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Originally published in Harvard’s Nieman Watchdog

Over the past dozen years, the United States has spent vast amounts of its human treasure and national resources on a series of foreign interventions.  We have now been involved in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, with Syria and Iran and Central Africa representing candidates for the immediate future.

All of this has been and will be done without declarations of war, over the supine body of our Congress, without the agreement of the majority of the American people and without real scrutiny from the press. We have become a nation of onlookers.

In the United States, Congress has the power under the constitution to “declare war”. However neither the US Constitution, nor the law, tell us what format a declaration of war must take.  The last time Congress passed joint resolutions saying that a “state of war” existed was on June 5, 1942, when the U.S. declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania Since then, the U.S. has used the term “authorization to use military force”, as in the case against Iraq in 2003.

For a variety of reasons, all of which are based on local historical, tribal, ethnic and national realities, our adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are not turning out as we might have wished.  Despite early warnings from our governmental and academic experts on those areas, it seems clear that any hopes we had for bettering the situations that existed there are likely to fail.  In fact, our military involvement in the region has lead to instability in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, as it almost certainly will if we succumb to local and international pressures to become involved in Syria and Iran.  And now we are told we should become militarily involved in Central Africa.

This is all well and good, but one key ingredient is missing.  We have never had a national discussion about the efficacy of American military intervention abroad.  We have seen two Presidents act in ways that made Congress disposed to support them without intelligent discussion of the activities proposed.

Over the past year, two thirds of Americans have been polled as opposed to our activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans are now faced with the specific prospect of military activity in Syria and Iran and with further future interventions around the world, it is time for America to have this discussion.

First, we need to discuss whether or not we want to conduct such operations at all.  If so, should we act independently of the UN and international coalitions, as stipulated, or unilaterally as many of our hawks and neocons would wish?

We need to have a discussion that defines the specific intervention problem and its solution.  We need to know the precise goal of the intervention, how long it will last and what the likely response to our intervention will be.

Then we need to and how it will be funded.  Are there to be more unfunded interventions like Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when we are already in deep economic trouble resulting from our past interventionist adventures?

Additionally, we need to be reassured that if the intervention involves terrorism, our approach will be limited to police and intelligence work.  We have learned far too much from Iraq and Afghanistan to again involve our military establishment in counterterrorism operations.

If we learn that an insurgency is involved, we need to know how our government plans to avoid subsequent nation building and the export of democracy.  Again, Iraq and Afghanistan provide the wholly negative lesson for us here.

Finally, we must determine whether or not any proposed intervention is in our true national interest and we need to do that in the absence of foreign pressures.

The only way we will learn the answers to these critical questions is through a national discussion of any proposed future intervention.  Our Government isn’t holding such a debate except for a little squawking by individuals now and then.  The media should and could do so, with one or more news organizations making it a front-burner item, interviewing experts and political leaders and staying on the subject.

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Originally published in American Diplomacy

Anthony Shadid, the New York Times’ correspondent, died in Syria on February 16, 2012 . An exemplary reporter and student of his subject matter, his last piece, “Islamists’ Ideas on Democracy and Faith Face Test in Tunisia”, appeared in the Times on the following day. In that piece, Mr. Shadid examined some of the issues involved in the evolution of governance after the Arab Spring Tunisian uprising. He paints a picture that considers some of the problems involved in any hoped-for transition to liberal democracy in the region.

Having listened for a decade to the premise — from some of our more conservative (and hopeful) national politicians — that our military activities in the Middle East were part of the process of bringing democracy to that region, perhaps it is time to more thoroughly examine that premise.

In its broadest sense, today’s Middle East and North African national borders were established or codified under British, French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese colonial rule in the 19-20th centuries for the advantage, convenience and profit of the colonial powers. The region under discussion here includes Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Algeria and Morocco.

Those borders ignored or cynically exacerbated many sectarian, tribal and national issues, which were of major importance to the local populations. The arbitrary l948 sectarian division of colonial India into India, Bangladesh and Pakistan; the virtual ignoring of tribal issues in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere; the further ignoring of other sectarian issues in Islam; and discounting the importance of nationality issues for Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Central Asians and Turks in virtually all of the post-WWII states that emerged out of the European colonial era, all stand as examples of the indifference of the colonial powers to issues that ultimately would create major differences and difficulties in the region.

Independence from Imperialism
Regional independence from European imperialism began with Afghanistan in 1919, with the largest number of nations gaining that independence after World War II. It all ended with Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar in 1971. It is worth remembering that in no one of the 20 countries involved, with the possible exception of Turkey, was imperial rule replaced by anything resembling democracy.

Post-war US policy was dictated by our Cold War imperatives and by the existence of abundant and inexpensive regional energy resources. Seeing Soviet communism as a threat to the status quo, we actively supported kingdoms, dictators, strongmen and just about anyone else who was anti-Soviet and could maintain stability for us. We sought to replace any regional regime that looked as if it might add an element of instability as in the cases Iran and Syria, which were destabilized under the active interventionist policies of the Eisenhower administration, creating situations with which we are still dealing today.

