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Archive for the ‘terrorism’ Category

[Originally published in the Herald of Randolph.]

Over the decades, Americans have fought in a wide variety of irregular foreign conflicts.  They have fought in the Russian Revolution, Northern Ireland, the Spanish Civil War, the 1948 Palestine Civil War, Bosnia and Kosovo. Americans were even spontaneously involved in the 1956 Hungarian uprising against the USSR!  The US Government generally prefers to ignore this kind of activity.

John Walker Lindh chose an inopportune moment to sign on with Al Qaida in Afghanistan and is doing hard time for his troubles.  In fact, his conviction can be seen as the moment when the game changed.  In the eyes of the American government, it is perfectly all right to go and fight with a foreign group as long as that group does not actually threaten the Unites States.  And that is as it should be.

“Terrorism” is a universally condemned word. “Insurrection” is very ambivalent. In this context, we have an extraordinarily legacy left us by the Bush administration.  They continuously and probably consciously conflated terrorism with insurgency here at home to  keep us on edge and to make insurgents fair game. They did it abroad for both tactical and strategic reasons:

Tactically, after 9/11, they wished to curry favor and support.  For example, we went along with Russia when they wanted to designate the Chechens as terrorists when the Chechens clearly were an insurrection looking to rid itself of the Russian occupiers.

During the last eight years, it is hard to find an “ally” of any kind that had an internal security issue whom we failed to support by agreeing to call it terrorism.  In short, the Bush Administration was prepared to label any group, specifically including insurgencies, “terrorist” that was threatening to us or our friends.

Strategically, the Bush administration did so to get those countries on our side, first in our “war on terror” and second in what the Neocons referred to as their “fifty year war” – presumably the Neocons’ war against Islam.

Why does any of this arcane argument matter? After all, a killer is a killer whether terrorist or insurgent.  It matters for a number of reasons.  It determines what tactics we use to combat them in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has a strong effect on how we are viewed in the Middle East and it has a judicial impact on Americans.

Are these struggles really terrorism or are they insurgencies fighting for national liberation? This is a very nuanced issue because insurgencies often use terrorism as a tactic. The US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations includes 45 “terrorist” organizations. Many of those organizations deny using terrorism as a military tactic to achieve their goals.  Many of the others do practice terrorism, but they also run municipal governments.  Clearly in this context are Hamas and Hizballah, both of which organizations are fighting to free their land (Palestine) for their people. To further muddle the issue, there is no international consensus on a legal definition of terrorism.  It is, indeed a confusing and confounding landscape.

The measure of any organization should be its goals, not its tactics.  Is it trying to liberate its homeland, or blow up America?

As an example of the dilemma we now face, consider Somalia. A handful of Somali-Americans have recently been indicted for joining Al-Shabaab.  Al-Shabaab began life as a militant Islamic youth movement devoted to the establishment in Somalia of an Islamic Republic under Shariya law.  Since 2004, it has been primarily involved in insurgent activities against the existing Somali government.  Yet, it is designated a terrorist organization by the US Department of State.

The issue here is whether or not Al-Shabaab really is a terrorist organization which is actually threatening to the United States.  That would appear doubtful, as the great preponderance of its activities concern internal Somali affairs.

As our military involvement in the Middle East evolves, with more and more of our “friends” in the area being challenged by local insurgencies, it might be well for America to review all of its past designations of foreign organizations as “terrorist organizations”.  Many of those designations are absolutely accurate, but many of them come from the Bush era when the criteria used were deliberately aimed at calling anyone we didn’t like a “terrorist”.

In addition, our own citizens are now signing up with foreign civil movements.  If they are insurgencies, the Americans probably are not breaking our laws. The least we owe them is to be sure we know just what they really have done and not be swayed by questionable political decisions made in the aftermath of 9/11.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. A former long term-resident of Brookfield, he now lives in Williston.

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Does US Policy Hurt or Help Al Qaeda?

[Originally published by the Middle East Institute on February 23, 2010 and later (in this slightly different format) on AmericanDiplomacy.org.]

A long time observer of Middle Eastern affairs proposes a radical change in American policy in the region with the goal of “helping Al Qaeda die.” Would this change have unintended consequences? The suggestion itself is sure to be controversial in the U.S. and abroad. -The Editor

Al Qaeda has a major, long term, existential problem in the Middle East and the greater Muslim world. It is a problem that it certainly cannot fix on its own. However, America’s counterterrorism policy has given Al Qaeda hope for the short term and if we continue that policy, it may well assist them in their ultimate goal of establishing a hegemonic Caliphate in the Muslim world.

The US policy toward the Muslim world that evolved after the events of 9/11 was crafted by policymakers who honestly believed that the solution to America’s problems in the Muslim world, or for that matter anywhere else, lay in the swift application of American unipolar military might. That position might have worked in other parts of the world. However, its application in the Muslim world has brought with it problems that its authors probably had not envisaged and for which they clearly had not planned.

US National Interests Toward Islam

Years ago it was said that, “The United States does not have a Middle East policy. That is probably a good thing, because if it did, it would be the wrong one.” That reality has not changed much in the last half century, which underlines the politically partisan difficulties involved in constructing a precise definition of our national interests. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about solutions to our problems in the Muslim world without first broadly defining those interests. It is probably safe to settle on the following generalities:

  • Stability or the absence of armed conflict;
  • The maintenance of U. S. commercial interests;
  • An end to being viewed as the enemy of the Muslims;
  • Realizing our National Security interests, i.e. inhibiting the growth of terrorism by marginalizing secular and religious extremists and supporting Muslim moderates.

The United States and Terrorism

After 9/11, the Bush Administration identified fundamentalist Muslim terrorism as our primary concern in the Muslim world. The Obama administration appears to be following that program, and for the last eight years we have chosen military confrontation as our primary tool for dealing with terrorism.

At the same time, largely because of our choice of military confrontation, the nature of the threat we have faced has changed. Iraq was never a terrorist problem before our 2003 invasion. It became one solely because we were there militarily. We provided Al Qaeda with an opportunity for first-rate live training, a target-rich environment and excellent prospects for recruiting. They moved in under cover of the Iraq insurgency against our troops.

The Afghanistan situation began as a struggle with terrorism and has since morphed into a counterinsurgency. Today, there are hardly any Al Qaeda fighters left. Again, we are dealing with an insurgency. Unlike terrorist movements, which are often overcome, insurgencies are extremely difficult to snuff out.

We begin with a major contradiction. We want to fight terrorism, but we are fighting insurgencies. The nature of the Muslim world is such that virtually any time we choose to go after Al Qaeda militarily, we will end up fighting insurgencies, whether in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria or Pakistan. All of these countries, like much of the Muslim world, have built into them the kinds of internal ethnic, tribal, religious and political contradictions that make general civil strife a perpetual nightmare waiting to happen. All it takes to push it over the edge into insurgency is something foreign, like American military involvement.

It would be nice, however irrational, to believe that one day we could actually conquer Al Qaeda and bring an end to the terrorism that has plagued us for over a decade. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen. If we are ultimately to rid ourselves of this terrorist phenomenon, it will be because the terrorist movement itself dies, as has been the case with most of the terrorist organizations that have not survived during the past half-century.

According to a 2006 Rand Corporation study, the tactic least likely to succeed against terrorism in the past fifty years has been military confrontation. The Rand finding is supported by Israeli experience, which says that wars against terrorism turn into extended counterinsurgency operations that are seldom won.

Our goal in this ongoing struggle with terrorism is clearly to figure out how to help Al Qaeda die.

Al Qaeda Today

The methodical decimation of Al Qaeda leadership over the past few years, mostly by drones and covert operations, has resulted in the franchising of their terrorist operations. Al Qaeda’s leadership has been sharply reduced and inhibited by unconventional attacks. With its surviving leadership concentrating almost entirely on its own survival in Waziristan, there is little if any central command and control left for their operations.

National franchises have sprung up around the world. They operate in Yemen, Somalia, the North African Maghreb, Pakistan, Indonesia and elsewhere. They are even currently advertising for a start up in Muslim north Nigeria. The scene is further complicated by the arrival on the scene of the new phenomenon of individual volunteers who present a very difficult counterterrorism problem. There is a new air of unpredictability in the counterterrorism field. As these terrorists get more efficient and change their tactics and targeting, which they certainly will, we will have more difficulty anticipating their activities.

