minimum cost, without making the situation worse than it now is. In order to do that, we will have to do two things. We will have to weaken the Taliban to the point where they are amenable to the table and we will have to negotiate the conditions of our departure with them.

The Obama administration has decided that intensifying the struggle with the Taliban by raising troop levels is the answer. Unfortunately, that may be the worst approach to the problem. Raising troop levels, irrespective of whether we use them in combat against the Taliban or to build infrastructure, will simply turn more and more Afghans against us. And you can bet that there will be more combat between us and the Taliban, because the Taliban knows that such combat will primarily benefit them, not us.

Additionally and unfortunately and despite our constant protestations, the Afghans people know a invader/conqueror when they see one and we fit the bill.

So, how do we weaken the Taliban without ramping up counterproductive military operations against them? One way is to do the exact same thing that we did when we went into Afghanistan after 9/11. We buy them off.

The Taliban, after 5 years in power and another 8 in their current comeback, is not beloved by the Afghan people. Their brand of radical, repressive Islam is not benign and in the process of denying girls education, blowing up historic Buddhist statues and generally behaving like tyrants, they have alienated masses of their countrymen. We are not talking here about an insurgency that is beloved by its people. Feared perhaps, but not beloved.

That gives us wiggle room. We need to create something for Taliban fighters that is more attractive than the Taliban. The simple act of raising Afghan National Army salaries to the point where they are competitive or even superior to Taliban salaries is a good starting point.

The Taliban is really only a problem in the south of the country. The northern tribes, ethnically different from the Taliban Pashtuns, are not arrayed with the Taliban against us. That allows us to concentrate on the Pashtuns and the south, where broad support of the Taliban, even without our involvement, is already problematical at best.

Afghanistan will not evolve without the Taliban. It will be part of the coming management of any unified country. Thinking they can be eliminated is simply absurd. They want power and they do not seek a further relationship with Al Qaida. To portray the Taliban as waiting eagerly to welcome back Al Qaida is delusional and self-serving for those who want to step up our military involvement there.

Many Taliban fighters are reluctant at best. By actively working to wean them away from their organization, as we have done successfully elsewhere in the region and know how to do, we should be able to weaken their organization and encourage them to negotiate.

By attacking the problem this way, we avoid an augmented military presence and the concomitant combat, which will only exacerbate our problems and help Taliban recruitment and indigenous support. Actively seeking to weaken the Taliban buy buying them off is the only approach that accomplishes our goal of bringing a weakened Taliban to the table.

As it is now, having made this war his own by taking the military option, President Obama has set himself up for total blame for the virtually inevitable ultimate failure of his policy. And you can bet that the party that created the situation that got him into that mess will be the first and most vociferous in laying that blame on him.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog.]

Journalists don’t need to dig far to find the self-deception at the heart of Obama’s Afghan surge: A little Googling is all it takes to see that his hopes for the Afghan forces are absurdly high.

The success of President Obama’s surge in Afghanistan depends on raising the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to the point where they will be able to secure and hold their own country.

But it seems the Obama administration is mired in the same bog of self deception in which the Bush administration foundered, that is, they see the world as they wish it were, not as it really is. As long as that is the case, and as long as these kinds of important decisions are made on the basis of the domestic political needs of the Administration (the coming congressional and presidential elections), rather than the objective facts in Afghanistan, they will lead to the adoption of policies that try to please as many people as possible, rather than solve policies and probably will not find success.

At the most elemental level, and putting aside all the legitimate concerns about the nature of Afghanistan, its people, culture and present leadership, our press might properly and profitably zero in on the most important element in this just-announced Afghan policy – the Afghan security forces.

There are few if any secrets involved in this matter. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) have been the focus of every conceivable examination and inquiry the United States has to offer and there is a plethora of results of such examinations on the internet.

All an enterprising reporter has to do is Google “Afghan Army Readiness” or some permutation thereof and a world of estimates of the combat readiness of the ANA and ANP will appear authored by foreign news services, the GAO, the Armed Forces Journal, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Research Institute and legions of others. The first 200 hits out of almost one million produced by the aforementioned search raise enough questions about Afghan readiness to keep the press occupied for decades.

