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Archive for the ‘foreign policy’ Category

Many questions about Libya

Posted in foreign policy, Libya on March 27, 2011|

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald & Barre Times-Argus]

It’s hard to know precisely where to begin examining our recent “intervention” in Libya. However, we might start by asking how we got into this. Were we bullied by the British and French? In stressing the moral imperatives of intervention, did they shame President Obama into participation?

Why, if he ultimately decided it was right and proper to get involved, did he dither so long in making up his mind? He came very close to giving Libya back to Gadhafi.

This, in turn, questions the efficacy of running foreign policy on an internationally democratic basis, committing to coordinate our activities with the entire world. Don’t we have enough of a problem getting consensus here in America with our own people?

Given that reality, how could we expect broad international agreement on anything as provocative as the third American military intervention in an Arab country in the last nine years?

In fact, after the rush of Arab League approval of action against Libya, we find its members backing off. “We didn’t really mean that!”

They now say we went too far in the Security Council, while lambasting us for “killing civilians.” One simply has to ask here how you pull off a “no-fly zone” without killing civilians, particularly when your adversary is making sure he populates every last military target you have with his own imported civilians. All of this should have been anticipated.

In addition, we are the object of the purest worldwide schadenfreude seen in decades. Our enemies are more than enthused at our discomfort. Putin has asked if we are the new crusaders, pushing an emotional button in Islam that cannot be overestimated. The Chinese have to be delighted at this unexpected, politically suicidal turn of events. Iranians, Koreans, Cubans, Venezuelans and the Arab street see that America has taken steady aim at its own foot and pulled the trigger. None of them could believe that we Americans could have been so stupid as to get involved in this way, in this place at this time.

All of this aside, there are some truly important questions that so far have gone begging. Why are we intervening in what is clearly a civil war? Will we be doing that again elsewhere around the world? How will we decide where and when? Human misery? Oil?

Just what are our goals in Libya? One suspects that our primary goal is to depose Gadhafi, yet that is never agreed to either in the Arab League or in the Security Council. Our “coalition” already has philosophical fissures.

Then we have to ask exactly who and what our allies are. Are they simply those Libyans who have a grievance against Gadhafi? How many of the 140 tribes and tribal groupings in Libya do they represent? Like it or not, as poorly as we appear to understand them, they are our chosen allies. The fact that they are made up of dozens of hostile tribes and that they are not today close to being a decent fighting force is a fact we have chosen to live with. Who will be the boots on the ground? The new crusaders?

What are their goals, other than the removal of Gadhafi? Do we think they are all closet democrats? If we do, we are likely to be sorely disappointed. Just what kind of post-Gadhafi government are they likely to form, and how stable is that likely to be? Tribal societies do have problems with consensus and stable national governance.

What does this intervention say about Obama’s leadership style? Is his deliberate style of seeking consensus likely to survive in today’s world, or does this style take too long and ultimately come up with questionable results? Is it better or worse than Bush II?

Then we have the Republicans who seem to be uniformly critical of this Obama decision. Have they forgotten where they were after 9/11? They do appear to be wildly hypocritical in their uniform condemnation of activities that they themselves approved a scant nine years ago. It would appear that the Democrats have become the war party and the Republicans the pacifists — a quaint role reversal from the Bush era.

Finally, this looks just like the Bush invasion of Iraq in that so many in and around the government, except Bush and his neoconservative friends, knew that it would ultimately go badly because of the inherent fissures in Iraqi society. The same holds true today in Libya.

Insanity is defined as “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

Are we mad?

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Democracy and Islam

Posted in foreign policy, Middle East on March 13, 2011|

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Let’s start out by agreeing that, whatever its faults, the liberal democracy that exists here in the United States ranks among the best forms of government that ever have been invented by mankind. In a nutshell, it goes to the yearnings that almost all people have for control over their lives and destinies.

Those yearnings are not the sole province of Americans. They are shared by most others around the world, ranging broadly from Western Europe where liberal democracies are in place, through the rigid, repressive regimes of the Middle East and North Africa, and on to Iran, China and North Korea. It also includes countries that lie somewhere in between those extremes, like Russia, Venezuela and Cuba, where one or more of the necessary pillars of democracy — a constitution, free elections, freedom of the press and the rule of law — are missing.

With totalitarianism under the gun in North Africa and the Middle East, American and Western politicians and pundits are calling for “democracy” for all those people. And wouldn’t it be nice if we could simply wave our magic wand and install our liberal democracy in those countries? Perhaps not.