Al Qaeda Goals, Tactics, and Realities

“Muslims hate us for who we are and everything we stand for” was an almost constant mantra for the Bush Administration. That is simply untrue. Muslims admire our standard of living, our entrepreneurial spirit, our business acumen and our creativity. Those Muslims, who hate us, and today they come in ever increasing numbers, hate us not for who we are but for what we do. They hate us for our policies.

Unlike Al Qaeda fundamentalists, moderate Muslims, while they may have serious complaints about American policy, are not enthralled at the thought of fundamentalist Islam taking over their lives. Moderates represent our greatest potential allies in this struggle with Al Qaeda, but they are also easily turned against us.

What turns all Muslims, including moderates, against us is:

  1. They are offended by the stationing of non-Muslim, foreign (American) troops on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia.
  2. They resent the American history of supporting and maintaining despotic regimes that rule Muslim people by force and intimidation.
  3. They hate us for killing Muslims, waging war in and occupying Muslim countries.
  4. They would like to see Palestinian aspirations treated with the same respect and care by America as the U. S. treats Israeli aspirations.

Al Qaeda’s primary goal is the re-establishment of strict Islamic rule in a new Caliphate, modeled on the Eighth Century Caliphate that stretched from Spain through North Africa and on through the Middle East to the eastern border of what is now Iran and which held sway over what was then the entire Muslim world.

The establishment of this new Caliphate is designed to rid the Muslim world of what Al Qaeda sees as the corrupting influences of the West. An established Caliphate would diminish support of elements in the Muslim world that would today be opposed to Al Qaeda goals. That would include virtually all of the regimes now in power there, including those that Al Qaeda considers to be the corrupt secular Muslim regimes supported by the West.

In 2005, Robert Pape of the University of Chicago analyzed more than 500 suicide or martyrdom attacks around the world over the past quarter century. He concluded that somewhat over 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks around the world since 1980 have in common “from Lebanon, to Chechnya, to Sri Lanka, to Kashmir, to the West Bank“ is not religion, but a specific strategic goal: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw combat forces from territory the terrorists view as their homeland, or prize greatly.

It follows that the activities of groups that use such tactics are directed toward local, not international goals. Al Qaeda is focused on reestablishing strict Islamic rule in a new Caliphate. To that end, it is doing everything it possibly can to keep the US militarily involved in the Muslim world in the short run. They know that the Muslim world is not yet ready for their fundamentalist Caliphate. They want the US to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan because our military presence and activities strengthen their position with their co-religionists.

Al Qaeda martyrdom attacks are designed to create and maintain an unstable situation, which, in the short term, the US will find difficult to leave. They need us to stay in the Middle East in the short run because our military presence daily coalesces more and more moderates against us and for Al Qaeda.

Moreover, they would be absolutely delighted to see us involved on the ground in Somalia, Yemen or any other Muslim state. Our continued presence and military activities provide them with critical advantages they would not have in our absence.

Direct Al Qaeda attacks in the West are designed to show the Muslim world how all-powerful they are. They even claim unsuccessful attacks. It would also increase western insecurity and disrupt their resolve to maintain their long-term interests in the Muslim World. Such attacks are not designed to take over the West or any part of it. The old Bush notion that “we will fight them over there, so we don’t have to fight them at home” has no basis in fact. Thus, it is in Al Qaeda’s interest to keep America on edge at home. When and if airplanes become less vulnerable targets as a result of western countermeasures, Al Qaeda will switch to softer targets; ships, subways, buses, trains, etc. They will do this until they believe America no longer represents a long-term threat to their goals in the Muslim world, when we have withdrawn, or when they have died a natural death.

To survive, Al Qaeda must have an external enemy and we have turned ourselves into Al Qaeda’s enemy of choice. If we disengage from their battlefield before the majority of moderates turn against us, they will have to deal immediately with all those unavoidable, intractable, internal Muslim issues that have made our lives so complicated since the Iraq invasion. Religious, ethnic and national differences, rivalries and conflicts will be Al Qaeda’s to deal with in their quest for the Caliphate.

Al Qaeda and its fundamentalist allies are no more likely to succeed in this than America was in attempting to forcibly install democracy in the Muslim world.

The key to the future of Islam lies in its moderates. Whoever secures their allegiance and cooperation, secures the region. Unfortunately, today’s moderates are driven more by their hatred for U. S. policies than they are about Al Qaeda’s un-Islamic excesses. They are less offended by Al Qaeda’s taking of innocent Muslim lives than they are by U. S. military activities and policies.

When America no longer poses a threat to Al Qaeda, that is, after American military disengagement, the moderates will become the primary counterbalance to the radical excesses of Al Qaeda. Until then, with our military present, killing Muslims and trying to keep the despots in power, we will exacerbate tensions with the moderates and drive them toward Al Qaeda.

Failed and Failing States

Much is made of the necessity for us to pay attention to and “do something” about failed and failing states. Taking Taliban Afghanistan in the pre 9/11 period as our national model, we have apparently decided that the elimination of failed states is the answer to our problems with terrorism.

In the real world, that does not compute, a fact that is perfectly illustrated by Richard Reid, the shoe bomber whose terrorist odyssey was focused largely on the UK, hardly a failed state. Other Al Qaeda affiliated operations have been planned in the UK, Spain and other non-failed states.

All an enterprising terrorist organization needs to carry out a shoe bombing or an underwear bombing is a reasonably secure safe house in a country where not too much attention is paid to people who mind their own business and thus do not come to the attention of local internal security authorities. The 9/11 attacks could easily have been planned in New York City itself and, significantly, required that its participants get their flight training in America.

Such conditions exist all over the world and provide Al Qaeda affiliates with all the options they could need to plan their operations. However, even if it were not the case, the issue of dealing with failed or failing states presents an entirely different set of problems and pitfalls for American policy makers.

The Muslim world is comprised of a number of nation states that were more the creation of Western imperialist powers than the result of natural cultural, political, and economic evolution. The result can be seen in Iraq where there are two major interpretations of Islam, Shia and Sunni, plus two major ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds. In Iraq as in all the other failed and failing states, those divisions and conflicts are at the root of our difficulties in trying to find solutions to problems there and that are in keeping with our goals and values.

How can we solve our problems with Al Qaeda when host governments are not sufficiently helpful in countries where we have tangible military goals? They are either uninterested in our problems, as in Somalia, so busy trying to deal with their own that they have no time for our issues, as in Yemen, or actually have reasons of their own not to help us out, as in Pakistan with the Taliban. In effect, we are left competing for the time and attention of the reluctant or incompetent governments on which our own policies have forced us to rely. That is not a good formula for success.

Available Solutions

There really are only three available solutions for our problems with terrorism in the Muslim world:

  1. We can respond to all such situations with military power.
  2. We can disengage militarily from the Muslim World.
  3. We can try to implement a hybrid of the first two.

Under the Bush Administration, we were totally married to the military solution. Under the Obama administration, it would appear we are flirting with the hybrid. No one has tried disengagement.

What we know is that a decade of military confrontation has created at least as many problems for us as it solved, largely because it has alienated, infuriated and neutralized moderate Muslims. It seems highly unlikely that the ongoing hybrid Obama approach will be any more successful, as the same issues of alienation and hostility still exists.

Yet, a careful examination of the realities of the Muslim world and our relationship with it will argue favorably for our complete military disengagement from the region. That act would effectively remove the primary motivation of present and future moderate Muslims who, as a result of our ongoing policies, have come to support, or at least not actively oppose Al Qaeda.

There will be major concerns that our military disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan will precipitate internal strife in those countries, or worse yet, a general conflagration in the Middle East. Almost all of the disparate ethnic and sectarian components in each of the countries there have external advocates or protectors in the Muslim world. Iraqi Shia have Iran, the Sunnis have Saudi Arabia and Syria, etc.

It does not appear at this time that any of those “protectors” actively seeks to precipitate strife either in the countries involved or in the greater region. Quite the opposite, they have every reason not to seek regional strife. It is far too destabilizing. However, if such strife does come on the heels of US military disengagement, it will be their endemic hatreds and rivalries that will precipitate it, whether we leave now or in fifty years. These divisions and hatreds have existed for millennia. How long are we prepared to stay?

