Rural Ruminations

[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog.]

Using our military to try to deprive al Qaeda of sanctuaries will not bring us immunity from the next terrorist attack, writes a former CIA station chief. That attack can be organized, planned, funded and carried out from any safehouse in any country that allows freedom of movement. By contrast, as long as we use our military to try to mold the world to our liking, we are going to create more and more people and nations who will wish us ill, increasing the likelihood that we will be attacked again.

After 9/11, the Bush Administration concluded that it would have to look very carefully at every nation that could conceivably provide a launch pad for an al Qaeda attack on the United States.  Later it was further decided that any “failed state” in Islam could supply Al Qaeda with the environment it needed.

Of course, the state that harbored the 9/11 terrorists was not a failed state.  It was a state dominated by the Taliban.  In their Afghan facility, al Qaeda ran a complete terrorist training operation, grooming their troops for just about any conceivable paramilitary task.  They trained their recruits as guerillas, attack troops, bomb makers, snipers, suicide foot, car and truck bombers and anything else that struck them as appropriate for a terrorist organization.

What they could not train them to do in the Afghan mountain caves was to fly planes into buildings. They had to come to America for that training. Nor was it necessary for them to find a failed state or a friendly state in order to sit down and plan 9/11.  They could do that in just about any mud hut in the Pushtun countryside or in any other country that provided freedom of movement, like America, Spain, Germany, France or England, in all of which countries they have subsequently done just that.

Indeed,  9/11 was planned and then trained for in places that had absolutely nothing to do with failed states.  It would almost certainly have been successfully planned and carried out in the absence of a safe haven in Afghanistan.

We have recently been ominously informed that Somalia and the Yemen could easily turn into “failed states” that could provide support for al Qaeda training and plotting.  And if we look at a map, there are other states in Islam with which we do not enjoy cordial relationships, states that do not hold us in high esteem.  Any of these states could turn into a sanctuary for al Qaida.

Apparently the Saudis are concerned about a growing threat from the Yemen.  This concern is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, who recently told Congress that the weakness of Yemen’s government provides al Qaeda a safe haven and that terror groups could “threaten Yemen’s neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.”

So, there is some reason for our allies in the Middle East to be concerned about al Qaeda and failing states.  That may mean that we should also be concerned, as long as we understand that it is not a military issue which will directly involve the United States.  It is a security problem for the Saudis and should be handled by them and any other threatened country.

There are two lessons here.  The first is that there are always bad people doing bad things in the world.  It is important for us to learn that we are not responsible for rectifying all the world’s ills.  We need to let the rest of the world accept primary responsibility for its own wellbeing.

The second is that undertaking to keep states from failing and trying to make sure that al Qaeda doesn’t have any friends who will give them sanctuary will not bring us any sort of immunity from the next terrorist attack.  That attack can be organized, planned, funded and carried out from any safehouse in any part of the world that gives its residents a relative lack of scrutiny.  It requires neither a friendly nor a failing state.

As long as we are compulsively militarily involved in trying to mold the world to our liking, we are going to create more and more people and nations who will wish us ill, increasing the likelihood that we will be attacked again.

We are at a crossroads here.  At our own peril, we are either going to continue to undertake truly high risk military operations like the Iraq war in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and perhaps elsewhere, or, having been given the opportunity to change as a result of the elections of November 2008, we can reassess our role in the world and consider the possibility that there are other ways to do our business that will not keep us stretched thin around the world and not put us constantly in military, political and economic jeopardy.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief, who served in Eastern and Western Europe, Lebanon and Tehran and as chief of the counter-terrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Barre Times-Argus and Rutland Herald.]

After 9/11, the Bush administration concluded that it would have to look very carefully at every nation that could conceivably provide a launch pad for an Al Qaida attack on the United States. Later it was further decided that any “failed state” would supply Al Qaida with the environment it would need and that we would therefore, presumably, have to see to it that no state in Islam failed.

Of course, Afghanistan was not a failed state. It was a state dominated by the Taliban. Our problem was that the Taliban had no problem with Al Qaida setting up shop on Afghan soil. So they did, and they trained their terrorists and we watched and waited until 9/11, before we truly galvanized.

In their Afghan facility, Al Qaida ran a complete terrorist training operation, grooming their troops for just about any conceivable paramilitary task. They trained their recruits as guerillas, attack troops, bomb makers, snipers, suicide foot, car and truck bombers and anything else that struck them as appropriate for a terrorist organization.