The problem is that most of the citizens of those Islamic countries don’t have the foggiest idea what “democracy” really is, and there’s a good possibility that if they did, they might not be so keen on importing it into the Islamic world.

All they really know is that they don’t like what they have — Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya — and that they like the idea of being able to get more freedom, more control over their lives.

But there are a lot of conflicts involved in importing “democracy” into Islam. The Quran is a complete blueprint for life. It tells the believer everything he or she needs to know to lead an appropriate life. Much of that instruction, however, is essentially incompatible with the ideals of liberal democracy.

The root of the problem lies in the fact that in Islam, God determines the laws through the Quran, shariya and hadith. Under strict interpretation, man has only limited license to interpret those laws. Under shariya law, all aspects of life — religious, political, economic, social and private — are predetermined. There is little room for man to intervene.

Then there are practical matters like the extremes of stoning people, cutting off hands as punishment and the overall treatment of women. The extent of adherence to Islamic law depends on the time and place. Some modern Islamic democracies like Turkey and Indonesia have opted not to enforce all those laws. Other Islamic countries, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, have stuck to the traditional interpretation of Islam, which can hardly be called democratic.

What this means today is that we may not do anyone any service by calling for the “democratization” of Islamic countries. In the long run, the inhabitants of those countries may decide that democracy is incompatible with their Islamic ideals. All we know for sure about the stirrings of discontent in the Arab world is that the people in those countries know what they don’t want. They don’t want Arab dictatorships and the concomitant suppression of their own needs and desires. From that we can infer that what they do want is control over their lives and destinies.

When we preach about the virtues and advantages of our democracy, all we are saying is that it works for us. We seldom stop to think that it works for us largely because we have been at it for almost 250 years. We are comfortable with it.

The democracy that many Muslims seek is essentially unknown to them. They have never lived it or worked at it, as we have. It is simply an idealized goal for them. Given that reality, perhaps we should consider what we really want for these peoples.

That seems pretty straightforward. What we want for them is the right for them to choose whatever system of government they wish through the democratic process of free elections. That process is called self-determination, which is a word that does not prejudice the outcome of the process. All it says is that any people would be allowed to determine the kind of government under which to live.

In Islam that may very well turn out not to be democracy as we know it in America, but if those peoples and the region are to find any sort of stability, self-determination is the only practical way they have to reach it.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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The Predicament of Yemen, and Why We Should Care

Posted in foreign policy, Middle East on February 24, 2011|

[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

In the last few months, we have seen the underpants bomber trying to blow up a plane in the US, as well as an attempt to use computer printer cartridges for the same purpose. The origin of these activities lies in the same country where the successful attack on the USS Cole was carried out in 2000—Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

Last year, a CIA analysis said that al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a far worse threat to U.S. security than is its parent organization in the hills and caves of Pakistan. This is completely consistent with the ongoing diffusion of authority, the “McDonaldization of Al Qaida Central,” to outlying affiliates like AQAP.

Apart from the Cole incident, what do most Americans know about Yemen? First up, they should be aware of the uncanny similarities it has with Afghanistan.

Almost as large as Texas, Yemen consists primarily of mountainous desert which is described as even tougher than the Afghan mountains. Its blazing sun is said to have been the reason that the Roman legions left after one attempt, giving up any thought of conquering Yemen.

The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the region for centuries, never really controlled Yemen, nor did the British Army when it occupied southern Yemen from 1937 to 1963. Yemen is not an hospitable place for foreigners.

It is not simply the terrain that makes Yemen such a problem. It is a country of 20 million people, most of them armed to the teeth. According the CIA Factbook, it is the poorest country in the Arab world, with 40% living below the poverty line, some 50% of the country illiterate and 35% unemployed. The population is projected to double to 40 million over the next 20 years.

According to the Yemeni Times, the problem gets more complicated for U.S. policy-makers because “the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh remains weak outside the capital, lacking in resources and credibility, and riddled with corruption.”

Southern secessionists, a Shiite rebellion in the north and civil wars between north and south characterize recent Yemeni history. Constantly in turmoil, Yemen is a poor bet for any kind of stability and a welcoming place for AQAP.

Adding to that, past incidents involving American drone attacks that have killed primarily civilians have fostered widespread belief, with eager help from AQAP, that the United States is responsible for all of Yemen’s misery and problems.