Afghanistan cannot be considered to be a modern state with a modern population. It is a family-based agglomeration of towns, villages, valleys and mountain tops where residents identify themselves as where they are from, rather than what they are. On the “what they are“ scale, they are dead last “Afghan”.

Therefore, the root question is whether or not such a state can rationally be expected to produce effective and appropriately ethnically diverse national organizations like Police and Army, when the primary allegiance of their people is to the family. What will a Tajik soldier do when asked to participate a military operation in Pashtun country? A Pashtun the north? Will they fight, run abstain, defect or mutiny? Those will be the questions every time a multi-ethnic force gets committed in Afghanistan.

In that context, it might be illuminating to examine the effects that some or all of the following issues are likely to have on unit cohesion, morale and effectiveness:

• The stipulated ethnic balance of the forces; ethnic tensions are said to be high.
• The effect of ethnicity on future military engagements.
• An ANA turnover rate or 25% and rising, according to US army figures.
• The ANA’s unwillingness to fight on certain occasions.
• Painfully slow training and uneven troop effectiveness.
• Inadequate ANA and ANP leadership as identified by U.S. military advisors.
• The effect of endemic national illiteracy on the training process.
• Very high narcotics use in the security forces.

Journalists should also note that it took eight years to grow the Afghan army to 100,000 soldiers. How long will it reasonably take to get to the desired 350,000, if that’s even possible?

The results of these inquiries will not lead to optimism. The limitations of the human raw material central to our new policies will very likely make our goals difficult if not impossible to achieve.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East, as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff, and as Executive Assistant in the Director’s office.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

President Obama has just informed us that we are going to remain in Afghanistan long enough to train security forces capable of keeping the Taliban at bay. Given Afghan realities, that is, at very best, problematical.

Afghanistan is not even a pure tribal society. It is a family- and geographically based society. Afghan Tajiks do not think of themselves by tribe. They refer to themselves by the region, province, city, town, or village from which they come. That means that even though two Afghans may be from the same Tajik tribe and speak the same Afghan Farsi, they may have absolutely nothing further in common. They could well have been raised in inaccessible mountain valleys hundreds of miles apart in families that shared virtually no common experience.

In that kind of society, individuals, in the main, owe their loyalties to their family, village, mountaintop or valley, for it is on such entities that they rely for their security and well-being. The concept of a greater loyalty to a national entity is largely unknown, particularly in rural Afghanistan where, given its fragmented geographic realities, there is little prospect for integrating the various groups.

Ethnically, Afghanistan breaks down into eight groupings — Pashtun, 42 percent; Tajik, 27 percent; Hazara, 9 percent; Uzbek, 9 percent; Aimak, 4 percent; Turkmen, 3 percent; Baluch, 2 percent; and others 4 percent.

These realities make the concept of national security forces — the Afghan National Army (ANA) or the Afghan National Police (ANP) — virtually alien. Guidelines set up in 2003 by General Karl Eikenberry, then our commander in Afghanistan, stipulate that the ANA must have proportional ethnic representation from its diverse population.

His guidelines called for 38 percent of the troops to be Pashtun, 25 percent Tajiks, 19 percent Hazaras and 8 percent Uzbek. In reality, Tajiks now account for 41 percent of all ANA troops who have been trained, and only 30 percent of the ANA trainees are now Pashtuns.

First, this is a difficult mix in a society that is narrowly family-based. Second, what do you do when you need the ANA in the Pashtun region? Does the normal 27 percent Tajik membership stand down for the operation because of ethnic differences? Does it stand up and create chaos, or does it refuse to carry out orders it does not favor?

Afghanistan is not America, Australia or Canada where, despite the “melting pot” nature of those societies, all the trappings of nationhood exist. Armies in those liberal Western democracies truly are national armies. They lack any meaningful, negative, ethnic schisms and understand the concept of nation that they are there to support. In Afghanistan, you have all the ethnic differences with no allegiance to the nation, no meaningful understanding of what nation means, and little inclination to support national goals over family or ethnic goals.

Then there is the Afghan flavor that permeates society and the ANA and the ANP. The turnover rate in the army is said to be about 25 percent. That means that statistically, the entire army is replaced every four years. This does little for unit cohesion or combat readiness.