American Regional Foreign Policy
Much of America has long believed that we have the best existing economic (market) and governmental (liberal democracy) systems. This belief has been sufficiently widespread that it has quite often been the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Coupled with an inherent American tendency to evangelize, we have often sought to spread our systems around the world and to combat those systems that were not compatible with it.

The problem with this approach is that it does not sufficiently take into account already existing, foreign, governmental, economic and belief structures. It never asks, as can most recently be seen in the neoconservative authorship and continuing support of our invasion of Iraq, whether the ground abroad is sufficiently fertile for the establishment of democracy.

This American exceptionalism, which is fine for us at home, is unfortunately coupled with a poor to nonexistent understanding of the way the rest of the world works and why it is not necessarily a reflection of America.

Unfortunately, we are not favorably viewed in the region. Over the past 65 years of our post-WWII involvement there, we have hardly endeared ourselves to local populations. We have everywhere supported despots and dictators against the wishes of their citizens. We have stationed foreign (US) troops against Muslim law on holy Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia. We are seen by regional locals to have been biased in our support of Israel. And now we are, again in contradiction of Muslim law, killing Muslims across the region.

As If that were not enough, the Bush administration hectored the Palestinian Authority to hold free elections in 2006. They did so and the result was the election of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The administration immediately refused to recognize Hamas, saying it was a “terrorist” organization. This proved beyond doubt to the citizens of the region that the United States was just another hypocrite. If elections we call for do not go our way, we don’t recognize their validity.

We are just now withdrawing from Iraq, still heavily engaged in Afghanistan and, if some would have their way, soon to be involved in Iran and maybe even Syria. And all of this without any real discussion of our own vital national interests or expectations for the region. Do we want to support monarchies across the region? Or, consistent with our Cold War policies, do we want to support any ruler or government that provides stability, irrespective of the manner in which it is provided? Do we want Democracy? How is that working out anywhere in the region? Iraq is problematical, as is Egypt where the military establishment owns a significant share of the economy and has a vested interest in the status quo.

The Middle East today
The unfortunate fact is that the region has virtually no experience with Liberal Democracy. Its history of non-governmental political organization is severely limited. The region is mired in tribalism, sectarianism, brutally imposed secularism or Islamic law, dictatorships and monarchies. None of these are steppingstones to Democratic governance. We have tribes almost everywhere, significant military power in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran and Jordan, to name but a few and Islam everywhere.

In the most evolved post-Arab Spring states, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, “free and democratic elections” which must never be mistaken for the actual existence of Liberal Democracy, have brought Islamic parties to the forefront. That is to be expected, as the Islamic parties, even in Turkey where they were once marginalized, represent the only non-governmental political organizations that exist and have existed under pre-Arab Spring governance. They have the membership, organization and funding to outcompete all the opposition, including those on Tahrir Square who believe, without quite knowing what it really means, that they are seeking something called “democracy”

What they all are seeking, whatever they may be heard to say, is self-determination and if we wish to stay on the right side of whatever is to come in this important region, that is what we must support.

The preconditions required for the successful establishment of Democracy
Democracy doesn’t simply spring up, particularly in countries with little to no history of self-rule. It has certain preconditions. To be successful, it must have the active, unfettered participation of the people as citizens in politics and civil life. It requires national and regional tolerance of pluralism, a general and equal right to vote, free and fair elections, the rule of law, unbiased courts, a guarantee of basic human rights to every individual person vis-à-vis the state and its authorities as well as to all social groups, particularly religious institutions,

In addition, it requires a Constitution providing for the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), freedom of speech, press and religion and, particularly, good governance which stresses the public interest and the absence of corruption.

How do these preconditions stack up against today’s regional realities? The answers may be found in the region’s sectarian, tribal and national realities most of which can be found in all of the region’s 21 countries.

In the sectarian world, Muslims tend to believe in and be content with Islam. There may be glaring deficiencies from our point of view, but by and large that view is not shared by Muslims. The Koran and its attendant writings, the Hadith and Shariya, provide the believer with a complete blueprint for life. An essentially content group of Muslim believers cannot be viewed as ripe for conversion to democracy as many of democracy’s basic tenets are diametrically opposed to the teachings of the Koran. Besides that, conversion attempts have been going on since the 11th century crusades and continue to this day with the Bush administration’s policy of bringing democracy to Islam. Muslims are used to us. Many call us the 21st century Crusaders.

Ongoing tribalism is another factor that inhibits receptivity to democracy and Tribalism has never not been a factor in a region where tribes have always been the basic building block of society. Tribalism exists throughout the Middle East and in its extremes, Afghanistan, for example, it brings with it an ingrained distrust of central governance and a drive to keep it as weak as possible.

In its subsequent state of evolution, tribalism supports ethnic alliances, essentially macro-tribal groupings. This can be observed in the Arab, Kurdish, Persian and Central Asian groupings that exist willy-nilly in the region. And thanks to the European colonial powers, these groups, which are only edgily compatible at best, have been corralled into “nations” which over the years have owed their existence to iron-fisted rule that forbad their disintegration. Hardly the underpinnings needed for liberal democracy.