Oil accounts for about a third of Yemen’s GDP. It is expected to run out in 10 years and no thought has been given to an oil-free future.

It uses a sizable percentage of its water supply and agricultural land (less than 3% of the country) to grow the stimulant qat, which is said to bring clarity of thought. Its use used to be de rigeur prior to important tribal and governmental meetings, but its real product is only a mildly stoned population.

Poverty has made Yemen vulnerable. AQAP has found a population that is not hostile to its presence. AQAP numbers estimates range up to 500 members who can blend seamlessly into local populations. Many are said to have married into local families and are thus afforded community protection.

Yemenis have been sympathetic to radical Islam for decades. It is, after all, the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden. They joined jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and are the largest population group present at our Guantanamo detention center. Whatever they do, they are apparently always welcomed back home to Yemen.

This collection of facts and observations raises important issues about U.S. policy, not only in Yemen, but in the region as a whole. We are faced with an enemy that enjoys relative stability while it plots to carry out terrorist plots against our homeland.

We can only hope we have learned enough from our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan to know that military intervention in Yemen would only further radicalize the country, lead to a boon in AQAP recruitments and support and create a set of new problems for us.

Quite apart from our questionable ability to bear the financial costs of yet another war in the Middle East, who is to say that such an invasion would not precipitate an AQAP move from Yemen to, say, Somalia?

What is wrong here is our counterterrorism policy. We persist with massive troop commitments, when we should be thinking more about totally non-conventional, non-military solutions to the counterterrorism problems that face us in the Muslim world.

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Egypt’s Long History

Posted in foreign policy, Middle East on January 29, 2011|

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

George Santayana, the Spanish philosopher and Harvard professor once trenchantly said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.  More often than not, that has proved to be true.

With all the excitement and promise of recent events in Egypt, what do most Americans know about that country’s past?  Probably precious little.

Evidence of early civilization in Egypt goes back to the tenth millennium BC.  The first formal system of governance in Egypt was a kingdom dating to about 3150 BC.  From then until the fourth century BC, Egypt was ruled by a series of home grown kingdoms.  Subsequently, Egypt was ruled by Greek, Roman, Persian, Ottoman, French and British occupiers, well into the 20th Century.

Modern Egyptian nationalism began in the early 20th century.  Having become a British Protectorate in 1914, they got a new king in 1917, revolted against British rule in 1919, were presented with “independence” by the British in 1922, got a constitution and a parliamentary system in 1923 and overthrew their king in a 1952 coup d’etat which led to the creation of the “Egyptian Republic”.

The Egyptian Republic of 1953 remained until President Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011.  During that period, Egypt was tightly and repressively controlled by a series of military officers:  Generals Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak.  This period was punctuated by a number of significant events that further molded the country:  The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, the 1967 and 1973 Wars with Israel, the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and the assassination of Sadat in 1981 which led to the accession of Mubarak.

Egypt was under military, political, or economic pressure during that entire period.  Stability, such as it was, was maintained through the military control and repression of the population.  Further, the military is still in control after all the events that have just played out in Egypt. The Sadat assassination in 1981 resulted in the declaration of Martial law, which is still in effect thirty years later.

The exposure of Egyptian citizens over the centuries to the ideals of liberal democracy has been minimal.  The preconditions for liberal democracy – fully protected individual rights and rules for lawmaking and elections, all in a framework of checks and balances – have never been enjoyed by the Egyptian people.

Egyptian military officers can be broadly classified into two groupings:  (1) Those who were trained in or by the USSR before 1970 and subsequent officers who matured under them and (2) those who were trained in or by the US and were largely uninfluenced by senior, Soviet-trained officers.

This makes it likely that, in general, younger officers would be more understanding of and interested in the ideas of western Democracy, an understanding that, given the earlier Soviet influence, would be greatly diminished in the older officer corps.  In addition, since public media are a phenomenon of the past decade, it is also likely that younger Egyptians are equally so disposed, however alien those ideas might be to their elders.  And the elders still run the country!

In addition, it is estimated that the Egyptian military is involved in between 5% and 40% of the economic activity of the country.  They are said to be involved in construction, appliance manufacture, the food industry, automobile assembly, clothing, pots and pans and tourism.  How else would Mubarak have managed to amass a personal fortune estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars?