It will be argued that military disengagement will jeopardize the West’s energy supplies, but oil is fungible and only has value when pumped out of the ground and traded. It is also the only major economic asset most of those countries have.
Some will say Israel will be jeopardized, but we have been their primary mediators for forty years. What Muslims view as our totally biased involvement has led only to a deterioration of the situation there. Demographics argue for a two-state solution for both Israeli and Palestinian survival. It may be time to let them sort it out themselves for their own survival. Our disengagement should help mitigate the participants’ excuses for not really negotiating.

Are we deserting our friends? Who are they and are they really friends, or are they in it simply to get whatever support they can from us for their own narrow national goals, without making more than a minimal commitment to us and to our needs?

The fact is that our recent military-based and spearheaded policies in the Muslim world have exacerbated our problems with terrorism, added endless new terrorists to our enemies’ ranks, sullied our previously good reputation with Muslim moderates, maintained and encouraged despots in power and accomplished very little positive for us. If nothing else, it’s time to consider change. In that context, it might be a profitable departure for America to see the world as it really is, not as we would like it to be. Only then will we get policies that are in harmony with the existing facts on the ground.

A New American Policy

Within the framework of our national interests, there is no viable military solution for terrorism in any part of the Muslim world. Everything we do militarily is directly contradictory to our national interests. The reason for that lays partly in the fact that Muslim terrorism seems to regularly morph into or become absorbed by insurgencies as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More importantly, it stems from the critical, decades-old complaints that Muslims have had about American policies and activities in their region. What Americans need to understand is that as long as those American policies continue, we will be dealing with terrorism and rejection in the Muslim world. They are the causative factors behind the fact that, “they hate us for what we do, not who we are.”

If, on the other hand, we were to change those policies, Al Qaeda would not last long in an increasingly moderate Muslim world hostile to their extreme and un-Muslim philosophies and activities. Without the United States as an intrusive, compliant, external whipping boy, Al Qaeda would be forced to deal with the realities of their own diffuse and fragile Muslim world, a world largely hostile to them.

But this is a suggested policy built on the realities on the ground in the Muslim world and we all know that US policy is more often built on the internal political needs of the Administration in power, in this case, the Obama administration.

Whatever happens, whatever decisions are made, we will not “win” our struggle with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism with our military establishment. Quite the contrary, as long as we are militarily involved, we will lose far more than we will gain and we will see no end to this terrorism.

Finding himself in a recently weakened position today vis-à-vis the Republicans and facing disapproval from elements of his own party, President Obama is faced with unhappy choices. If he were to see merit in complete military disengagement from the Muslim world, he would face onslaughts from Republicans and from all those who see advantages in the “long war,” including those people and organizations that benefit politically and economically from its continuation. That might just be enough to do him in.

On the other hand, if he can make up his mind to consider what is in our national interest and is prepared to suffer the perhaps dire political consequences of going against the supporters of the “long war,” he could, at minimum, begin the process of solving our most basic problems with the Muslim world and with terrorism.

This commentary was originally published in a slightly different format by the Middle East Institute. It is used by permission of the author.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. A graduate of Dartmouth, he served in the Army Security Agency, undertook Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

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How Do We End Al Qaeda?

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

Years ago it was said that, “The United States does not have a Middle East policy. That is probably a good thing, because if it did, it would be the wrong one.” That reality has not changed much in the last half century, which underlies the politically partisan difficulties involved in constructing a precise definition of our national interests. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about solutions to our problems in the Muslim world without first broadly defining those interests. That said, it is probably safe to settle on the following generalities:

  1. Stability or the absence of armed conflict.
  2. The maintenance of U.S. commercial interests
  3. An end to being viewed as the enemy of the Muslims.
  4. Realizing our national security interests, i.e. inhibiting the growth of terrorism by marginalizing secular and religious extremists and supporting Muslim moderates.

After 9/11, the Bush administration established fundamentalist Muslim terrorism as our primary concern in the Muslim world. The Obama administration appears to be following that Bush program and for the last eight years, we have chosen military confrontation as our primary tool for dealing with terrorism.

Much is made of the necessity for us to pay attention to and “do something” about failed and failing states. Taking Taliban Afghanistan in the pre-9/11 period as our national model, we have apparently decided that the elimination of failed states is the answer to our problems with terrorism.

In the real world, that does not compute, a fact that is perfectly illustrated by Richard Reid, the shoe bomber whose terrorist odyssey was focused largely on the United Kingdom, hardly a failed state. Other al-Qaida-affiliated operations have been planned in the United Kingdom, Spain and other non-failed states.

All an enterprising terrorist organization needs to carry out a shoe or underwear bombing is a reasonably secure safe house in a country where not too much attention is paid to people who mind their own business and thus do not come to the attention of local internal security authorities. The 9/11 attacks could easily have been planned in New York City itself and, significantly, required that its participants get their flight training in America.

Such conditions exist all over the world and provide al-Qaida affiliates with all the options they could need to plan their operations. However, even if it were not the case, the issue of dealing with failed or failing states presents an entirely different set of problems and pitfalls for American policy makers.

The Muslim world is comprised of a number of “nation states” that were more the creation of Western imperialist powers than the result of natural cultural, political, and economic evolution. The result can be seen in Iraq where there are two major interpretations of Islam, Shia and Sunni, plus two major ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds. In Iraq, as in all the other “failed and failing states”, those divisions and conflicts are at the root of our difficulties in trying to find solutions to problems there and that are in keeping with our goals and values.

How can we solve our problems with Al Qaida when the host governments of countries where we have tangible military goals are not sufficiently helpful? They are either uninterested in our problems, as in Somalia, so busy trying to deal with their own that they have no time for our issues, as in the Yemen, or actually have reasons of their own not to help us out, as in Pakistan with the Taliban.

In effect, we are left competing for the time and attention of the reluctant or incompetent governments on which our own policies have forced us to rely. That is not a good formula for success.

At the same time, largely because of our choice of military confrontation, the nature of the threat we have faced has changed. Iraq was never a terrorist problem before our 2003 invasion. It became one solely because we were there militarily. We provided Al Qaida with an opportunity for first-rate live training, a target-rich environment and excellent prospects for recruiting and fund raising. They moved in under the cover of the Iraq insurgency against our troops.

The Afghanistan situation began as a struggle with terrorism and has since morphed into a counterinsurgency. Today, there are few if any Al Qaida fighters left. Again, we are dealing with an insurgency. Unlike terrorist movements, which are often overcome, insurgencies are extremely difficult to snuff out.

So, we start out with a major contradiction. We want to fight terrorism, but we are fighting insurgencies. The nature of the Muslim world is such that virtually any time we choose to go after Al Qaida militarily, we will end up fighting insurgencies, whether in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria or Pakistan. All of those countries, like much of the Muslim world, have built into them the kinds of internal ethnic, tribal, religious and political contradictions that make general civil strife a perpetual nightmare waiting to happen. All it takes to push it over the edge into insurgency is something foreign, like American military involvement.

It would be nice, however irrational, to believe that one day we could actually conquer or somehow defeat Al Qaida and bring an end to the terrorism that has plagued us for over a decade. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen. If we are ultimately to rid ourselves of this terrorist phenomenon, it will be because the terrorist movement itself dies, as has been the case with most of the terrorist organizations that have not survived during the past half-century.

According to a 2006 Rand Corporation study, in the past fifty years, the tactic least likely to succeed against terrorism is military confrontation. The Rand finding is supported by Israeli experience, which says that military operations against terrorism invariably turn into extended counterinsurgency operations which are seldom won.

Our goal in this ongoing struggle with terrorism is clearly to figure out how to help Al Qaida die a peaceful death.

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[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

This is the second of a four-part series on United States counterterrorism policy in the Muslim world. It will run regularly in Perspective.

“Muslims hate us for who we are and everything we stand for” was an almost constant mantra of the Bush administration. But it is simply untrue. Muslims admire our standard of living, our entrepreneurial spirit, our business acumen and our creativity. Many actually like us as individuals. Those Muslims who hate us – and today they come in ever-increasing numbers – hate us not for who we are, but for what we do. They hate our policies.

Unlike al-Qaida fundamentalists, moderate Muslims, while they may have serious complaints about American policy, are not enthralled by the thought of fundamentalist Islam taking over their lives. Moderates represent our greatest potential allies in this struggle with al-Qaida, but they are also easily turned against us.