At one point, the ANA rewarded recruits with a Kalashnikov rifles. Recruits accepted the rifle, then either did or did not serve out their enlistments, went home, waited a while and re-enlisted a second time in a new name to get another Kalashnikov.

A recent examination of U.S. Marine trainers of the ANA by the Guardian newspaper in London showed the acute frustrations of the Marines in trying to accomplish their missions. One trainer referred to his group of trainees as no easier to handle than “26 children.” All the Marines questioned said that narcotics use was so high that it seriously hindered the ANA in their appointed tasks. One trainer surmised that if drug tests were used and drug use were unacceptable, 75-80 percent of the ANA would not qualify for service.

These are extreme examples, but they are generally supported by embedded reporters and trainers who have worked with the trainees. Ultimately, the trainees represent what would be expected of a broadly illiterate, backward population of a country that really isn’t a nation at all. And this is the raw material on which our success is to be built?

As under the Bush administration, we continue now to see Afghanistan as we would like it to be, not as it is. There are alternate strategies that better reflect reality. As long as domestic American politics remains at the top of our list of imperatives in foreign policy formulation and we refuse to employ different strategies, our prospects for any kind of “success” in Afghanistan are minimal.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief, who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published in The Herald of Randolph.]

President Obama is in a real pickle around Afghanistan.  It is, partly of George W. Bush’s making, partly of his own.

George W. Bush went to war in Afghanistan for compelling reasons that centered on the horrors of 9/11.  The main reason was to bring to justice those who had perpetrated the 9/11 attacks against America.  We were focused entirely on a terrorist organization called Al Qaida. The battle came to a speedy conclusion.  We destroyed Al Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan and defeated the Taliban whose crime had been to give sanctuary to Al Qaida.

That changed rapidly as the Bush focus switched to Iraq.  US claims of lraqi misdeeds – WMD and connections to Al Qaida – proved false.  At the same time, there was much talk from the White House about the “long war” against terrorism.

In retrospect, pinning down the true motivation of the Bush White House for its Middle East policies remains illusive.  So far there have been no “kiss and tell” stories from former insiders, so we have no real fix on the truth.

However, if you look dispassionately at what actually happened between 9/11/2001 and the 2008 Presidential election, some reasonable conclusions can be drawn.

First, we were given the “War on Terror”.  Even though the name made no sense at all, it got across the fact that our American government was getting ready for what it began to label the “long war”.  It was coupled with the color-coded terrorist threat system which fluctuated up and down like a yoyo. Then we began to see incursions into our civil rights in the form of some activities authorized under the Patriot Act and some with no constitutional basis at all.

The White House was in a dither.  Karl Rove sponsored endless talk of the ”long war” and Vice President Cheney spoke ominously of going to the “Dark Side”, which, unfortunately, we ultimately did.  It almost looked as if the White House was consciously trying to keep the American public on edge, insecure, submissive and prepared to accept any activity as long as in enhanced their security.  The goal?  To maintain their power.

The most telling point, however. was when the White House began to refer to literally any activity it did not like as “Terrorism”. There was clearly a conscious move to confuse terrorism and insurgency in the minds of the American public. Thus, an organization like Hamas, which clearly commits terrorist acts, was labeled “terrorist”, even though it runs the entire civil side of life in the Gaza and in much of Lebanon as well. It’s sort of like saying that the American Revolutionaries were terrorists, where they were clearly an insurgency, simply because they used terrorist tactics.

What was the purpose of conflating terrorism with insurgency?  It enabled the Bush administration to explain the invasion of Iraq as, inter alia, a battle in the long war on terror, which it clearly was not.  It then enabled them to label the Taliban as part of the war on terror and justify a move back to Afghanistan and a brand new “surge” as the “most important site in the War on Terror”, even though the Taliban are an insurgency, pure and simple.

Terrorist organizations over the last half-century have tended to last no more than 10 years because they have little local support.  In contrast, insurgencies have seldom been defeated because their fellow citizens usually share their views.

So, even under President Obama, we are now considering a military campaign designed to “defeat the Taliban”, whatever that may mean and however unlikely it is to be successful, a struggle that will likely take decades, when the Taliban and Afghanistan have nothing to do with terrorism!