The senior officers who are now control of the military establishment were beholden for their jobs to Mubarak.  Additionally, they are heavily involved in the economic life of their country through business ventures that make billions and billions of dollars a year.

Despite its ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity, Egypt is a country that has its divisions.  The country is now, for the moment, at least, in the hands of a military establishment  that has a vested interest in the maintenance of much of the status quo.  Economically and politically, there isn’t much they are likely to want to change, whereas recent events indicate clearly that change is the driving force for Egypt’s youth.

With luck, patience and time, Egypt may make it through what is very clearly going to be a difficult transition.  In the meantime, our administration and our politicians might better tout “self-determination” for the Egyptians, rather than pushing our ethnocentric, exceptionalist version of “democracy”.

Only real self-determination, whatever that may bring, has the potential to result in any lasting stability for Egypt.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counter- terrorism staff

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Little check on military influence

Posted in foreign policy, United States on December 19, 2010|

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Over the 40 years of its existence, there has been endless examination of, and commentary on, the efficacy of and prospects for our all-volunteer military force.

At the onset of the discussions in the early 1970s, it was said that the all-volunteer force could not be sufficiently effective and efficient, as it would inevitably draw on the most economically disadvantaged and poorly educated members of our society. There were issues of pay and overall costs, as well as the contention that our fighting capability would suffer.

There is very little on the record today that supports any of the early concerns about the all-volunteer force. Today’s soldiers are equally as trainable as their draft-era predecessors. In addition, they are better disciplined and present far fewer morale problems.

Although the cost of this fighting force has continuously risen, the equipment provided to it has improved at a remarkable rate, and its volunteer soldiers have proven capable of evolving into a highly technical force.

By all counts and analyses, they are a formidable fighting force, allegedly the best this country has ever produced, probably the best in the history of the world.

So, if there is a problem, what exactly is it?

The change to the all-volunteer force has diminished the ability of the American people to have much of any influence on the formation of military policy in this country, particularly in the short run. Some will say that this is a very good thing and that warfare policy should be left to the military, the White House and the Congress.

Others, particularly those who remember the Vietnam War and who are carefully observing our attempts at disengagement in Iraq and Afghanistan will say that the all-volunteer force diminishes the only direct, day-to-day potential for influence that citizens have on our war-fighting policies.

In Vietnam, major input toward ending our involvement came from fact that virtually every American voter had relatives, friends and neighbors in Vietnam. It was personal for all of us and when it looked as if President Johnson was never going to get us out of the endless abyss that was Vietnam, the protests began, the people were heard and we finally departed.

More recently, in Iraq and in our second invasion of Afghanistan, we have seen two different administrations do pretty much what they wanted to do with the all-volunteer force because most Americans didn’t have a dog in the fight. Unlike Vietnam, too many of us don’t know anyone who is there, so there is no cohesive opposition to the endless prolongation of those wars.

In addition and despite the fact that there was a great deal of well-founded skepticism about those invasions here at the time, the administrations in power were able to steamroller the Congress because, among other things, there was no counterpressure from the voters.

We now have a highly proficient and successful all-volunteer force with educated, intelligent military leadership. The attitude of those leaders is, as it should be, “we can do the job if you give us the time and resources to succeed.” The only problem with that is that those leaders are loathe to take into consideration the historical realities that exist in the countries where they seek to do battle.

With the exception of Gen. Shinseki, who warned against the Iraq invasion plan and lost his job as a result, our military leadership has not acknowledged either historical Iraq realities or the realities of internal U.S. politics and economics. In Afghanistan, Gen. Petraeus, in the face of harsh economic realities and a growing antiwar sentiment at home, has insisted that with time and resources, he can win. “Only” a decade or so more! And we have never been told what “win” really means.

In short, in the face of difficult realities, the military seems programmed to insist that they can win, whether that claim is feasible or not. And that’s what we pay them to do. However, given that fact, it is really important that the military run only our military operations, not our policies. Policy must be in the hands of our civilian leadership and for that to work properly, we must keep our electorate involved, aware and empowered. The all-volunteer force does not facilitate that process, but rather shortcuts it by not providing enough engaged constituents in the general civilian population to sufficiently effect policy. As politically difficult as it might seem to do, we need to discuss a return to some form of universal service.

If, because of our exclusive reliance on our all-volunteer force, there is only military-based input on policy, without balance from our American civilian population, we could be mired in wars forever.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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Not as special as that

Posted in foreign policy, United States on December 5, 2010|

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

There have long been theories that there is a predetermined sweep to history that is not subject to human input. History develops according to objective laws over which we have no control. In other words, history will happen irrespective of what we poor humans would like to engineer.