A swift transition to democracy?
Almost all of our politicians, both past and present speak glowingly of a transition in the Middle East to “democracy”. However, there is nothing in past history or contemporary reality that could logically argue that the region is ready for such a transition. Unfortunately, when American politicians speak of “democracy” this way, they are lecturing a short attention span American audience that takes them to mean that we will see a “democratic” Middle East in the near future.

Both the Bush and Obama administrations speak thusly about Iraq, yet Iraq shows every sign at this moment of falling into what has been for many students of the area, predictable, protracted internecine strife. The most recent impediment to strife after Saddam, the US military, has now left, opening the country to very old antagonisms. Afghanistan does not meet any of the criteria for the future successful growth of democracy and we will probably have to make do with some form of Taliban governance.

In Tunisia and Morocco we see moderate Islamists winning elections. In Egypt, the moderate Muslim Brotherhood is running into the Egyptian military juggernaut, which because of its large holdings in the Egyptian economy, are vested in the status quo. Further, the fundamentalist Salafi Muslims are waiting in the wings. In Libya, none of the western powers that supported the struggle against Qaddafi wants to stay around. They have all left and Libya with its 140 tribes and tribal groupings and its old jealousies and rivalries, as it is likely heading for internal trouble. Syria will stop being a problem only after the current minority sect Alawite regime or the protestors are gone. There really is nothing but bloodshed in the offing, regardless of who “wins”. Retribution will likely be the name of the game.

It is an unfortunate fact that our military presence and activities in the region have not helped at all. When we face what are truly insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, not terrorism as claimed by both the Obama and Bush administrations, we present local populations with impossible choices. They must choose between a foreign military force whose true motives are unclear to them and their own people who are fighting against the foreigners. As we are now seeing, there is little reason to support the foreigners and every reason to support their fellow citizens.

There is no magic democratic wand for the Middle East. The absolute best we can hope for are moderate Islamist regimes. The worst will be fundamentalist regimes of the type supported by the Saudi Salafis. We need to get the notion of a democratic Islam in the short term out of our heads and focus on supporting moderate Islamists. Only they have any possibility of successfully confronting Islamic extremists and ultimately evolving into liberal democracies. The timelines for that kind of change are likely to be measured in decades at best and centuries at worst.

In the interim, we might want to concentrate on proving to a skeptical Middle East and greater world that our systems work for us Americans, let alone anyone else. What has happened to that “Shining City upon a Hill”?

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What Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us and what Syria and Iran can teach us further is that American needs to have a robust debate on if, why, where and when we should be involved in future foreign interventions.

In 2001, solely as a result of the events of 9/11, the United States invaded Afghanistan.  There were some Americans who spoke out against that invasion, largely on moral grounds, but in the main, we understood why we were doing it and agreed with that invasion.

In the longer run, as is now becoming painfully clear to the average American, absent repressive governance, the bitterly tribal Afghanis are so resistant to any central government that they are unlikely to achieve any kind of unity.  The likely result is instability.

When we had wiped out Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, we shifted our aim to Iraq and for reasons still largely unknown to the American people, we invaded there.  In our rationale for that invasion, we painted Iraq as “a regime that developed and used weapons of mass destruction, that harbored and supported terrorists, committed outrageous human rights abuses, and defied the just demands of the United Nations and the world”.

None of those reasons passed muster with us.

Although most of our governmental and academic experts on the region said that would not work, the Bush administration implemented the plan.  Since then, we have seen no sign of ultimate success.  Sectarian and national differences within that country make unity illusory, as many experts told us in 2003.  How can we expect Sunni, Shia, Arab and Kurd to get together when they have never previously done so except when coerced?  The likely result is instability.

Our next Middle East adventure was in Libya where we became involved primarily with air support for the anti-Ghaddafi rebels.  In the case of Libya, we were ultimately “successful” in that the rebels did bring about the demise of Ghaddafi.  In the longer run, we are seeing the effect of centuries-old tribal realities – about 150 of them – which split the country and make non-coercive, central government extremely difficult, if not impossible.  The likely result is instability.

Now, the pressure is on here at home for us to “do something” in Syria.  “Do something” apparently ranges in the minds of Americans from Invasion, through air support, to the creation of “safe zones”, but the fact is that we really don’t know what to do.

In Syria sectarianism is at work.  It is a country ruled by a 12% minority Shiite government of Alawites, over the the 74% majority Sunnis.  Since its beginnings in 1963, it has not been a happy arrangement.  The people don’t like either the Baath Party or the Assad family.  Unfortunately, that’s about all they have in common.  There is no indication that those rebellious Syrians have anything much in common when it comes to what sort of post-Assad, post-Alawite government they would support.  Given the extent of anger on both sides, it is probably safe to assume that the losers in this ongoing

struggle will exit Syria in coffins.  There seems to be little hope for a triumph of either reason or humanity.  The likely result is instability.

And finally, let’s move on to Iran where American pro-war activists and the Israeli government are clambering for the invasion of a country which has not yet decided, according to the US and Israeli governments, whether or not to build nuclear weapons, where the Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has referred to nuclear weapons as a sin and where, in 2005, he issued a fatwa forbidding their production, stockpiling and use.