What they could not train them to do in the Afghan mountain caves was to fly planes into buildings. They had to come to America for that training. Nor was it necessary for them to find a failed state or a friendly state in order to sit down and plan 9/11. They could do that in just about any mud hut in the Pushtun countryside or in any other country that provided freedom of movement, like America, Spain, Germany, France or England, in all of which countries they have subsequently done just that. 9/11 was planned and then trained for in places that had absolutely nothing to do with failed states. It would almost certainly have been successfully planned and carried out in the absence of a safe haven in Afghanistan.

We have recently been ominously informed that Somalia and the Yemen could easily turn into “failed states” that could provide support for Al Qaida training and plotting. And if we look at a map, there are other states in Islam with which we do not enjoy cordial relationships, states that do not hold us in high esteem. Any of these states could turn into a sanctuary for Al Qaida.

Apparently the Saudis are concerned about a growing threat from the Yemen. This concern is shared by Gen. David Petraeus, who recently told Congress that the weakness of Yemen’s government provides Al Qaida a safe haven and that terror groups could “threaten Yemen’s neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.”

So, there is some reason for our allies in the Middle East to be concerned about Al Qaida and failing states. That may mean that we should also be concerned, as long as we understand that it is not a military issue which will directly involve the United States. It is a security problem for the Saudis and should be handled by them and any other threatened country.

There are two lessons here. The first is that there are always bad people doing bad things in the world. It is important for us to learn that we are not responsible for rectifying all the world’s ills. We need to let the rest of the world accept primary responsibility for its own wellbeing.

The second is that undertaking to keep states from failing and trying to make sure that Al Qaida doesn’t have any friends who will give them sanctuary will not bring us any sort of immunity from the next terrorist attack. That attack can be organized, planned, funded and carried out from any safehouse in any part of the world that gives its residents a relative lack of scrutiny. It requires neither a friendly nor a failing state.

As long as we are compulsively militarily involved in trying to mold the world to our liking, we are going to create more and more people and nations who will wish us ill, increasing the likelihood that we will be attacked again.

We are at a crossroads here. At our own peril, we are either going to continue to undertake truly high risk military operations like the Iraq war in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and perhaps elsewhere, or, having been given the opportunity to change as a result of the elections of November 2008, we can reassess our role in the world and consider the possibility that there are other ways to do our business that will not keep us stretched thin around the world and not put us constantly in military, political and economic jeopardy.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

Most Americans who are watching current revelations about our past torture practices and related abuses, or “enhanced interrogation techniques,” seem primarily interested in the extent and nature of those activities. We can all speak to the downside of torture in terms of our world standing. However, in the arcane world of secret intelligence, many professionals are asking precisely what if any benefits have accrued as a result of these questionable activities. More simply put, does torture work and do we really need it?

Interrogation is one of the techniques used by intelligence officers working to obtain information. It rests somewhere in a continuum that includes interviewing, recruitment, debriefing and elicitation.

The most basic of these techniques is arguably recruitment, in which an intelligence officer seeks to obtain the cooperation of a prospective agent for the purpose of producing needed intelligence. Recruitment attempts can be categorized into two general categories, collaborative and coercive. Of these two, collaborative recruitments have been the only ones that have been consistently successful. Coercive recruitments rarely work because there is no communality of interest, only the threat of some as yet undefined punishment for the prospective recruit.

Collaborative recruitment is like seduction. It involves a dynamic in which two people realize that they have a common goal and then work together to reach that goal. The point is, as a mutually shared process and goal, it works only if there is some positive benefit in it for both participants.

Interrogation is a totally different process. It starts with the fact that it involves one person who has been captured or arrested and is now being held captive by another, creating an uneven situation in which there is no mutual benefit in sight. That means that at the onset of the interrogation process, there is no identity of purpose between captor and captive. There is only reason for him to do everything he thinks will help him survive.

In an uneven, captor/captive situation, the captive – and this is particularly true in military or intelligence operations – has no reason to tell the truth. He has every reason to try to figure out what his captor wants to learn, and then try to provide it. He will say virtually anything to stop torture, but will be terrified to reveal the real truth, realizing that doing so will probably end the interrogation process, bringing a totally uncertain future for him, perhaps even death!

Truly gifted interrogators say unequivocally that they can move from the essentially hostile imbalance that is inherent at the beginning of an interrogation to the stage of mutual advantage found in a recruitment scenario simply by approaching the captive as if he were a recruitment target. At that point, using the same process of seduction, he not only establishes a mutuality of interest, but completely removes all the disadvantages of coercion.

Members of the Bush administration and the occasional “anonymous CIA source” have consistently told us that waterboarding has produced critical intelligence. Yet, admissions have crept into the public domain that not all of what was learned was true or accurate, or that it was really the result of waterboarding. Many of the most experienced and successful Military and FBI interrogators support this conclusion, saying it simply does not work and that, even if it did, we can get the information we need without using it.