If you then consider the Marxist dialectical concept of “historical materialism,” you will learn that Marx believed that man can make history only within the limits set by the existing conditions of the society in which he lives.

This is clearly a philosophical argument. It has existed in various forms for centuries and will continue as long as we inhabit the earth. It is not the purpose here to enter substantially into that philosophical fray.

On the other hand, things happen in the world, particularly in our American world, that make one wonder precisely why we Americans continue to repeat the same things over and over when each action has successively and observably failed.

Why, since World War II, has America gotten itself into Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan when in each case there have been powerful contemporary arguments that doing so was not going to end in anything we could possibly call success? What is there about us as a nation that seems to predispose us to this sort of activity?

Some of the answer to this question lies in the world’s view of us. Since World War II, we have been viewed with increasing suspicion around the world. Our Cold War enemies were in the struggle with us for economic, geopolitical and philosophical reasons. They had their friends and allies, and we had ours. At least in the case of the United States and our allies, we were pretty well united in our belief that we were facing a truly evil power. That community of belief brought us together with our allies in ways that managed to overcome or set aside the inherent differences that existed between us.

Our friends followed us into Korea and tolerated us in Vietnam, both part of the Cold War. What has changed in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the foreseeable future is that this is no longer a bipolar world, which forces countries to take sides. In this new multipolar world, it’s every man for himself, and that makes it increasingly difficult for us to get others onto our side.

Look at our attempts to get China to support our policies and goals today in Iran. Or consider Pakistan’s ambivalence toward the Taliban. It simply isn’t in their national interest to buy into our goals.

To foreigners, America is increasingly looking like a willfully ignorant, insensitive, self-centered bully whose interests do not coincide well with those of the rest of the world.

On the other hand, some of the answer lies in our view of the rest of the world. As a nation, we are blissfully unaware of how the world sees us. We are mired in our notions of our own exceptionalism, which tells us that everything about us is better than anywhere or anything else: Our Constitution and way of life are the best; our social, political, military and economic structures and systems are superior. For most Americans, it is perfectly fine, even imperative for us to want to bring the wonders of our systems to everyone in the world, whether they seek it or not.

Although many Americans really do understand these new realities, it is unfortunate that for reasons probably rooted in our geography and past history, many if not most of us are blissfully unaware that the rest of the world may not love us or wish to emulate us or is even tolerant of what is really our benevolent desire to share with them the bounties of our system. We just don’t get it.

Maybe the determinists have put their finger on the pulse in the wrong way. Perhaps the only force that predetermines what is to happen historically and over which we have no control amounts only to ignorance on the part of ill-informed leadership around the world.

Certainly we could have avoided the downside of all of our recent invasions if we had listened to the better-informed experts in this country — those who told us unequivocally that, based on reality and history, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan would provide far less than successful results for America.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

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Not behaving like a friend

Posted in foreign policy, Israel/Palestine, United States on November 21, 2010|

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Since Israel declared independence in May 1948 as a Zionist (democratic and Jewish) nation, the United States has been its most loyal friend on earth. As other nations have vacillated in their support, ours has never faltered. Since World War II, Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in the world. The U.S. has provided billions of dollars in grants to Israel.

U.S. bilateral military aid provides Israel with privileges unequalled by any other recipient country. Israel can use some U.S. military assistance both for research and development in the U.S. and for military purchases from Israeli manufacturers.

In addition, all U.S. foreign assistance earmarked for Israel is delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year. Most other recipients normally receive aid in installments. Congress also appropriates funds for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs.

In August 2007, the Bush administration announced it would increase U.S. military assistance to Israel by $6 billion over the next decade. The agreement called for incremental annual increases in foreign military financing to Israel, reaching $3 billion a year by 2012. The Obama administration requested $2.775 billion in foreign military financing to Israel for 2010.

Although we have provided assistance with nuclear delivery systems, France, not the U.S., was most heavily involved in supporting Israel’s development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we have had a consistent policy for Israeli nuclear activities of looking the other way. That policy, and the concessions we have made to Israel to persuade it not to use nuclear weapons over the years, have validated its nuclear arsenal’s existence.