Given the other salient realities of Iran and their unquestioned ability to harm our interests in the region, one has to wonder why we are so intent on an attack. In addition, there are current Iranian overtures for talks and the fact remains that any attack on Iran will be the only event that will unite the fractious and unhappy Iranians under its current leaders, which is certainly not in our interest.

The real issue here is whether or not Americans want to be involved in such activities at all and if we do, how will we decide where to intervene?  Is it in our national interest?  Should we involve ourselves in Syria, Iraq, or, as President Obama seems to wish, in Central Africa?

The American people have never had that discussion.  With a war-weary population and before we rush off to some new “worthy” intervention, the discussion simply has to take place.

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First published in Harvard’s Nieman Watchdog

COMMENTARY | March 01, 2012

The only way to achieve our goals in the region is to relentlessly promote self-determination, support moderate Islamists — and not expect miracles, writes a former CIA station chief. Trying to impose our ways, as we should know by now, will only be counterproductive.

The national boundaries created in the Middle East by European colonial powers in the 18th and 19th Centuries ignored traditional, long-standing tribal, sectarian and national realities. They stand as examples of European indifference to issues that ultimately have created major difficulties in the region. Partly as a result of this indifference, Western activities are not favorably viewed in the region in this post-Arab Spring era.

Over the past 65 years of our post-WWII involvement there, America has hardly endeared itself to local populations. In striving for regional “stability”, we have everywhere supported brutal despots and dictators against the wishes of their citizens. We have stationed foreign (U.S.) troops against Muslim law on holy Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia. We are seen by regional locals to have been biased in our support of Israel. And now we are killing Muslims across the region.

Local populations generally do not support terrorists, but when we combat what are really insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan — not terrorism as claimed by both the Obama and Bush administrations — we present local populations with impossible choices. They must choose between a foreign military force whose true motives are suspect and their own people who are fighting against the foreigners. As we are now seeing, there is little reason to support the foreigners and every reason to support their fellow citizens.

As If that were not enough, for years the Bush administration hectored the Palestinian Authority to hold free elections. They finally, reluctantly did so in 2006 and the result was the election of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The administration immediately refused to recognize Hamas, saying it was a “terrorist” organization. This proved beyond doubt to the citizens of the region that the United States was just another self-centered hypocrite. If free elections promoted by us do not go our way, we don’t recognize their validity.

We further prove our bad intentions and insensitivities with Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, waterboarding, Koran burning and errant drone strikes.

The unfortunate fact is that the region has virtually no experience with liberal democracy. Its history of non-governmental political organization is severely limited. The region is mired in tribalism, sectarianism, brutally imposed secularism or Islamic law, dictatorships and monarchies. None of these are steppingstones to democratic governance. There are tribes almost everywhere, significant military forces in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran and Jordan, to name but a few, and Islam everywhere.

What they all are seeking, whatever they may be heard to say, is self-determination and if we wish to stay on the right side of whatever is to come in this important region, self-determination is what we must support.

Democracy doesn’t simply spring up, particularly in countries with little to no history of self-rule. To be successful, democracy requires the active, unfettered participation of the people as citizens in politics and civil life. It requires national and regional tolerance of pluralism, a general and equal right to vote, free and fair elections, the rule of law, unbiased courts, a guarantee of basic human rights to every individual person vis-à-vis the state and its authorities as well as to all social groups, particularly religious institutions,

In addition, it requires a constitution providing for the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), freedom of speech, press and religion and, particularly, good governance which stresses the public interest and the absence of corruption.

But there is no magic democratic wand for the Middle East. The absolute best we can hope for are moderate Islamist regimes. The worst will be fundamentalist regimes of the type sought by Salafis. We need to get the short-term notion of a democratic Islam out of our heads and focus on supporting moderate Islamists. Only they have any possibility of successfully confronting Islamic extremism and ultimately evolving toward liberal democracy in the long term.

In the interim, we might want to concentrate on proving to a skeptical Middle East and greater world that our democratic systems actually work here at home, let alone anywhere else.

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Originally published in Harvard’s Nieman Watchdog

By Haviland Smith

It’s difficult not to notice that there is a growing crescendo here at home which appears to be encouraging the United States to attack Iran.  Backers of this campaign, at least until recently, have been limited to the Neoconservatives who would like us to invade everywhere and who got us into the Iraq invasion, parts of the Israeli government, and those American supporters of Israel who never question anything the Israelis do.

However, to the amazement of many who do follow this kind of story, the game changed late last year with an article in “Foreign Affairs” which purported to explain “Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option”.  And this from one of the most venerated, serious, foreign policy publications in the world!

So, what’s wrong with this notion of attacking Iran?  Perhaps it’s best to look at it strictly in terms of American national interests, because that is what US foreign policy is supposed to reflect, particularly in matters of war.

Even if Iran is actually in the process of developing a nuclear weapon, which, incidentally, they and the International Atomic Energy Agency both say they are not, how does that represent an existential threat to the United States?  The Iranians do not have the required rocketry to deliver it here.  Even if they did, the decision to do so would involve Iranian acceptance of the fact that the inevitable retaliatory strike would destroy most of Iran.  If you are among that group of Americans who think of the Iranians as ignorant ragheads, think again.  These are educated, intelligent, sophisticated people.  They may be annoying, but they are anything but suicidal.