How is it possible that anyone as intelligent and as quick a study as President Obama could get caught in this Bush trap?  It’s really pretty simple.  During the campaign, while criticizing our presence in Iraq, Obama said that Afghanistan was the most important country in our fight against terrorism.  At least he didn’t say “war on terror”.  So here he is, with things going (predictably) badly in Afghanistan, saying not only how important ”success” is there, but that he will take into account the recommendations of his field commanders – a group which is generically incapable of saying any given military fight cannot be won. Yet, Obama is in the crosshairs of our military establishment, of all Americans who support military solutions to just about all our problems and likeminded, mostly Republican congressmen.  Obama further suffers from the fact that he has virtually no military credentials.  Thus, for him, any decision is a political no-win.

So, the future of our involvement in Afghanistan (and probably also in Iraq), as so often in the past, will be decided on the basis of Obama’s political needs here at home rather than the facts on the ground in the Middle East.  That approach has seldom worked in the past and there is no reason to believe it will work in the future.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff.  He is a former long time resident of Brookfield who now lives in Williston.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]
Trial Balloon?  President Obama has reportedly decided to limit our involvement in Afghanistan to a counterterrorism program. If this is true, he is on the right track.

In order to sort out Afghan and Pakistan policy, Americans need to better understand both terrorism and insurgency, because those are the key issues we are facing today in those countries. Our problems with this stem from the constant Bush administration policy of conflating the two, probably for its own political reasons.

It’s helpful to look at the results of a recent Rand Corp. study that examined 648 terrorist groups that existed briefly between 1968 and 2006. The study found that, on average, terrorist groups last around 10 years, whereas insurgencies can literally go on for decades. Compare the German terrorist Bader Meinhof Gang that lasted about 10 years to the Tamil Tigers’ insurgency that lasted 33 years in Sri Lanka. Effective insurgencies normally have a broad popular support base, since they share ethnic, linguistic and religious roots and often, goals, with the population. Local populations seldom support terrorist organizations because they normally do not have close ties to or much in common with the terrorists and their goals.

Most interesting in the Rand study was the finding that 75 percent of those terrorist groups were absorbed into the population, where 18 percent were defeated by police/intelligence operations and only 7 percent by the military. In short, terrorist groups are most productively confronted by police/intelligence operations, and least effectively by military operations.

The $64 billion question in Afghanistan and Pakistan is: Where are we dealing with terrorism and where with insurgency? This really matters, because you confront the two absolutely differently. If you do not, and get them confused, you will lose. Military operations against insurgencies usually spawn more insurgents than they kill. All insurgencies have to do to “win” is avoid total defeat, which makes them extremely difficult to eliminate. However, terrorist organizations can be far more easily selectively targeted and defeated, largely because of their lack of support from the indigenous population. Al Qaida is no exception to this.

Even the U.S. military concedes that Afghanistan is a battle against the Taliban insurgency and that there are few, if any Al Qaida terrorists in that country. Afghanistan is not center stage in our struggle with terrorism.

It is claimed, particularly by those who favor military action in the region, that Al Qaida has holed up in Pakistan and that they could easily return to Afghanistan if we were to leave. That may be, but U.S. Special Operations have decimated large numbers of Al Qaida’s leadership, leaving the organization a pale image of its former, potent self. Al Qaida has become a franchise operation with spontaneous, discrete groups springing up in England, Spain, and most recently in the United States — probably under neither the command nor the control of Al Qaida Central.

Quite apart from that, Al Qaida doesn’t need Afghanistan and can operate, plan and train from an infinite number of places around the world.

Unfortunately, our stepped up military activities in the region have enhanced our growing reputation in Islam as the “new Crusaders,” which does not help us in any way.

Afghanistan is not a terrorist problem. It is an insurgency and in taking the Taliban on, we are deviating 180 degrees from our original (and stated current policy) of combating terrorism. In addition, we will be in the middle of a nation-building operation, which, when combined with military-based anti-insurgency operations is likely to keep us involved there for decades.

Pakistan is an entirely different matter. As the only regional nuclear power with sufficient internal instability to provoke major concerns, it is and probably will continue to be of major importance to the United States. In fact, with the increasing instability of that country and our need to preclude seeing its nuclear weapons fall into the hands of terrorists, it is in relative terms far more important for our security than anything that could possibly happen in Afghanistan. Pakistan is, however, a Pakistani problem of which the Pakistanis are rapidly growing aware, which we should fully support, but to which we need not contribute troops.