In the international political arena, the U.S. has been unstinting in its support of Israel. In 1972, George H.W. Bush cast the first U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council. Between 1972 and 2009, the U.S. cast 48 vetoes and negative votes on every issue that was in any way critical of Israel.

We have vetoed resolutions proposed by our allies, Spain and France, and by our then enemy, the USSR, as well as resolutions with signatures from three to 20 nations.

This history reflects the fact that there are millions of Jewish and non-Jewish Americans, particularly those who were alive and aware of the Holocaust, who genuinely support the existence of a democratic, Jewish Israel and continue to do so.

The situation became more complicated in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, largely as a result of Israel’s West Bank and East Jerusalem settlement policies and by the political emergence in Israel of the Jewish emigration from the USSR, a country that, along with its citizens, never really understood much about democracy.

The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 forbids resettlement by an occupying power of its own civilians on territory under its military control.

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice ruled that “Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development [… and] have been established in breach of international law.”

By acceding to Israel’s every wish, the U.S. has enabled an Israel that believes it can act with impunity, without making any adjustment to the international, regional and national realities that face her. Her own imperatives far outweigh those of her neighbors and her people. This situation encourages aggressive behavior, as in the Gaza War and its aftermath, the ongoing settlement program, and a knee-jerk military reaction to perceived threats.

Although the Obama administration, doggedly searching for the elusive two-state solution, has slightly hardened the position of this government on Israeli settlement policies, all of the requests made by the administration have either been ignored, or flat-out rejected by the Netanyahu government.

But the two-state solution is the only one that preserves a Zionist (democratic and Jewish) Israel. Demographic realities show clearly that Jews in Israel will soon be outnumbered by Arabs, forcing Israel to choose between democracy and Jewishness. The situation worsens as the settlements absorb the West Bank and more and more Arabs. In the longer run, it is doubtful that Americans will support an expansionist, apartheid, and/or non-democratic Israel.

Our ongoing uncritical backing has enabled Israel to behave in a self-absorbed and counterproductive way. Israel lives in a “safe” world constructed with U.S. economic bricks and mortar, surrounded by a U.S. political moat and protected by U.S. military hardware. This uncritical support has permitted Israel to behave in ways that have weakened her morally in the eyes of the world, left her in a perpetual state of war with her neighbors and with a highly questionable Zionist future.

This is hardly what sensitive and thoughtful Americans would have done for Israel if we truly had cared about her future as Zionist state. In terms of Israel’s future viability, we have not behaved like her true friend.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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How U.S. policy defeats its own aims.

Posted in foreign policy on November 7, 2010|

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

Much is being made here in America of Iran’s provision of money to Karzai’s Presidential office in Kabul.  Some call it meddling in internal Afghan affairs, others call it a classic Iranian covert action operation designed to clandestinely undermine American interests in Afghanistan.  Some believe that these payments are really an expression of Iranian national interests in the region.

Most Americans approved of our 2001 invasion of Afghanistan on the grounds that it was justifiable retaliation for 9/11. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, there was some skepticism among the population, but a supine Congress went along.

The first analyses of the Invasion outcomes were pointedly critical in the sense that the results favored Al Qaida and Iran, not the US.

Al Qaida has a major problem in Islam. It is unacceptably radical and therefore, lacking general support from moderate Muslims, it is very likely to die on the vine.  What our invasion of Iran and subsequent reinvasion of Afghanistan have done is set up a Hobson’s choice for Muslim moderates.  Whom do they hate more, the invading foreign army (American) or Muslim apostates (Al Qaida)?  Without that invading, foreign army there would be no future for Al Qaida.

So, we have voluntarily entered into a policy the ultimate outcome of which is to strengthen Al Qaida in the Muslim World. Our hopes for stability in that region as well as our need to cope effectively with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism, will continue to be unachievable as long as that policy of military confrontation is in place.

As if that were not enough, our military-based policies in the region have accomplished just about all the goals Iran has had in its quest to become a major player in the Gulf region. As the largest, most populous, best educated country on the Gulf and rich in natural resources, Iran thinks is should have some influence there.

First, we wiped out Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party which represented the backbone of regional opposition to Iran’s goals.

Our defeat of Iraq unleashed Shia Iran, the largest country with the largest army in the region (and non-Arab to boot) against the mostly Arab and Sunni Gulf states and Israel.