We live in an unfortunate environment in which, thanks to mass media productions like Fox TV’s “24”, many Americans have been led to believe that torture produces critical intelligence. As that is the primary argument used by proponents of enhanced interrogation, it simply must be challenged and cleared up. The keys to this matter lie probably the cases of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.

If it is found that torture is productive, the debate formed in the Bush era on the legality of enhanced interrogation will continue. Next we will examine whether or not it is really needed. Regardless of the result, this process will probably end with the banning of these techniques based simply on their illegality.

However, if it can be established, as it is claimed by so many successful and experienced interrogators, that torture does not work and really never has, and that we can get the information we need without it, there will be no need for further debate.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

In pointing out blandly in a March 15 CNN interview that America has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11, former Vice President Cheney stated that he believes that the policies undertaken by the new Obama Administration are making America less safe.

In saying this, Cheney was making a direct comparison between the policies of the Bush Administration and those of President Obama. He was saying that the standby policies of the Bush administration—preemptive military action, wireless wiretapping, enhanced interrogation techniques (torture), Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, the CIA ‘s rendition and overseas detention programs, to name but a few—were what kept us safe and that their ongoing repudiation will make us more vulnerable.

Democracies are never completely safe. They are inherently dangerous. If they were safe, they would not be democracies. To make us safe from terrorism, we would have to employ all the questionable techniques listed above, plus many more. In the process of doing that, we Americans would have to give up layer after layer of our constitutional guarantees. Remember Benjamin Franklin’s admonition that “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety“.

To get back to Cheney, let’s just arbitrarily stipulate that what he says is true. Even then, it is only a tactical response to the terrorist threat. Optimally, it may stop the occasional attack, but it won’t solve the fundamental problem. We need a new strategy that deals with the weaknesses in this terrorist threat with a view to stopping the movement, not just the attacks. Without such a strategy, there will be no foreseeable end to this problem.

The essence of a successful strategy against terrorism lies in not losing your old friends in the Muslim world, and also gaining new ones. In that context, it is critical that we keep moderate Muslims on our side. Basically, our entire approach to terrorism has been misguided. Our major response after 9/11 was the invasion of Iraq which, in itself, was offensive to all sorts of Muslims. Then we added torture and all of the questionable activities enumerated above which, in the aggregate, although they may have eliminated some terrorists, create an environment in which moderate Muslims have turned away from us. When moderate Muslims do that, there are not many alternatives available and they turn toward terrorism. Our questionable activities become recruiting posters for terrorism and their ranks swell.

On the positive side, we have decimated Al Qaida management to the point where the organization is on the run and marginal. The result has been the MacDonaldization of Al Qaida, in which groups spring up in the spirit, but not in the line of command of Al Qaida Central. That turns them into local groups vulnerable to the authorities in the countries in which they exist and makes them far easier to cope with, if we maintain good relations with those countries’ security services.

The real issues that remain are the futures of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia. Somalia is in the mix because there is no effective central government there, creating the kind of environment that existed in pre 9/11 Afghanistan which Al Qaida found so amenable.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are problems for us, but not terrorist problems. They are insurgencies and they have to be dealt with as such. In addition to that, we have to deal with state sponsors of terrorism like Syria and Iran, a process that appears to be underway with Syria and could well be a part of any future negotiation with Iran.

According to a recent Rand study, between 1968 and 2008, 648 terrorist groups disappeared. Of that group, 75% were absorbed into their national political systems, 10% were defeated by police activities, and a mere 7% by military action. The critical point here is that military force often has the opposite effect of what is intended. It is often overused, alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and is a boon to terrorist recruiters. The US military should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim societies, especially in large numbers, where its presence is likely to create more problems than it solves.

The default position for dealing with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism is talking. Like the three-way baseball trade analogy, everyone has things they want and things they will give up. The key is to find out which is which and the only way to do that is to talk with all those involved.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. A longtime resident of Brookfield, he now lives in Williston.

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[Originally published in the Rutland Herald and Barre Times-Argus.]

During the seven years since the attacks of 9/11, America has gone through a difficult learning process in dealing with international terrorism. That experience has done little to help us address the problem in any positive, meaningful way. Quite the contrary, our policies over those years have done serious damage to American national interests.

The only immutable in dealing with terrorism is to maximize your friends and minimize your enemies. America’s departure from a “rational,” pre-2000, foreign policy that valued international friendships, to a neoconservative policy of pre-emptive unilateralism that rejects diplomacy, has resulted in the loss of friendships and prestige, both of which are critical in addressing international terrorism.