Unfortunately, it may not matter what the facts are in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As has often been true in American history, politics will more than likely rule the day. The real question is whether or not President Obama will be able to overcome his insecurity and lack of experience in military matters and his concerns about being labeled “soft on terrorism” by his nemeses in the military and the political right if he goes ahead with any solution, however creative and promising, other than a stepped up war against the Afghan insurgency.

Whatever decision is made in the White House, it seems unlikely that the American people will support any protracted military effort in Afghanistan, not only because of memories of Viet Nam, but because it is not in our national interest to do so.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

Why does President Obama believe it is necessary to “win” in Afghanistan? Of course, this question begs the issue of what “winning” means and whether it is even remotely possible. Certainly, historically, it rarely, if ever, has been.

The president is, by all counts, a thoughtful and intelligent man. He has grasped the important issues involved in Iraq and has moved to a position that will end our military presence there in 2011. He appears to be uninterested in waging war against Iran. He is doing his level best to solve the intractable Palestine situation. These are all good, smart things.

But again, why is he intent on at least maintaining and probably increasing our level of military activity in Afghanistan? Which of his advisers is advocating that policy? Perhaps the answers can be found in his 2008 campaign rhetoric, his lack of military experience, and his hopes for increased bipartisanship.

During the presidential campaign of 2008, Barack Obama pleased many Americans by saying it was not in our national interest to be in Iraq and that he would get us out. As a companion part of that position, he said incessantly that we had been fools to abandon Afghanistan in favor of lraq. In other words, he supported our invasion of Afghanistan and criticized its abandonment, in contrast to his strong negative feelings about our Iraq adventure. He thus created a situation in which, ultimately, he would find it difficult to change his Afghan policy without being accused by his detractors of “flipflopping”.

Barack Obama of 2008 had literally no military experience or background and thus little credibility with either the military or its American supporters. If he wanted to have any credibility with the right and with pro-military congressmen, he may have felt that he had to balance his negativity on Iraq with a pro-military stance on Afghanistan. He does speak favorably and often about increasing bipartisanship.

He is probably a bit defensive about his own lack of experience in military affairs and wants to stay on the good side of military to placate the far right and not be referred to as “soft on terrorism” – all political, as opposed to military issues.

As president-elect Obama, he has found himself in a completely different situation. None of his old political associates had much experience with military matters. President Obama has hired retired General James Jones as his National Security Advisor, retained a Republican-appointed Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, and completely revamped his military team with Generals Petraeus and McCrystal as his go-to leaders on Afghanistan.

It’s a fair guess that two highly ambitious, educated, articulate, relatively young generals would be disinclined to admit that they could not meet the military needs of the administration – “winning” in Afghanistan. Clearly, they have said that the job can be done, albeit with much involvement on the civil side, yet they have no example of its ever having been accomplished!

America often has a way of re-fighting its last war and Afghanistan is no exception. The notion that there will be a literal repeat of 9/11 is pretty absurd. yet our defenses are all designed to thwart that attack! With all the current security involved in US air travel and the fact that there has not been a repeat in eight years, that approach seems pretty unlikely. The same can be said of the “refuge” theory that stipulates that terrorists must have training camps like pre-9/11 Afghanistan in order to pull off another attack of some kind. All they really need is a safehouse in a part of the world where they will not be likely to be watched. That opens up half the world for training and planning.

So, it would seem that President Obama is “motivated” in his Afghan policy, not by any personal experience or conviction that he is on the right course, but rather by his own lack of those attributes and his concomitant reliance on his military establishment, coupled with his own political imperatives, which play an important, perhaps even dominant role in his motivation.

Assuming that “winning” will continue to be illusory, our best way out of Afghanistan probably will be the inevitable decrease of support for that war in the American electorate. That would make every additional day we stay there a major part of the President’s negative legacy. Afghanistan is, after all, Obama’s war.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff.

Read Full Post »

[Originally published in The Herald of Randolph.]