Then, in taking on the Taliban in 2001, we fought and defeated another major threat to Iran – a fundamentalist Sunni organization that had nothing religiously or philosophically in common with the fundamentalist Shia in Iran.  In the vast chess game of the Middle East, the Taliban had always been arrayed against Iran.  We forwarded Iran’s goals with our 2001 invasion and again with our 2009 reinvasion of Afghanistan.  A weaker Taliban is absolutely in Iran’s favor.

Finally, with Saddam and the Baath in power, the inherent religious, tribal and sectarian destabilizing elements in Iraq were managed through forceful repression.  With Saddam gone, those forces were unleashed.  The result has been internecine warfare which has led to internal instability which has only been marginally mitigated by the US military presence.  In short, we have created a new, unstable “Iraq” which benefits only Iran and Al Qaida.

What we accomplished with invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has wiped out all of Iran’s real enemies and given Al Qaida hope for survival.  If Iraq and Al Qaida had been asked to create a US policy for their region, one which weakened the United States and strengthened them, they simply could not have done better than the combined Bush and Obama policies.

So, all of that history aside, how can we be surprised that Iran is funneling money to the Karzai government?  With American commitment to the region on the wane, Karzai is their best bet for keeping the Taliban out of real power and fostering the national instability that is in their interest.

How can we be surprised that the Iranians are supporting their Shia co-religionists in Iraq and that they are almost certainly creating instability there?  A dis-united, unstable Iraq is in their national interest.

How can we be surprised that Iran is baiting Israel?  Israel-baiting keeps the pot boiling in the Middle East and supports the instability that in turn supports Iranian national interests.

And all of this encourages regional instability which is precisely what we would like to eliminate, but which we will never do as long as our own unique contribution to instability, our military presence and activities, is ongoing.

This is not an apologia for Iran.  We don’t have to approve of what the Iranians are doing, but must understand why they do it, because if we don’t we will never find a policy that will permit us to realize our goals for stability in that region.

Haviland Smith of Williston is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe and the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterroism Staff.

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Democracies Just Aren’t Very Good Imperialists

Posted in foreign policy, United States on October 28, 2010|

[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

Merriam Webster defines “imperialism” as: “the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.”

We Americans don’t like to think of ourselves as imperialists, but given the foregoing definition, it would seem that we are.  Of course, we do not seek territorial acquisition.  We do what we do “for the good of the world.”  And therein lies the rub.

When we think of imperialism, we think of the classic empires—British, Roman, Ottoman, Persian, Russian. Such empires went out and militarily conquered other areas of the world.

No one can say that America did that. On the contrary, it is generally conceded that the American form of imperialism has been quite different, at least until Iraq.

American Imperialism began in the 1890s in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war. It brought us the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, all former Spanish possessions. Despite those territorial acquisitions, America added another page to the book begun by Christianity and Islam.  Just like those great religions, in the 20th century we based our imperialism on American exceptionalism—political, economic, and cultural power and influence, not on our military.

That has been the nature of American Imperialism. We are not like the conquering imperial armies and navies of the 19th century and before. As a nation driven by American exceptionalism, we are convinced that since our system is the best, we are bound to share it, by force if necessary, with the rest of the world.

Our motivation is not so different from that which drove our predecessor imperialists. We need markets and we are concerned with challengers. We are convinced that If we were able to install our system in Iraq, for example, then liberal democracy would spread like wildfire in Islam and we would have nothing to fear from fundamentalist terrorists. Since Iraq is essentially immune to our unique economic, political and cultural form of imperialism, we had to go at them militarily, but the result is the same. Our plan was that, after having demolished the existing government and installed one of our choosing, we would get out.

However, the ideal scenario for us involves pure economic, political and cultural penetration, resulting in a slow metamorphosis to liberal democracy.

Either way, military or nonmilitary, the world, particularly the Islamic world where our dreamers thought they would succeed, has not show much willingness to bend to our will.

Even if that were not the case, there is another critical issue. Does America have the goods to be successful imperialist power?

Liberal democracies don’t make good imperialists. In America today, we have the built-in possibility of extreme, electoral political change every two years. Radical policies, like the invasion of Iraq, can and do result in the architects of the policy getting booted out.

We have been sold counterterrorism as a long-term issue. The Bush Administration began the “War on Terror” and consistently referred to it as the “Long War”. They, as well as the Obama administration, saw this struggle in military terms, not realizing that military engagement with fundamentalist terrorism would lead inexorably to the unintended result of seeing counterterrorism morph into counterinsurgency and on into the export of democracy and nation building, all very long term issues.