Furthermore, irrespective of the exhortations of the current Israeli Prime Minister, Bibi Netanyahu, the same is true for Israel, since Israel’s nuclear arsenal and delivery systems leave little to be desired in terms of their effectiveness.  Retaliation, either from Israel or the US, for a strike on Israel would essentially eliminate Iran and the Iranians know it.  Nothing we have learned since the Cold War has invalidated George Kennan’s “containment policy”.

The value of nuclear weapons in foreign policy remains valid only as long as those weapons are not used.  Once used, once the damage is done, they are irrelevant.  No one can say precisely what is likely to happen if we or the Israelis are somehow stupid enough to try a preemptive attack on Iran, but it is worth looking at the possibilities.

Iran presides over the 34-mile-wide straights of Hormuz and probably can shut them down for long enough to create economic chaos in the rest of the world.  Where the Iranians are not stupid enough to initiate nuclear war, they most certainly would retaliate conventionally against an attack on their own country.  Such an attack, originating from the West or Israel probably represents the only thing that could unite the Iranian people behind the Ayatollahs.  Shipping through the Straights carries 20% of the world’s crude oil.  Its denial to worldwide markets, particularly in these times of economic stress, would be catastrophic. How does gasoline in the range of $15-20 a gallon appeal?

Iran is the 18th largest country in the world.  It has a population that exceeds 77 million, a standing army of over 500,000 backed by an active reserve of over 600,000.  The military is well-equipped and well-trained.

Iran has Shiite connections throughout the Middle East.  They constitute 36.3% of entire regional population and 38.6% of the regional Muslim population.  The Shiite majority countries are Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, homeport of the US Fifth Fleet.  Shiite Muslims constitute significant portions (20% or more) of the population in Lebanon, Yemen, Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Through these Shiites, Iran has the potential to cause all kinds of trouble for us and our interests in the Middle East, most emphatically including our naval assets and troops in the region.  Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mahdi army in Iraq and the Shiite majority in Bahrain represent only a partial list of the troubles Iran can cause us through the Shiite populations of the region.

Unless the US has some unknown, magical weapon to deploy against Iran that will prevent Iranian retaliation after a raid on their nuclear sites, it would appear that we suffer from a real tactical disadvantage in the Middle East when it comes to planning an attack on Iran.  Unfortunately for us and the rest of the world, that tactical disadvantage has almost limitless potential to morph into a strategic, worldwide, economic disaster.

An attack on Iran is a really bad bet, whether initiated by us or by the Israelis.

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By the end of this month, there will be no more American troops stationed in Iraq, and if the American logistical team is as good as we hear, there won’t be any US military hardware, not even uniforms and toothbrushes left there either.

March 19, 2012, would mark nine spent years in Iraq.  Precise numbers of casualties are disputed, but it would seem that over that period of time, we have suffered almost 4500 deaths and over 33,000 wounded.  The only dispute here is on the numbers of US wounded, with some sources claiming that over 100,000 would be closer to the truth.  In any event, the care and treatment of wounded, whatever the number truly is, will continue for decades and cost close to a trillion additional dollars.

In direct financial costs, the Brown University “Costs of War” project estimates that the Iraq war alone has already cost in excess of 1 trillion dollars.  That number does not count any future costs, whether medical or interest payments on the billions borrowed to pursue the war, or anything else.  It’s not too hard to remember Bush Administration officials telling us that the Iraq war “would pay for itself”!

Saddam Hussein, unless you were on his team, was a horrific leader.  He murdered countless numbers of his fellow Iraqis, using poison gas on his own people.  On the other hand, if you take a totally self-serving, cynical point of view, he represented a number of things that have been important to United States administrations in the past.  He maintained a stable government and country – by repression, of course.  He maintained the flow of Iraqi oil to the West. He and his large army represented the only truly effective deterrent to Iranian hegemonic goals in the Gulf region.  He was on “our side” in the Cold War.  Additionally, he attacked and made war against Iran between l980-88.  All of these things, at one time or another, have been important to, approved and encouraged by American administrations, particularly the war with Iran, which took place during Ronald Reagan’s administration.

One of the things our attack on Iraq accomplished was to end all of the above practices which were appreciated, even encouraged by a variety of US Administrations.  So, what good did it do for anyone?

The roughly 100,000 Iraqi dead didn’t appreciate our invasion.  The Sunnis, a minority in Iraq’s complex ethnic and secular structure, who had ruled mercilessly there, have not fared well in the aftermath of the invasion.  It’s really hard to figure just how the Kurds have made out.  If they can continue their semi-autonomy there, which they clearly plan to fight to do, they could conceivably be considered winners.

Regional Sunnis are not pleased with Shia ascendancy in Iraq since that basically empowers contiguous, Shia Iran.  After all, Sunni Iraq had been the major bulwark against Iran’s quest for Gulf hegemony at the expense of the Sunnis.  Thus, the Shia, who represent 60+% of the Iraqi population are clear winners.  Having been horribly repressed by a succession of Sunni governments, they are finally in charge.