Under an Obama administration, a new approach to terrorism on the domestic front might well start with the abolition of all of those mechanisms that have kept the American public on edge since 9/11. We should abolish color-coded terrorism warnings and the constant hyping of the terrorist “threat” which, in the aggregate, serve primarily as a hedge against the still unlikely prospect of a repeat 9/11.

From there, we should revisit the Patriot Act and do away with all of those elements which have been sold to us as “increasing our security,” but which in reality diminish or abrogate our civil rights.

Benjamin Franklin correctly said, “They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” In reality, “safe” countries are not free and “free” countries are not safe. It is up to us to decide whether or not we are better off in the aggregate for the loss of our liberties, remembering that once surrendered, they are difficult to reacquire. Has a sense of safety, however illusory, been worth that loss?

Vesting our domestic counterterrorism responsibility in the FBI is a real problem. The entire culture of the FBI is directed toward law enforcement. They are extremely competent in that task because it is consistent with their charter. The problem with counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism operations, two disciplines that have major similarities, is that you can’t run such operations successfully with a statutory law enforcement mentality.

Counterterrorism in America is looked at as a law enforcement problem and so it is. But, particularly in the early stages of any terrorist operation, it is also very much an intelligence problem and thus totally at odds with the precepts of law enforcement. We should have something more like MI5, the British internal intelligence organization.

In the murky world of intelligence, the organizations that collect intelligence should be permitted to send only thoroughly evaluated, finished intelligence to their White House customers. Such customers should never be given access to raw intelligence, as they are today, as it can be extremely confusing, contradictory and even deceptive.

Our overseas activities and policies are just as important as our domestic counter-terrorism activities and much can and must be done to improve those efforts.

An end to a foreign policy of “preemptive unilateralism” and a return to our old “rational” policies will have the immediate effect of improving our diplomatic relations with most of the rest of the world, particularly those friends who have been so alienated by post-9/11 U.S. policies. That, in turn, will bring the potential for improvements in our liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security services, without whose willing cooperation the struggle with terrorism cannot be won.

Terrorism, whether directed against a local population, a local government or a foreign occupier, is by its nature a movement that lacks local support. Anything we can do to drive a wedge between terrorists and their neighbors, as we have between Sunnis and al-Qaida in the “Awakening” program in Iraq’s Anbar Province, will serve us well and can most effectively be accomplished with assistance from foreign governments and their intelligence and security services.

Our public face to the world is a direct reflection of what we do and say. “Bring ’em on” makes us look cocky and arrogant. The braggadocio with which we alternately dehumanize and belittle the Muslims may make some of us feel better, but is directly counterproductive to our goals for dealing with terrorism.

Equating all Muslims with terrorists is not only inaccurate, it is demeaning and infuriating for mainstream, moderate Muslims who hold the key to our success in combating fundamentalist terrorism. Such responses and the concomitant publicity and press coverage are the mother’s milk of terrorist organizations. They thrive on such publicity and wither without it.

Military action against terrorism is unlikely to succeed. Terrorism is mostly a law enforcement and intelligence problem. A recent Rand Corporation study examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. During that period, 398 of those groups have ceased to exist. Forty-three percent (171) of those that ended were absorbed into the political systems of the countries in which they operated, while 40 percent (159) were defeated by police activities. It is most significant to note that only 7 percent (28) of those groups were defeated by military action.

There is a rising dialog in and out of government on the perils of increasing U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, particularly given the Taliban/al-Qaida safehaven in Pakistan. The new administration should consider these arguments, despite the president-elect’s commitments during the election campaign.

Finally, we must more clearly define, rather than conflate, terrorism and insurgency. In order to develop successful strategies against insurgency and terrorism, we will have to treat the two totally differently. What will succeed with terrorism is unlikely to succeed with insurgency.

If we continue to fail to discriminate between terror and insurgency, as we have generally failed to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will create more problems than we solve, aiding terrorist recruitments and support and alienating the moderates whose opposition to terrorism we need so badly.

It matters a great deal what you call these movements. The label you give them will determine the nature and extent of local and international support you gain for your program and will, if it is to be successful, dictate the strategy and tactics you use against your enemy.

Our first seven years of dealing with terrorism can only be viewed positively if we recognize our errors and move on to totally new policies.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle East and as Chief of the Counter-terrorism Staff.

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[Originally published as a letter to the public editor in the New York Times.]

Re “Separating the Terror and the Terrorists” (Dec. 14):

I write as a long-retired C.I.A. station chief and chief of the counterterrorism staff. I served abroad in East and West Europe and the Middle East over a 25-year career.