What turns all Muslims, including moderates, against us is that:

  • They are offended by the stationing of non-Muslim, foreign (American) troops on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia;
  • They resent the American history of supporting and maintaining powerful despotic regimes that rule Muslim people by force and intimidation;
  • They hate us for killing Muslims, waging war in and occupying Muslim countries;
  • They would like to see Palestinian aspirations treated with the same respect and care by America as the United States treats Israeli aspirations.

Al-Qaida’s primary goal is the re-establishment of strict Islamic rule in a new caliphate modeled on the eighth-century caliphate that stretched from Spain through North Africa and the Middle East to the eastern border of what is now Iran, and which held sway over what was then the entire Muslim world.

The establishment of this new caliphate is designed to rid the Muslim world of what al-Qaida sees as the corrupting influences of the West. An established caliphate would diminish the power of all those elements in the Muslim world that would today be opposed to al-Qaida goals. That would include virtually all the regimes now in power there, including those that al-Qaida considers to be the corrupt secular Muslim regimes supported by the West.

In 2005, Robert Pape of the University of Chicago analyzed more than 500 suicide or martyrdom attacks around the world that had occurred over the past quarter century. He concluded that “what over 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks around the world since 1980 have in common – from Lebanon, to Chechnya, to Sri Lanka, to Kashmir, to the West Bank – is not religion, but a specific strategic goal: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw combat forces from territory the terrorists view as their homeland, or prize greatly.”

It follows that the activities of groups that use such tactics are directed toward local, not international, goals. Al-Qaida is focused on re-establishing strict Islamic rule in a new caliphate. To that end, al-Qaida is doing everything it possibly can to keep the U.S. militarily involved in the Muslim world in the short run. They know that the Muslim world is not yet ready for their fundamentalist caliphate. Al-Qaida “martyrdom attacks” are designed to create and maintain an unstable situation, which, in the short term, the United States will find difficult to leave. They need us to stay in the Middle East in the short run because our military presence daily coalesces more and more moderates against us – and for al-Qaida.

Moreover, they would be absolutely delighted to see us involved on the ground in Somalia, Yemen or any other Muslim state. Our continued presence and military activities provide them with critical advantages they would not have in our absence.

Direct al-Qaida attacks in the West are designed to show the Muslim world how all-powerful they are. They even claim unsuccessful attacks. Such attacks also increase Western insecurity and disrupt their resolve to maintain their long-term interests in the Muslim world. These attacks are not designed to take over the West or any part of it. For that reason, the old Bush notion that “we will fight ’em over there, so we don’t have to fight ’em at home” has no basis in fact.

The key to the future of Islam lies in its moderates. Whoever secures their allegiance and cooperation, secures the region. Unfortunately, today’s moderates are less offended by al-Qaida’s taking of innocent Muslim lives than they are by U.S. military activities and policies.

When America no longer poses a threat to al-Qaida, that is, after American military disengagement, which will come sooner or later, the moderates will become the primary counterbalance to the radical excesses of al-Qaida. Until then, with our military present, killing Muslims and trying to keep the despots in power, we will exacerbate tensions with the moderates and drive them toward al-Qaida.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

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[Originally published in The Randolph Herald.]

When America invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, our stated national purpose was to eliminate Al Qaida. That goal was rapidly forgotten with the ill-timed invasion of Iraq in 2003 and our focus subsequently morphed from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency.

Since then, we have fought Al Qaida in Iraq, while they joined an ongoing insurgency against us, and waged an unconventional war against them, mostly in Pakistan, consisting of special operations and drone missile strikes against their known and suspected people and positions. Those operations have decimated Al Qaida leadership.

We have focused on Pakistan because there are virtually no Al Qaida terrorists left in Afghanistan. What is left of the original Al Qaida leadership is now hunkered down somewhere in Pakistan’s Waziristan, simply trying to survive.

Al Qaida as we knew it has radically changed. It has been franchised out to discrete local volunteer terrorist groups. They now exist as Al Qaida Maghreb, Al Qaida Arab Peninsula, Al Qaida Yemen, and on and on. Al Qaida Central has little if any command and control over these groups. The situation is further complicated by the new phenomenon of singleton volunteers like the Nigerian Abdul Mutallab and US Army Major Hassan who were self-radicalized and therefore extremely difficult to uncover and neutralize.

Quite simply, America is today fighting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, an exceedingly difficult task. As long as that is our primary goal, the tactics we use will draw more and more fighters to and sympathy for Al Qaida, making them, our real enemy, increasingly difficult to defeat.

Combating terrorism, compared to counter-insurgency operations, is relatively simple and always potentially more successful. Terrorists do not often enjoy the support of the populations where they are operating. This has been true in Iraq and is definitely true in Afghanistan today. For that reason, they are easier to vanquish than insurgents.

Insurgents usually do have the support, or at minimum the tolerance of the local population. More often than not, as natives, they are preferable to a disliked regime in power or a foreign occupier. They can fade into that supportive population whenever threatened.

As things stand right now, we have none of the necessary advantages in Afghanistan needed to defeat an insurgency, a fact that makes any sort of ultimate “success” exceedingly illusory.

We do not have the overwhelmingly superior troop numbers needed to shut down a country as vast and geographically complicated as Afghanistan.

We do not have the support of the population because we are the foreigners and we are allied with a central “government” for which they have little use.

As long as that is the reality, we will not have the quality intelligence needed to adequately protect ourselves and keep them on the defensive because neither we, nor the Karzai government, is trusted by the bulk of the Afghan people.

In this respect, it doesn’t really matter that we think of ourselves as benevolent liberators, it only matters that Afghans think of us as foreigners occupiers.

Because Afghanistan always has been what it now is—a group of tribes unfavorably disposed to foreigners telling them how to live—our prospects for success in any form are extremely limited.

Al Qaida is finished in Afghanistan. The Obama administration, like its predecessor, claims we are fighting terrorism there. That is simply not true. It is a pure counter-insurgency issue. Why have we changed our goals? What is our concern with this purely national insurgency? What is our real goal and is it attainable?

We clearly hope to install a government of our liking in Afghanistan, yet it’s not at all clear what it would look like. The age-old resistance of the Afghan people to any sort of central government will make it difficult to implement any plan for the country that is consistent with our values.

The logical outcome, in the unlikely event we are successful in defeating the Taliban insurgency, would be further involvement in nation building in Afghanistan. Yet there is little evidence to indicate that the goal of any kind of “nation” familiar to us is attainable.

It took 33 years for Sri Lanka to vanquish the Tamil Tigers’ insurgency—and that struggle never involved foreign troops of any kind. In fact, there are very few examples of successful counter-insurgencies.

How long will the American people support an American counter-insurgency program in Afghanistan, particularly when its success, however unlikely, would likely lead to decades of costly nation building?

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. He is a former long-time resident of Brookfield who now lives in Williston.

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Are there solutions?

[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

Al Qaida has a major, long-term, existential problem in the Middle East and the greater Muslim world. It is a problem that they certainly cannot fix on their own. However, America’s counterterrorism policy has given Al Qaida hope for the short-term and if we continue that policy, it may well assist them in their ultimate goal of establishing a hegemonic Caliphate in the Muslim world.

The U.S. policy for the Muslim world that evolved after the events of 9/11 was crafted by policy makers who honestly believed that the solution to US problems in the Muslim world, or for that matter, anywhere else, lay in the swift application of American unipolar military might. That position might have worked in other parts of the world, but its application in the Muslim world has brought with it problems that its authors probably had not envisaged and for which they clearly had not planned.

U.S. interests in Islam

Years ago it was said that, “The United States does not have a Middle East policy. That is probably a good thing, because if it did, it would be the wrong one.” That reality has not changed much in the last half century, which underlines the politically partisan difficulties involved in constructing a precise definition of our national interests. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about solutions to our problems in the Muslim world without first broadly defining those interests. That said, it is probably safe to settle on the following generalities:

  • Stability or the absence of armed conflict.
  • The maintenance of U.S. commercial interests.
  • An end to being viewed as the enemy of the Muslims.
  • Realizing our National Security interests, i.e. inhibiting the growth of terrorism by marginalizing secular and religious extremists and supporting Muslim moderates.

U.S. and terrorism

After 9/11, the Bush Administration established fundamentalist Muslim terrorism as our primary concern in the Muslim world. The Obama administration appears to be following that

Bush program and for the last eight years, we have chosen military confrontation as our primary tool for dealing with terrorism.