The far most important winner in the region is Iran.  With their confessional confederates in charge in Iraq, they no longer are faced with an implacable Sunni neighbor.  With our final expulsion from Iraq, Iran is now virtually free to pursue its hegemonic goals in the Gulf.  There is literally no army in the region that is remotely capable of taking them on.  Their active duty military establishment is over half a million strong with an additional 600,000 in the active reserve.  Iran is a country of 78 million people living on 1.6 million square kilometers, the 18th largest country in the World.  They are intelligent, capable people who, in the millennium before Christ, ruled the entire region that we now call the Middle East.  It was, at the time, the largest empire ever constructed by man.  Iranians have not forgotten these facts and seek to be taken more seriously in their region today.

How is the future shaping up for Iraq today?  With Nuri al-Maliki heading a government made up largely of pro-Iranian, Shia Islamists, hope is fading for a calm transition to a secular Islamic government.  It now appears that the national and sectarian instabilities of the past, Sunni/Shia, Arab/Kurd and Arab/Iranian are likely to determine the future.

Any country that is inherently politically unstable and volatile, like Iraq with its history of sectarian conflict, is heading for trouble.  There is every possibility that a renewal of the sectarian fighting of 2006-2007 that killed thousands of Iraqis could be just around the corner.

And remember, this time, the Shia will be in power, not our old “friends” the Sunnis, with Iran not very far behind.


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Egyptian Democracy?

As the situation in Egypt heated up last week, we learned that the Obama administration is applying the heat to Egyptian military rulers in the hope it can influence Egypt’s political future.  According to press reports, the administration’s concern is focused on the need for faster democratic reforms and stricter restrictions on the Egyptian security forces that are being blamed for the many deaths during the recent street protests in and around Tahrir Square.

Apparently, most of the heat came as a result of administration fears that the ongoing Egyptian unrest is threatening what the Obama administration hopes will be a smooth transition to democratic rule in that country.  And therein lies the rub!

“Smooth transitions to democratic rule” have certain prerequisites.  Most important, irrespective of the location of the hoped-for changeover, is some sort of history or experience with the most important aspects of democratic rule.  Those are:  the active, unfettered participation of the people in politics and civil life; national tolerance of pluralism; the right to vote in free elections; the existence of the rule of law and unbiased courts; the guarantee of basic human rights, particularly religious; the separation of powers and freedom of speech, opinion, press and religion.  Absent these preconditions, the struggle for democracy will rarely be won.

Egypt formally ended its colonial period in 1922 when England issued a unilateral declaration of Egypt’s independence, resulting in the creation of the Kingdom of Egypt.  That kingdom limped along with persistent British manipulation until 1953 when the Egyptian military, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser took power.  From then until the January 2011 uprising, the Egyptian military, successively under Generals Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, has maintained control of Egypt.  In fact, they control Egypt today.

The Egyptian election cycle started on November 28.  The question that needs to be examined is what are the likely outcomes of this process?

Given the fact that Egypt has virtually no experience with democracy, it is difficult to see the cohesive support that a triumph for democracy would demand.  There are, essentially, two national organizations that have the requisite organizational and political experience to compete effectively in these elections.  They are the military establishment that has ruled the country, to the ire of much of the population, for almost 60 years and the Muslim Brotherhood that was founded in Egypt in 1928 and has been actively engaged in Egyptian politics, albeit often surreptitiously, ever since.

There is no democratic organization in Egypt that has the political or organizational experience that would make it a contender in these ongoing elections.  Even if there were, such an organization would be perpetually in the crosshairs of both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Why, then, have we Americans staked so much on a “democratic” outcome for Egypt or any other Muslim country, if such a result in so unlikely?  Of course, we do it because we believe it is the absolute best system of government for all of mankind.  We do it because we are a collection of ethnocentric human beings who have little to no understanding of Egypt or Islam.

Egypt has Islam.  Islam provides its Egyptian believers with complete and comprehensive rules for behavior.  Most believers are comfortable with those rules.  Many see no benefit to them, either nationally or individually, in democracy.  In fact, the existing Islamic parties offer a viable alternative to the corrupt, repressive, long-serving dictators who have clearly been seen by Muslims to have been kept in power by western “democratic” governments.

On November 25th, Morocco’s first post-Arab Spring elections were won by an Islamist Party.  The only thing that is important here is that the Moroccan and other Islamist parties actually reflect the will of their peoples.  What we should be concerned about here is not “democracy” but “self-determination”.   Once these Muslim nations have decided what form or forms of government they wish to have, we should support them unreservedly, while maintaining our own convictions that our system has something to offer the rest of mankind – if they agree and if they should choose to adopt it.

It is absurd and counterproductive for the Obama administration to be up in arms about the Eqyptian elections.  The notion in the administration and in Congress that we will refuse to contribute foreign assistance to them because they “do not become a democracy” is absolutely absurd, particularly if it is in our national interest to support them. They will become what they become and no amount of American pressure will change that.

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Originally published in the Rutland Herald and the Barre Times-Argus

Article published Nov 6, 2011

Currently, the Arab world seems to be in nearly complete ferment, not necessarily heading for liberal democracy as we know it but probably toward self-determination, the result of which, if fulfilled, is likely to add to stability in the region.