We are an attention-deficit nation, unable or unwilling to follow one issue for any reasonable amount of time. Imperialism demands a level of patience, focus and persistence that is alien to us. Even under the most perfect circumstances, we change our leadership every eight years or less, far too short a time to be successful imperialists who must see their world in centuries rather than decades.

Just about every nation with a terrorism problem has found that the best counterterrorism programs are police- and intelligence-driven and that a military response is self-defeating.

In our military response, we have repudiated John Winthrop’s message, later echoed by Presidents Kennedy and Reagan: “For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.”

Instead of setting ourselves as a model for others to emulate, we decided to militarily export our economic, political and cultural models abroad. It began over a century ago with America trying to find new markets for investment and ended up with Iraq and Afghanistan.

American politicians need to read and learn from history.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the Counterterrorism Staff.

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In a democracy the military must know its role

Posted in foreign policy, United States on October 10, 2010|

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

During the endless deliberations that took place on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during the summer and fall 2009, it became clear that the U.S. military establishment — as personified by Adm. Mullin and Gen. Petraeus — was vitally interested in proving that it could reach a successful conclusion in Afghanistan. The military seemed disinclined to consider any of the other factors involved in our Afghan commitment.

This entire episode is laid out in minute detail in Bob Woodward’s new book, “Obama’s Wars,” which is a fascinating read on the way the Obama administration builds military policy and the interplay between the White House and the Pentagon.

What is clear is that our military establishment was concerned primarily with its own goals and operations and far less concerned with the many other issues facing the administration and the nation.

In effect, the military leadership told the president that the only viable policy for Afghanistan would involve our commitment to six to eight additional years and almost $1 trillion.

Today’s military is probably correctly described as far more politically aware and attuned to the needs of the nation that it ever has been. After all, many of the military’s general officers have advanced degrees from some of our most prestigious universities.

It is not the purpose here to decide whether our efforts in Afghanistan are in our own national interest or not, good or bad, viable or hopeless. This is designed simply to enumerate some of the more difficult issues facing America right now and whether or not we can afford the costs of our military engagements in the Middle East and Asia.

It is generally conceded that one gallon of gas delivered to our troops in Afghanistan in 2009 cost $400. More recently, that has been revised upward to $800 because of the Pakistani closing of one of our routes to Afghanistan and the blowing up of fuel trucks.

In February 2010, the cost of the Afghan war was running $6.7 billion a month and the cost of Iraq was $5.5 billion. At those rates, the current cost of our military involvement in those theaters is verging on $150 billion per year. In fiscal year 2011, Afghanistan is projected to cost $117 billion, Iraq $46 billion. These figures will ultimately be revised upward by the costs we will be incurring in dealing with the long-term effects of the wars on hardware and, more important, on personnel.

As long as these wars are placing such a burden on our economy, it will be difficult for us to deal with the critical issues that face us at home. Quite simply, our national infrastructure, our public education system and our issues with energy demand a level of investment that will be impossible as long as these wars drag on.

Without major changes, those critical structural elements of our country will not support the kind of economic and political clout that will be required for us to maintain any sort of meaningful influence in the world. In short, our needs at home far outweigh our needs in the Middle East and Asia.

Finally, there seems to be a growing sub rosa debate in our military establishment concerning the appropriate role of the military in the formulation of military policy. A close read of Woodward’s book shows strong evidence of the military attempting to end-run the president on the timing and extent of the commitment of increased troop numbers to Afghanistan.

The role of our military establishment is to carry out the policies of our civilian leadership. It is not to determine policy from the cocoon of the Pentagon, but to do what any administration tells it to do. Such military decisions will and must be affected by other national realities of which the Pentagon should be aware, but should not be concerned. The role of those realities has always been considered by the White House.

The legal pre-eminence of our civilian leadership over and control of the military is completely established. The ongoing argument (http://www.ndu.edu/press/breaking-ranks.html) that an officer is obliged to refuse to carry out orders he finds morally objectionable cannot be supported in our democracy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/09/breaking-ranks/), yet it apparently persists at all levels of the officer corps.

We are clearly approaching some sort of critical juncture where insubordination may play a role. The behavior of some of our military leadership around the two critical issues of Afghanistan and our well-being at home has no place in this liberal democracy.

There should be no question about the role of the military or the identity of the commander in chief.

Haviland Smith of Williston is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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