At the same time, largely because of our choice of military confrontation, the nature of the threat we have faced has changed. Iraq was never a terrorist problem before our 2003 invasion. It became one solely because we were there militarily. We provided Al Qaida with an opportunity for first-rate live training, a target-rich environment and excellent prospects for recruiting. They moved in under the cover of the Iraq insurgency against our troops.

The Afghanistan situation began as a struggle with terrorism and has since morphed into a counterinsurgency. Today, there are hardly any Al Qaida fighters left. Again, we are dealing with an insurgency. Unlike terrorist movements, which are often overcome, insurgencies are extremely difficult to snuff out.

So, we start out with a major contradiction. We want to fight terrorism, but we are fighting insurgencies. The nature of the Muslim world is such that virtually any time we choose to go after Al Qaida militarily, we will end up fighting insurgencies, whether in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria or Pakistan. All of those countries, like much of the Muslim world, have built into them the kinds of internal ethnic, tribal, religious and political contradictions that make general civil strife a perpetual nightmare waiting to happen. All it takes to push it over the edge into insurgency is something foreign, like American military involvement.

It would be nice, however irrational, to believe that one day we could actually conquer Al Qaida and bring an end to the terrorism that has plagued us for over a decade. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen. If we are ultimately to rid ourselves of this terrorist phenomenon, it will be because the terrorist movement itself dies, as has been the case with most of the terrorist organizations that have not survived during the past half-century.

According to a 2006 Rand Corporation study, in the past fifty years, the tactic least likely to succeed against terrorism is military confrontation. The Rand finding is supported by Israeli experience, which says that wars against terrorism turn into extended counterinsurgency operations which are seldom won.

Our goal in this ongoing struggle with terrorism is clearly to figure out how to help Al Qaida die.

Al Qaida today

The methodical decimation of Al Qaida leadership over the past few years, mostly by drones and covert operations, has resulted in the franchising of their terrorist operations. Al Qaida’s leadership has been sharply reduced and inhibited by unconventional attacks. With its surviving leadership concentrating almost entirely on its own survival in Waziristan, there is little if any central command and control left for their operations.

National franchises have sprung up around the world. They operate in Yemen, Somalia, the North African Maghreb, Pakistan, Indonesia and elsewhere. They are even currently advertising for a start up in Muslim north Nigeria. The scene is further complicated by the arrival on the scene of the new phenomenon of self-motivated singleton volunteers who present a very difficult counterterrorism problem. There is a new air of unpredictability in the counterterrorism field. As these terrorists get more efficient and change their tactics and targeting, which they certainly will, we will have more difficulty anticipating their activities.

Al Qaida goals

“Muslims hate us for who we are and everything we stand for” was an almost constant mantra for the Bush Administration. That is simply untrue. Muslims admire our standard of living, our entrepreneurial spirit, our business acumen and our creativity. Those Muslims who hate us, and today they come in ever increasing numbers, hate us not for who we are, but for what we do. They hate us for our policies.

Unlike Al Qaida fundamentalists, moderate Muslims, where they may have serious complaints about American policy, are not enthralled at the thought of fundamentalist Islam taking over their lives. Moderates represent our greatest potential allies in this struggle with Al Qaida, but they are also easily turned against us.

What turns all Muslims, including moderates, against us is that:

  1. They are offended by the stationing of non-Muslim, foreign (American) troops on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia.
  2. They resent the American history of supporting and maintaining in power despotic regimes that rule Muslim people by force and intimidation.
  3. They hate us for killing Muslims, waging war in and occupying Muslim countries.
  4. They would like to see Palestinian aspirations treated with the same respect and care by America as the US treats Israeli aspirations.

Al Qaida’s primary goal is the re-establishment of strict Islamic rule in a new Caliphate, modeled on the Eighth Century Caliphate that stretched from Spain through North Africa and on through the Middle East to the eastern border of what is now Iran and which held sway over what was then the entire Muslim world.

The establishment of this new Caliphate is designed to rid the Muslim world of what Al Qaida sees as the corrupting influences of the West. An established Caliphate would diminish support of elements in the Muslim world which would today be opposed to Al Qaida goals. That would include virtually all of the regimes now in power there, including those that Al Qaida considers to be the corrupt secular Muslim regimes supported by the West.

In 2005, Robert Pape of the University of Chicago analyzed over 500 suicide or martyrdom attacks around the world over the past quarter century. He concluded that “what over 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks around the world since 1980 have in common – from Lebanon, to Chechnya, to Sri Lanka, to Kashmir, to the West Bank – is not religion, but a specific strategic goal: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw combat forces from territory the terrorists view is their homeland, or prize greatly.”

It follows that the activities of groups that use such tactics are directed toward local, not international goals. Al Qaida is focused on reestablishing strict Islamic rule in a new Caliphate. To that end, Al Qaida is doing everything it possibly can to keep the US militarily involved in the Muslim world in the short run. They know that the Muslim world is not yet ready for their fundamentalist Caliphate. They want us to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan because our military presence and activities strengthen their position with their co-religionists.

Al Qaida “martyrdom attacks” are designed to create and maintain an unstable situation, which, in the short term, the US will find difficult to leave. They need us to stay in the Middle East in the short run because our military presence daily coalesces more and more moderates against us and for Al Qaida.

Moreover, they would be absolutely delighted to see us involved on the ground in Somalia, the Yemen or any other Muslim state. Our continued presence and military activities provide them with critical advantages they would not have in our absence.

Direct Al Qaida attacks in the West are designed to show the Muslim world how all-powerful they are. They even claim unsuccessful attacks. It would also increase western insecurity and disrupt their resolve to maintain their long-term interests in the Muslim World. Such attacks are not designed to take over the West or any part of it.

The old Bush notion that “we will fight them over there, so we don’t have to fight them at home” has no basis in fact.

Thus, it is in Al Qaida’s interest to keep America on edge at home. When and if airplanes become less vulnerable targets as a result of western countermeasures, Al Qaida will switch to softer targets; ships, subways, buses, trains, etc. They will do this until they believe America no longer represents a long-term threat to their goals in the Muslim world, when we have withdrawn, or when they have died a natural death.

To survive, Al Qaida must have an external enemy and we have turned ourselves into Al Qaida’s enemy of choice. If we disengage from their battlefield before the majority of moderates turn against us, they will have to deal immediately with all those unavoidable, intractable, internal Muslim issues that have made our lives so complicated since the Iraq invasion. Religious, ethnic and national differences, rivalries and conflicts will be Al Qaida’s to deal with in their quest for the Caliphate.

Al Qaida and its fundamentalist allies are no more likely to succeed in this than America was in attempting to forcibly install democracy in the Muslim world.

The key to the future of Islam lies in its moderates. Whoever secures their allegiance and cooperation, secures the region. Unfortunately, today’s moderates are driven more by their hatred for US policies than they are about Al Qaida’s un-Islamic excesses. They are less offended by Al Qaida’s taking of innocent Muslim lives than they are by US military activities and policies.

When America no longer poses a threat to Al Qaida, that is, after American military disengagement, the moderates will become the primary counterbalance to the radical excesses of Al Qaida. Until then, with our military present, killing Muslims and trying to keep the despots in power, we will exacerbate tensions with the moderates and drive them toward Al Qaida.

Failed states

Much is made of the necessity for us to pay attention to and “do something” about failed and failing states. Taking Taliban Afghanistan in the pre 9/11 period as our national model, we have apparently decided that the elimination of failed states is the answer to our problems with terrorism.

In the real world, that does not compute, a fact that is perfectly illustrated by Richard Reid, the shoe bomber whose terrorist odyssey was focused largely on the UK, hardly a failed state. Other Al Qaida affiliated operations have been planned in the UK, Spain and other non-failed states.

All an enterprising terrorist organization needs to carry out a shoe bombing or an underwear bombing is a reasonably secure safe house in a country where not too much attention is paid to people who mind their own business and thus do not come to the attention of local internal security authorities. The 9/11 attacks could easily have been planned in New York City itself and, significantly, required that its participants get their flight training in America.

Such conditions exist all over the world and provide Al Qaida affiliates with all the options they could need to plan their operations. However, even if it were not the case, the issue of dealing with failed or failing states presents an entirely different set of problems and pitfalls for American policy makers.

The Muslim world is comprised of a number of “nation states” that were more the creation of Western imperialist powers than the result of natural cultural, political, and economic evolution. The result can be seen in Iraq where there are two major interpretations of Islam, Shia and Sunni, plus two major ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds. In Iraq, as in all the other “failed and failing states”, those divisions and conflicts are at the root of our difficulties in trying to find solutions to problems there and that are in keeping with our goals and values.