Even though the process of getting to self-determination is likely to be exceedingly rough — take Libya, for example — it is inexorably under way. Every country in the region will be profoundly affected, most emphatically including Israel, which in the long run could face an even more united, less accommodating Arab world. Even today there is talk in Egypt of doing away with the 1979 peace agreement with Israel.

Recently, more than 110 members of the United Nations General Assembly announced their support for a Palestinian state. It is possible that in the coming months, the General Assembly will vote to recognize Palestine as a state defined by its pre-1967 borders. Such a motion would not be subject to Security Council veto and would have far-reaching ramifications for both countries.

And through all of this, Israel and the United States are talking about restarting Palestine-Israel negotiations. However, the likelihood of their taking place seems daily more remote.

The Palestinians, backed by the Arabs, and Israel, backed by the United States, remain equally resolute in setting up preconditions that the other side cannot or will not meet. Mutual recognition, establishing borders, negotiating the right of return and the ongoing Israeli settlement program are prominent among those issues.

To further complicate matters, UNESCO has just voted overwhelmingly to admit Palestine as a member state. Such a motion will not be subject to Security Council veto and is also likely to have a direct effect on Palestine’s ongoing attempts in the General Assembly to become a member state.

These could be ominous events for an Israel intent on maintaining the status quo. Remember, absent a two-state solution, the threat is to Israel’s Zionist roots of Jewishness and democracy, not to Palestine, which after half a century of statelessness has nothing much left to lose.

In addition, at a time when both Palestinians and Israelis need flexibility to reach any kind of acceptable solution, Israeli politics appear to be increasingly in the political grip of the settlers and their supporters, among whom we find Israel’s religiously conservative political right, the most strident of Israeli’s Christian and Jewish American supporters and the increasingly dogmatic Russian immigration to Israel.

For anyone who really cares about the Zionist future of Israel, a quick look is enough to bring tears to one’s eyes. It really doesn’t matter who is at fault; everything that is happening, every inescapable trend, every policy in place, every incontrovertible reality represents a virtually iron-clad guarantee that Israel is in the process of giving up its soul — its Zionist democratic and Jewish roots.

Unfortunately for Israel, time is not on its side. Demographics will do it in. The only answer for an Israel that decides to retain both its Jewish and democratic character lies in the two-state solution. As time goes on, however, the ongoing West Bank settlement program and ingrained Arab hostility toward the very existence of Israel make that outcome less feasible — some say, impossible.

So, absent the two-state solution, Israel has two options: giving up its democracy for apartheid, or giving up its Jewishness for a one-state solution. Retaining both seems highly unlikely, and neither would be acceptable for a true Zionist.

Recently, some committed Zionist supporters of Israel are showing subtle changes in attitude toward the future. The media contain daily articles questioning the settlement movement and the Likud’s approach to human rights. Israel’s daily Haaretz has just asked, “Is Israel confusing legitimate criticism of its policies with anti-Semitism to avoid having to make difficult existential decisions?”

Here in America, a new organization called J Street, “The political home for pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans,” is gaining membership, particularly among younger Americans, while being totally rejected by the Netanyahu government.

Will American Jewry be able to continue to support Israel if it maintains its current political, social and religious orientations?

Is the situation reaching a point where liberal American Jews will be forced to choose between their values and their emotional attachment to Israel? That would be a sad day, particularly when successful negotiations on four issues — security, borders, refugees and Jerusalem — could save Zionist Israel at the cost of some of the settlements.

That is an impossible goal if Israel continues to refuse to even try. Lose some settlements or lose your Zionist soul.

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Originally published in The Herald of Randolph

Our national leadership over the last decade, from Presidents Bush and Obama through the House and Senate leadership to General Petraeus and C/JCS Admiral Mullen, has collectively informed us that as long as the Taliban insurgency has a sanctuary in Pakistan, we will never defeat them in Afghanistan.

Despite that, Americans collectively refer to the Afghan adventure as part of the “War on Terror,” overlooking the fact that there are few to no terrorists there and that we are dealing with a pure insurgency in our struggle with the Taliban.

America is losing its marbles. Our policy in the region shows either an almost total lack of understanding, or a total disregard of historical realities. Our policy is based cynically and dangerously on internal domestic political pressures, not on facts on the ground. Unfortunately, people who know and understand history didn’t make our Afghan policy. Those who made that policy did not and do not understand or appreciate history.

Have we learned nothing from our past adventures? From Iraq, Vietnam, Korea? Have we learned nothing from others’ experiences in Afghanistan? From the British, the Soviets? The knowledge necessary for a cogent policy there has always existed here in America. It has simply not been used.

Current support of war will cost Republicans politically here where two-thirds of the population is against the Afghan war. It will also cost the Democrats where Obama, having spoken bravely during the 2008 campaign about leaving Afghanistan and Iraq, has adopted the Bush policy, lock, stock and barrel.

As difficult as the term is to define, “national interest” represents a country’s military, economic, and cultural goals and ambitions. The concept is important in foreign affairs, where pursuit of the national interest is critical to foreign policy formulation. National interests are occasionally, but never always, identical with those of other nations.

On October 1, 2011, NBC News questioned Pakistan’s commitment to fight terror. On that same day, Secretary of State Clinton said that the Pakistanis are “making a serious strategic error” in supporting the Taliban.