America invaded Afghanistan in 2001 because, facilitated by the Taliban, much of the planning and training for 9/11 was carried out there. We have just recently stepped up our troop levels and counterinsurgency operations in order to “defeat” the Taliban (once again) and turn the country over to its current leaders (Hamid Karzai and Co.).

We need to ask some critical questions about our Afghan adventure: What are our goals there? What should our goals be? Must we “defeat” the Taliban to reach those goals? What is the likelihood that we can succeed? Finally, how much additional treasure are Americans prepared to commit there? How great is our patience for this war?

Afghanistan is now Obama’s war. His spokespersons have described our goals in Afghanistan as designed to root out al Qaida and the Taliban forces, prevent their return, support self-governance, and ensure security, stability and reconstruction.

The president has been quoted as having said, “Our critical goal should be to make sure that the Taliban and al Qaida are routed and that they cannot project threats against us from that region. And to do that I think we need more troops.”

Our one truly legitimate national interest in Afghanistan is to guarantee that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary and training ground for Al Qaida or any other group that seeks to do us harm. There should really be no talk of bringing democracy or the rule or law to Afghanistan—only stability without the presence of Al Qaida or other such organizations.

President Obama and our military leadership have acknowledged that we will not be able to accomplish these goals through military means alone.

The Afghan situation is further complicated by what Afghans and other Middle Easterners think really motivates the US. With very little past military involvement in the region, suddenly Americans are seen invading Afghanistan and Iraq. The only conclusion Islam can draw is that America is the new crusader. This is simply because the most memorable and formative thing that has come at them from Europe and points west has been the Crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

There is no difference is to a Muslim between being brought Christianity in the first crusades and Democracy in the current crusade. The prevalent opinion in Islam is that we Americans are the new crusaders.

In order to accomplish our legitimate interests of stability without terrorism, we must understand some of the basic realities of Afghan history. Traditionally, power in Afghanistan has rested in the many tribal chieftains who, in effect, have long run the fragmented country via their own tribal areas. Central authority and power have almost always been illusory.

The real question here is why we think we are going to succeed when no other country ever has. Anyone who reads history knows that the odds against success are unlimited. There are a lot of reasons for that history: inhospitable terrain, tribalism, xenophobia, corruptibility, indomitabililty, bellicosity, etc.

All those foreign invasions of Afghanistan over the centuries failed because they were undertaken for the benefit of the invaders, not the Afghans. Ours is no different.

The real question here is whether or not we need to “defeat” the Taliban to accomplish our goals and, further, whether or not we can do that even if we want to. The military struggle against an insurgency which blends into the civilian population, will only bring more Taliban recruits and support.

Effective non-military counterterrorist operations tend to eliminate terrorist organizations, on average, in about 10 years. Counterinsurgencies seldom win because the insurgents hold most of the cards.

Secretary of Defense Gates says that defeating the Taliban insurgency will be a “long-term prospect”. Any US-run and financed counterinsurgency will be viable only as long as American voters support it. That support will require visible, sustainable progress of the type we are unlikely to see.

There are tribes in Afghanistan that have no natural affinity for the Taliban or Al Qaida. We identified and worked with many of them during our 2001 invasion. Given the history of the country, it is likely that there will never be national consensus for central governance. That gives us the opportunity to work with those tribes that will predictably not support the Taliban, and will support our goal of eliminating Al Qaida.

This is anything but a far-fetched goal. Al Qaida has managed to alienate moderate Muslims all over Islam. In fact, they have a knack for doing so. If we are successful, the Taliban will moderate their stance on Terrorism, bringing the added advantage of lessening their negative impact in Pakistan.

Absent identifiable success, American public support, weary after six years of questionable military involvement in the region, will wane. All the Taliban has to do is successfully avoid final defeat, which any well-organized and well-run insurgency easily can do.

We need to eliminate Al Qaida without continuing to try to militarily destroy the Taliban. That only brings more Taliban recruits against the foreign invader, which is how we are viewed. As long as that is true, we will unite more Afghans against us and our goals.

Like Bush, all this president will have accomplished with military action is to kick the Afghan can further down the road for a future administration, without solving anything. What kind of legacy is that?

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. A longtime resident of Brookfield, he now lives in Williston.

Read Full Post »