How can we solve our problems with Al Qaida when the host governments of countries where we have tangible military goals are not sufficiently helpful. They are either uninterested in our problems, as in Somalia, so busy trying to deal with their own that they have no time for our issues, as in the Yemen, or actually have reasons of their own not to help us out, as in Pakistan with the Taliban. In effect, we are left competing for the time and attention of the reluctant or incompetent governments on which our own policies have forced us to rely. That is not a good formula for success.

Solutions

There really are only three available solutions for our problems with terrorism in the Muslim World: (1) we can respond to all such situations with military power, (2) we can disengage militarily from the Muslim World or (3) we can try to implement a hybrid of the first two. Under the Bush Administration, we were totally married to the military solution. Under the Obama administration, it would appear we are flirting with the hybrid. No one has tried disengagement.

What we know is that a decade of military confrontation has created at least as many problems for us as it solved, largely because it has alienated, infuriated and neutralized moderate Muslims. It seems highly unlikely that the ongoing hybrid Obama approach will be any more successful, as the same issues of alienation and hostility still exists.

Yet, a careful examination of the realities of the Muslim world and our relationship with it will argue favorably for our complete military disengagement from the region. That act would effectively remove the primary motivation of present and future moderate Muslims who, as a result of our ongoing policies, have come to support, or at least not actively oppose Al Qaida.

There will be major concerns that our military disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan will precipitate internal strife in those countries, or worse yet, a general conflagration in the Middle East. Almost all of the disparate ethnic and sectarian components in each of the countries there have external advocates or protectors in the Muslim world. Iraqi Shia have Iran, the Sunnis have Saudi Arabia and Syria, etc.

It does not appear at this time that any of those “protectors” actively seeks to precipitate strife either in the countries involved or in the greater region. Quite the opposite, they have every reason not to seek regional strife. It is far too destabilizing. However, if such strife does come on the heels of US military disengagement, it will be the endemic hatreds and rivalries that will precipitate it, whether we leave now or in fifty years. These divisions and hatreds have existed for millennia. How long are we prepared to stay?

It will be argued that military disengagement will jeopardize the West’s energy supplies, but oil is fungible and only has value when pumped out of the ground and traded. It is also the only major economic asset most of those countries have.

Some will say Israel will be jeopardized, but we have been their primary mediators for forty years. What Muslims view as our totally biased involvement has led only to a deterioration of the situation there. Demographics argue for a two-state solution for both Israeli and Palestinian survival. It may be time to let them sort it out themselves for their own survival. Our disengagement should help mitigate the participants’ excuses for not really negotiating.

Are we deserting our friends? Who are they and are they really friends, or are they in it simply to get whatever support they can from us for their own narrow national goals, without making more than a minimal commitment to us and to our needs?

The fact is that our recent military-based and spearheaded policies in the Muslim world have exacerbated our problems with terrorism, added endless new terrorists to our enemies’ ranks, sullied our previously good reputation with Muslim moderates, maintained and encouraged despots in power and accomplished very little positive for us.

If nothing else, it’s time to consider change. In that context, it might be a profitable departure for America to see the world as it really is, not as we would like it to be. Only then will we get policies that are in harmony with the existing facts on the ground.

New policy

Within the framework of our national interests, there is no viable military solution for terrorism in any part of the Muslim world. Everything we do militarily is directly contradictory to our national interests. The reason for that lies partly in the fact that Muslim terrorism seems to regularly morph into or become absorbed by insurgencies as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More importantly, it stems from the critical, decades-old complaints that Muslims have had about American policies and activities in their region. What Americans need to understand is that as long as those American policies continue, we will be dealing with terrorism and rejection in the Muslim world. They are the causative factors behind the fact that, “they hate us for what we do, not who we are”.

If, on the other hand, we were to change those policies, Al Qaida would not last long in an increasingly moderate Muslim world hostile to their extreme and un-Muslim philosophies and activities. Without the United States as an intrusive, compliant, external whipping boy, Al Qaida would be forced to deal with the realities of their own diffuse and fragile Muslim world, a world largely hostile to them.

But this is a suggested policy built on the realities on the ground in the Muslim World and we all know that U.S. policy is more often built on the internal political needs of the Administration in power, in this case, the Obama administration.

Whatever happens, whatever decisions are made, we will not “win” our struggle with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism with our military establishment. Quite the contrary, as long as we are militarily involved, we will lose far more than we will gain and we will see no end to this terrorism.

Finding himself in a recently weakened position today vis-a-vis the Republicans and facing disapproval from elements of his own party, President Obama is faced with unhappy choices. If he were to see merit in complete military disengagement from the Muslim world, he would face onslaughts from Republicans and from all those who see advantages in the “long war”, including those people and organizations that benefit politically and economically from its continuation. That might just be enough to do him in.

On the other hand, if he can make up his mind to consider what is in our national interest and is prepared to suffer the perhaps dire political consequences of going against the supporters of the “long war”, he could, at minimum, begin the process of solving our most basic problems with the Muslim world and with terrorism.

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[Originally published in The Herald of Randolph.]

Compared with much of the rest of the world, America enjoys unparalleled, constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. Unfortunately, in bad or difficult times, our national leadership, irrespective of political party, is prone to make those guarantees secondary to their own notions of “security.”

Suddenly, the “safety of the American people” becomes more important than the Constitution. Practices and procedures are adopted that fundamentally conflict with that document. Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and George W. Bush have all gone that route.

At least Lincoln and Roosevelt had real wars on their hands. Bush had only his contrived “War on Terror,” a self-defeating reaction to the horrors of 9/11 which apparently was designed by the Neoconservatives, as were many of his other policies, to keep Americans in an endless state of fear and turmoil. This would, in turn, enmesh us in their “long war” which would commit us to equally endless years fighting their contrived enemies. Maybe they thought that fomenting this struggle would keep them in power. Clearly, it has not.

Over the six-plus years since 9/11, we have seen an end to certain habeus corpus rights, unconstitutional wireless wiretapping, torture, the CIA Gulag of prison camps, over 700 presidential “signing statements” abrogating legal legislation, and on and on.

We even got to the point where when President Bush found a law he didn’t like, he said he would interpret the law his own way. With a court system that was increasingly permissive in dealing with his activities, you had the perfect constitutional storm.

After 9/11, having not experienced a serious foreign attack on the continental US since the War of 1812, Americans panicked. We were being asked to actually give up constitutional rights for some amorphous sense of safety. We were bombarded with color-coded threat assessments, constant reminders of America’s vulnerability, stories of plots against America, and heavy coverage of attacks abroad.

Then we got Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, waterboarding, the CIA Gulag and we were told America had to do that to be safe. In a direct abrogation of our responsibilities as citizens, we accepted it! We simply packed up all our constitutional convictions and gave in, forgetting Benjamin Franklin’s admonition of 300 years ago that if you give up your rights for safety, you will get neither. That does not seem to have changed under President Obama.

The fact is that free societies are not safe. That’s the price you pay for your freedom. There is no middle ground. Either you are “free” or you are “safe”.

Let us accept as true the Bush administration’s claim that the techniques and tools that diminished our civil liberties at home and our reputation abroad were worth it because they stopped terrorist attacks. Even then the argument fails, for such things represent a tactical response to a strategic threat. They may stop the occasional attack, but they won’t address the fundamental issue. Even with a new administration, we need to change our counterterrorism policies.

Don’t believe the constant drumbeat that Muslims “hate us for what we are.” They actually like what we are. What they don’t like is what we do. They do not like our policies. As long as those policies persist, that tiny percentage of Islam that is composed of radical Muslims will wish and do us evil.

What Muslims want is pretty straightforward. They want foreign troops out of Arab countries, particularly out of the holiest countries like Saudi Arabia. They want an end to foreign support for the repressive, unelected governments in the Muslim world, an end to the American military occupation of Iraq, an end to killing Muslims and an equitable solution for Palestine.

It is possible to reach the goals outlined above if America and Europe get together and work for them. As of this moment, our active involvement is the only way we will solve the problems that face us in that part of the world. Only through such solutions will we realize our national interests in the Middle East, rid ourselves of our fears here at home and reconnect with our constitutional guarantees.