Senator Lindsey Graham, the Republican from South Carolina, couching his comments in terms of terrorism rather than insurgency, told Fox News that U.S. should consider military action against Pakistan because of Pakistani support of Taliban attacks on US troops and other personnel in Afghanistan.

No rational person could possibly suggest that course of action! Look at our troop numbers. We haven’t enough to deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan, let alone take on Pakistan. With an Afghan population of about 30 million, the accepted ratio of 20 counterinsurgent troops per 1,000 residents requires a commitment of 600,000 troops. By the same formula, Pakistan, with a population of just under 190 million would require an additional commitment of 3.8 million troops.

Where will those troops come from when, as of 2009, the United States had a grand total of just under 1.5 million troops in uniform to cover all its commitments at home and abroad?

We are considering this action because we are frustrated that the Pakistanis see it in their national interest to support the Taliban. They always have. U.S. policy makers have to learn that this will not change, no matter how much they hope or wish that it will. In terms of Pakistan national interests, support of the Taliban is an integral part of their India policy, and therefore critical for them to continue.

As to Pakistani commitment to “fighting terrorism,” the same is true. We want them to go after the Taliban, which is not an issue of terrorism, but of insurgency. They do not see it as being in their national interest.

The problem here is one of competing American and Pakistani national interests. The problem is not that Pakistan’s national interests are different from ours. The problem is that those who created our policy there have either shamefully not known the facts, or have willfully ignored them.

Either way, foreign policies rooted in American domestic politics that ignore or overlook facts and realities on the ground abroad are doomed to failure.

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Originally published in the Rutland Herald and the Barre Times Argus

We are now getting close to the 10th anniversary of the al-Qaida attacks of 9/11. Although a decade is an insufficient period for most historians to comfortably draw firm conclusions about anything, it is possible to look at our world today and see how it appears to have been affected by that disastrous event and the ensuing decade. 

It is critical to remember that terrorism is not designed to overwhelm. It is designed to undermine. In that context, whatever it does to cause or initiate anxiety in targeted populations and governments, it relies on the reaction of those populations and governments equally as much to achieve its final goals. And America has reacted in ways that have haunted us and will continue to haunt us for decades. Al-Qaida could not have wished for more.

Domestically, we have seen major changes in our lives. Think of our color-coded terrorist warning system, our current airport controls, our paranoia over anyone who “looks like a Muslim” (whatever that is), or “acts differently.” What is that paper bag doing in the subway? Airport? Train station? Movie?

In the aftermath of 9/11, Americans were clearly prepared to and ultimately did surrender their civil liberties and individual rights in the hope that doing so would add to their own physical security. We forgot Benjamin Franklin’s injunction that “they who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”

The Patriot Act, where it was designed ostensibly to increase our security here at home, did many other things that have negatively affected the way we lead our lives. It increased the government’s ability to spy on us, to monitor our activities in a very broad and general way. It introduced warrantless wiretapping and the monitoring of fund transfers and Internet communications. It also initiated the national security letter process that required any person or organization to turn over records and data pertaining to individuals without warrant, and all this without probable cause or judicial oversight.

The other major domestic impact of the decade has been financial. During that period, we have gone from what was verging on a national surplus to a deficit that is now approaching $15 trillion and increasing at the rate of $3.95 billion every day. We got there through a combination of factors, including tax cuts, the “War on Terror,” and unfunded military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and now Libya. Brown University’s comprehensive June 2011 “Costs of War” project, factoring in all the costs associated with the decade, arrives at close to $4 trillion. Tax cuts add $2.8 trillion. There seems virtually no doubt that in the absence of our reaction to 9/11, we would be fiscally relatively healthy.

In addition to the foregoing difficult domestic situation, which we largely created for ourselves in the aftermath of 9/11, the changes we have seen in our foreign policy will haunt us for years to come. In that arena, our move to military-based, unilateral policy was a radical change. Yet our invasion and defeat of Iraq and the ascendence to power of the Iranian-allied Iraqi Shiites will likely prove to be our most egregious blunder.

It’s not that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in any sense enlightened; it is very simply that Saddam’s Iraq was the only effective impediment to Iranian control over the Persian Gulf. From 1980-88, Iran and Iraq fought a war for supremacy in the gulf. In the absence of a clear resolution of that conflict, the fact that Iraq survived served as a critical deterrent to Iranian dreams for hegemony there.

Our invasion and defeat of Saddam’s Iraq was something the Iranians could never have accomplished on their own. With Shiites now assuming power under our new order in Iraq and Iran threatening the old Sunni positions in the Gulf States, Iran has come even closer. We have destroyed the last real impediment to Iranian dreams for the gulf.

We have had our chances to deal with 9/11 in ways that would have better favored our own national interests. Instead, we panicked, invoked questionable practices at home and became involved in military adventures abroad that will almost certainly ultimately be viewed as disasters.

Without the active, witless involvement and acquiescence of our government and Congress over the past decade, al-Qaida terrorism would have caused us far less pain than it ultimately has and we would be a great deal safer, richer, wiser and internationally more powerful and respected than is now the case.


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