The election of Barack Obama initially provided real hope that appropriate solutions would be undertaken. Since then, he appears to have adopted the Bush Administration’s foreign policy philosophy and tactics, leaving little hope either for peace or for our military departure from the Middle East.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe and the Middle East and as Chief of the Counter-terrorism Staff. He lives in Williston.

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[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

All it takes to get America ginned up about terrorism and air travel security is to have another attempt to down a jetliner hit the press. Detroit has done just that.

Suggestions for solutions to this problem cover the range from idiotic to inspired. One genius on CNN suggested we ban anyone with an Arabic name from flying at all. One rather thoughtful expert suggested that there are a number of devices available that are capable of sniffing out explosive compounds.

Americans cannot be both safe and free. Until the time when and if technology takes over, if you really want to be safe in the air, you will have to accept some diminution of your personal freedoms, like virtual screening and body searches. If you want to be free, you will have to reject such measures and perhaps not fly.

Let’s face it, Americans have already accepted major intrusions into their personal freedoms with warrantless wiretapping and most of the other measures instituted by the Bush administration under the Patriot Act after 9/11. So, you see, your horse has already left the barn.

One CNN “expert” has suggested that what is wrong is that we are focused too much on weaponry in our anti-terrorism measures. What we should be doing, he suggested, is focusing on the people. Terrorists, he and many others have said, have many common and identifiable factors. They are all Muslims and have strange names, for example. Forget the legal issues, we need to profile them.

If you look at Muslims around the world, they are black, white, tan, Asian, European and Middle Eastern. Consider Nigeria, the Arab world, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, China, Russia, Bosnia and Albania. That covers the human color range. There are no common denominators in those groups other than their religion, and that only if they are Muslim and choose to say so.

In addition, they now include numbers of converts who are entirely atypical. Some are white Americans and Europeans.

Quite apart from those absolutes, any good terrorist organization has its document specialists. Any such specialist can create or alter just about any passport by giving the bearer a new name, date and place of birth, or any of the other identifying characteristics contained in such a document. That really puts the torch to any foolproof system that would focus on the individual rather than the chosen weapon. In fact, the best known, most competent and highly blacklisted terrorist can foil the entire watch list system by assuming a new identity. So much for watch lists and no-fly lists.

The only potentially effective system available is based on common sense and technology. Common sense dictates that we have a system that will tell us unequivocally that any given person: bought a one-way ticket; bought a ticket with cash; had only a carry-on for a three-week stay. Or that that same person had been reported to U.S. authorities as an increasingly radicalized Muslim. We have computers. What we need is more reliable input and analysis.

Technological solutions now include machines designed to detect explosives at airports as part of security screening. Although performance specs on such technology are understandably closely held, they are said to work very well and to have low failure rates. The only impediments to the use of such technology are the availability of the machines and the decision to install them.

If the terrorist is able to get his bomb past airport controls, today’s carry-on bomb materials clearly require privacy to be assembled and armed. That can best be done in the toilet. There needs to be a way to learn that such a process is under way; given our high level of technical sophistication, that is certainly possible.

Of course, it would be useful if there actually were someone in charge at the Transportation Security Administration. The nominee, Erroll Southers, has been held up by Sen. Jim DeMint of South Carolina since early September, because the senator fears that Southers will unionize airport screeners. Now, there’s a good way to keep us safe in the air!

We are at the point where technology and common sense, instead of prejudice, stereotyping and hysteria, represent the possibility of saving us from our baser selves, while measurably increasing our security without further diminishing our personal freedoms. That certainly is worth a try.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog.]

What makes Obama think more troops are the answer in Afghanistan? A former CIA station chief questions the wisdom of banking on a centralized solution for a fragmented country.

We have been sold a real bill of goods on Afghanistan.  We have allowed ourselves to be persuaded that in order to reach our goals there, whatever they may be, we will have to defeat the Taliban insurgency.  According to a recent statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that is a “long-term prospect.”

This scenario raises a number of crucial questions about our Afghan adventure:  What are our goals there? What should our goals be? Must we “defeat” the Taliban to reach those goals? How much does the situation in Pakistan affect our chances for success?  What is the likelihood that we can succeed? Finally, how much additional treasure are Americans prepared to commit there?  How great is our patience for this war?

The Taliban doesn’t have to “win” in Afghanistan.  It simply has to avoid final defeat, something insurgencies know how to do and something the Taliban has actually accomplished since 2001.

Much was written about our goals for Afghanistan under the Bush Administration, which most notably includes wanting to “kick someone’s ass” on the heels of 9/11.

Obama Administration spokespeople have variously described our goals in Afghanistan as rooting out al Qaida and the Taliban forces, preventing their return, supporting self-governance, and ensuring security, stability and reconstruction.

The president told McClatchy Newspapers last year: “I can tell you what our strategic goals should be. They should be relatively modest. We shouldn’t want to take over the country. We should want to get out of there as quickly as we can and help the Afghans govern themselves and provide for their own security. Our critical goal should be to make sure that the Taliban and al Qaida are routed and that they cannot project threats against us from that region. And to do that I think we need more troops.”

Vice President Biden in February 2009 called for a “comprehensive strategy… that brings together our civilian and military resources, that prevents terrorists a safe haven, that helps the Afghan people develop the capacity to secure their own future.” Secretary Gates told U.S..troops in December 2008: “Significantly expanding [Afghanistan’s national security forces] is, in fact, our exit strategy,”

Our one truly legitimate goal in Afghanistan should be very clear:  We need to be sure that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary and training ground for Al Qaida or any other group that seeks to do us harm.

In order to accomplish that, however, we must understand some of the basic realities from Afghan history.  Traditionally, power in Afghanistan has rested in the many tribal chieftains who, in effect, have long run their own areas of the fragmented country.  Central authority and power have almost always been illusory.

But we are now training tens of thousands of national security forces in Afghanistan who are true products of their environment, having been recruited from all the tribes and ethnic groups in the country.  In this traditionally tribal society, to whom do they owe their true loyalty: the central government or their tribes?  Whose interests will they support when tribal and central government interests are at odds, which they nearly always are?  Since they exist with divided loyalties, how effective can they be in carrying out central national policy when that policy by definition will come at the expense of their own tribes?

There are tribes in Afghanistan that do not have a natural affinity for the Taliban.  We identified and worked with many of them during our 2001 invasion.  We now have the opportunity and obligation to work with them again, in our goal of eliminating Al Qaida.

And we need to help our new allies without continuing to try to militarily destroy the Taliban, which only brings them more Afghan recruits against the foreign invader.  Make no mistake about it, that is how we are viewed and as long as that is true, we will unite the Afghans – as much as they can be united — against us and our goals.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief, who served in Eastern and Western Europe, Lebanon and Tehran and as chief of the counter-terrorism staff.

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[Originally published on AmericanDiplomacy.Org.]

American foreign policy must be based on American moral beliefs, yet it inevitably encounters problems in dealing with regions where belief systems are fundamentally different, such as the Middle East. Moreover, this essay argues, domestic political pressures based on moral and religious beliefs have divorced U.S. foreign policy from objective U.S. interests in the Middle East. The author believes that a more rational policy debate may at last be getting underway. – Ed.

America faces some grim realities when it attempts to formulate foreign policy for regions in the world that cleave to belief systems that are radically different from our American moral and ethical foundation. The problems come in two different ways: First, for American foreign policy to be supported by Americans it must be consistent with our belief system.  Second, once formulated and implemented, to be successful it must also be relevant to the beliefs of the region in which it is being implemented.   When belief systems are radically different, these two realities are seldom compatible.  This could not be more true than it is for American policy in the Middle East today.

Afghanistan’s Marriage Law

American and other Western media have learned recently of the existence of a new marriage law in Afghanistan that they have characterized as legalizing rape within marriage and forbidding married women from leaving the house without permission.

It has made good copy and, in playing on the “backward and anti-human rights” aspects of the law, the media, at last count, have managed to incite protests from the British, United States, French, New Zealand, and Canadian governments, as well as the United Nations and numerous feminine rights organizations. All have responded with righteous condemnation, a completely understandable reaction.

But this melodrama is interesting not just because of its inflammatory allegations of legalized rape, or for discussions of the appropriateness of the Western response to the story. It is far more interesting in the way it illuminates the problems that exist for the West in general, and the United States in particular, in formulating and implementing foreign policies for the Muslim world.

Mohammad Asif Mohseni, a senior Afghan cleric and a main drafter of the law, has said that a woman must have sex on demand with her husband at least every four days, unless she is ill or would be harmed by intercourse. He amplified, saying, “It is essential for the woman to submit to the man’s sexual desire.”

In addition, he has said that the legislation cannot be revoked or changed because it was enacted through the bi-cameral legislative process and signed by President Karzai.

However, Mohseni’s most interesting and telling comment was that “The Westerners claim that they have brought democracy to Afghanistan. What does democracy mean? It means government by the people for the people. They should let the people use these democratic rights.”  He further condemned the Western outcry saying that Western countries were trying to thwart democracy because the results did not please them.

In our culture, forced sex in or out of marriage is equated to rape. It is therefore at least inappropriate and probably illegal here at home.

In Afghanistan, the law that in our eyes “legalizes rape,” was drafted after three years of debate by Islamic scholars and Afghan legislators. Even though it was condemned by many Afghan women, it was supported by hundreds of other women who affixed their signatures or thumbprints to it.

Looking at the new law through our cultural filter, the American government and most Americans roundly condemn such legislation as at least unethical or immoral, probably as illegal, and certainly as unacceptable.

If we were to support this law as a foreign policy position, how would the National Organization of Women, the ACLU, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, to name but a few, react?  How much support would such a foreign policy get from the American people?

On the other hand, the Afghan government as well as most Afghan men and significant numbers of Afghan women, accept it as reflecting the Koran, Sharia law, and tradition, the bases of Islamic law.  How should we expect them to react when we tell them how to live their lives?  It’s easy to say that there are universal standards that apply in these cases – that they concern fundamental human rights.  And for us, they do.

Are Human Rights Universal?

However, consider the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). No matter how appropriate and universal it seems to us, it has never been universally accepted. Quite the opposite, it has precipitated a nagging debate that has persisted over the last 60 years. Muslim countries have always objected, saying that the document was written in the Judeo-Christian tradition and as such failed to acknowledge the cultural and religious differences of Islamic countries, thus denying Muslims the freedom and right to a dignified life under their universally accepted Sharia law.

How could anyone possibly object to such fundamental truths as those in the UNDHR, we ask?

Much as we would like to think that our laws and traditions are a perfect reflection of mankind, there are plenty of other humans who would argue that point. Those differences are greatest where the belief systems are farthest apart.

All human beings are victims or beneficiaries of their own ethnocentric cultural environments and biases. Laws exist as contemporary forms of cultural traditions, and when one culture begins to tell another very different culture what is right and wrong, there is bound to be friction and conflict.

Who are we to say that our culture is right and theirs is wrong? And yet, that is invariably the problem when we start to tell disparate parts of the world how to run their lives.

Politics and National Interests

Formulating foreign policy in the United States has never been an easy matter.  As a land of immigrants, America has always had to grapple with the strongly held interests of those citizens who came here from the areas concerned.  A further complicating issue is the range of passionately held opinions ranging from right to left that flourish in our democracy and have always existed here.  A policy that satisfies one constituency is often likely to infuriate another.

The result of this is that U.S. foreign policy is more often than not formulated not on the basis of the objective facts that exist in the area concerned, but on the basis of the internal political needs of the political party in power.  In this context, it is normally understood that our policies have to be consistent with our values.  If foreign policy for a given region is out of sync with American values, that fact will cause political problems for the administration in power.

This conundrum is easily observed in the formulation of our Middle East policy.  The issue of Israel and Palestine has been on the books at least since 1967 and perhaps since 1948.  On the one hand, we have a passionately strong and effective pro-Israeli lobby that ranks among the most powerful and successful lobbies in Washington.  This amorphous grouping includes Americans who are the most unequivocal and passionate supporters of Israel.  That group is both Jewish and Christian and includes the Christian Zionists who believe that the second coming of Christ will not occur until Jews occupy all the biblical lands, including Samaria and Judea, which are currently – at least partially – under Palestinian control.

With the horrendous legacy of the Holocaust to unite and motivate them, many American Jews join the Christian Zionists in support of Israel and her territorial ambitions as mirrored in the settler program.  This group is often called “the Israeli Lobby.”

On the other hand, there is a growing group of Americans, both Christian and Jew, who look very differently at the situation.   Their views have spawned increasing interest in the two-state solution and can be seen in the birth of new pro-Israel but also pro-peace groups like J Street.  They see Israel’s West Bank settlements, as well as recent Israeli military activities in Lebanon and Gaza, as counterproductive to their notion of a decent future for Arabs and Jews alike.

This group includes a number of Americans, including foreign policy experts, who simply believe that there is a growing divergence in the perceived national interests of the United States and Israel.  This situation has been aggravated by the recent bellicosity of the new right-leaning Israeli government and its stated animosity toward Iran.  This has been manifested in increasing support for a two-state solution and opposition to the settler movement and to Israeli military aggressiveness.

In the past, it was a politically accepted although rarely tested premise that only rigorously pro-Israel parties, politicians, and policies could win American elections.  If a candidate appeared not to toe the Israeli line or showed a weakness on matters that hard-line Israeli supporters did not favor, it was political suicide.  And that may have been true.

Today that seems to be less true.  Perhaps a combination of Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, abetted by the legacy of 100% support of “Israel right or wrong,” has tipped the balance a bit.  The beginnings of a discussion on our national interests in the Middle East, of the healthy kind that always has existed in Israel, but which has been politically suppressed here, is beginning to creep into the national dialog.

Defining Interests

Just what then are our national interests in the Middle East if we define national interests as our country’s survival and security, its wealth, economic growth, and power, and the preservation of its culture?

Survival and security, at this particular moment, pertain to terrorism and to the existence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and their possible development in Iran.  Wealth, economic growth, and power can clearly encompass oil, trade, our balance of trade, and the national debt incurred by our military activities in the region; and all of those things can be wrapped up in the effect, largely negative at this time, of our foreign policy on the inclination of other nations to support us in our national interests.

We thus find ourselves in the difficult position of facing the fact that Policy “A,” which may very well be the objectively ideal policy to employ in Country “A,” is unacceptable either to the American people or the people of Country A for emotional, philosophical, or cultural reasons, thus making it impractical and unusable.

There really is nothing new here.  This situation has probably obtained in democracies since they began.  In trying to deal with the problem, U.S. presidents have generally gone one of two ways.  They have either done everything as much as possible in secrecy – consider Iraq or Viet Nam – or they have done it openly while trying to help the American public understand what they are up to and why – consider FDR.

There is a lesson here for President Obama.  America has reached this contemporary impasse in the Middle East for two very basic reasons.  There has never been the kind of open debate in America that exists in Israel about the day-to-day happenings in the region.  Such debate has been stifled by one-sided, pro-Israeli American organizations.  That has meant that, in general, Americans have never had sufficient information to enable them to come to valid conclusions about U.S. policy in the region.

That, in turn, means that far too many Americans are unable to understand that American and Israeli national interests, where more often than not congruous, are not always the same.  It is when they are not, as in the case of the possibility of an attack on Iran, that we need to act on the basis of our own national interests in order to avoid very real disaster.

A More Rational Approach

It is difficult if not impossible to change the values of the inhabitants of countries where we wish to apply any foreign policy, but we can surely do better at home.

Absent a real understanding of Islam and the differences between us, it is incredibly difficult, as we have seen over the past seven years, to conceive and implement a successful foreign policy based on American cultural values for a region with wildly different cultural biases.  FDR overcame a similar problem in his handling of American entry into World War II by explaining in excruciating detail why that entry was necessary.

We could use that kind of approach today to our problems in the Middle East or in any other region where our cultural differences are markedly divergent.

This rational approach to foreign policy is a difficult sell.  Despite the fact that the U.S. government and academia were full of experts who really did and still do understand the cultural and political dynamics of the Middle East, we have been unable to make our policies there rational over the past decade.  In fact, many of those policies have been directly counterproductive to our national goals and interests.

The old, irrational way of doing business into which so many administrations have fallen over the decades, has done us so much damage that any move in a more rational direction is worth every bit of the time and effort it will demand.   And it all starts with a totally free and open domestic debate conducted by our national leadership about the Middle East and our interests, policies, and goals there.  For the first time in decades, that may now be meaningfully underway under the Obama administration. 

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. A graduate of Dartmouth, he served in the Army Security Agency, undertook Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

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