Some insurgents commit terrorist acts (Chechnya) and some terrorists run hospitals (Hamas). It is a confusing landscape, but the fact remains that differentiating accurately between terrorists and insurgents is extremely important. The label you give any person, act or program will determine who signs on to your program to deal with it and, more important, the tactics you will use to counter it.

The wrong label is likely to produce the wrong tactics and ultimately produce unintended negative consequences, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The answer to this conundrum may well lie in labeling acts, rather than people.

Haviland Smith
Williston, Vt.
Dec. 14, 2008

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[Originally published on AmericanDiplomacy.org.]

The Bush Administration has conflated and confused the meanings of terrorism and insurgency, this essay maintains; but in dealing with these phenomena definitions are crucial, because definitions dictate the strategy and tactics that are used to defeat them, and measures that may be effective against one are likely to be futile or worse against the other. Specifically, the author believes, military action is rarely successful against terrorism, which is best dealt with through law enforcement methods. – Ed.

During the presidency of George W. Bush, everything possible has been done to obfuscate and conflate the true meanings of the terms terrorism and insurgency.  Preferring the former, largely because of its emotional post-9/11 impact on the American psyche, Bush spokespeople and the president himself consistently have used the terms insurrection and terrorism interchangeably, indiscriminately, and inaccurately.

This has not simply been a case of intellectual carelessness.  It has been a conscious effort to label any group that threatened any status quo of which they approved as a “terrorist organization,” without any thought to the origins of or reasons for the struggle being waged.  Thus, in a moment of warm and fuzzy presidential friendship with Vladimir Putin, with American concurrence, the Chechen rebels officially became terrorists rather than insurrectionists trying to break free from centuries of Russian oppression.  As terrorists, they were far less acceptable outside Russia.

If a group of dissident Egyptians, tired of their repressive government, decided to try to overthrow the Mubarak regime, how would we label them?  How would we label indigenous dissidents trying to overthrow any “friendly,” but not necessarily democratic governments?  Saudi Arabia and Morocco come to mind.  It’s not a stretch to say that they would immediately be labeled terrorists.  How would we label a group of Iranians who committed terrorist acts?  Of course, given how we feel about the Mullahs, they would be freedom fighters, never terrorists!

The moral here is that it has not been advantageous to become involved in any insurrection or national liberation movement against any country that is friendly to the United States.  In doing so, you will be branded a terrorist, and that brings with it certain moral, emotional, and legal consequences.

However, in strictly internal American terms, if the purpose of this mislabeling is to create enemies for the perpetual “long war” envisioned by the Bush Administration, then moving organizations from the morally ambiguous “national liberation” or “insurrection” column to the “terrorist” column serves your interests.

No one loves a terrorist.  Terrorists have attacked us, they threaten us today, and the anxiety thus created in the U.S. population has kept us on edge and more inclined to tolerate the civil indignities rained on us by the Bush Administration in support of the “long war.”

Contrasting Definitions and Responses

The U.S. Code defines international terrorism as:

…violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state…. (and that)….appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. [18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)]

Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as:

…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)

The Department of Defense defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”   That definition makes no pejorative judgments, it simply reports.

Clearly, these definitions evoke contrasting emotional responses.  Everyone is against terrorists, but the morality is not quite as clear when it comes to insurgents (freedom fighters).  It goes back to the old saw that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

Even in our own history, under the above definition the Minutemen who rose against the British at Concord could be labeled as terrorists.

Classification Matters

Isn’t this all simply splitting hairs?  After all, who really cares whether you call a trouble-making killer a terrorist or an insurgent?  Actually, it is objectively important to carefully differentiate between terrorism and insurgency because, once classified into either group, a dissident movement will be given a level of treatment either formally or by general international consensus from which it will be difficult for it to extricate itself.

Historically, it has been easier to deal with terrorism than insurgencies.  When terrorist movements are left to run their course, they tend to last around a dozen years. The good news about them is that, unlike insurgencies, which seldom lose, terrorism rarely seems to win. Terrorism, properly and intelligently confronted, is a short-term, dramatically violent irritant and not much more.  It is certainly unworthy of having war declared against it.

A recent Rand Corporation study examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006.  During that period, 398 of those groups have ceased to exist.  Forty-three percent (171) of those that ended were absorbed into the political systems of the countries in which they operated, while forty percent (159) were defeated by police activities.  It is most significant to note that only seven percent (28) of those groups were defeated by military action.

By its nature, terrorism cannot depend on support from the local population.  If their general populations are actively opposed to them, they are faced with the difficult task of operating entirely underground.  Recently Al Qaida in Iraq has been losing support from mainstream Muslims because they have indiscriminately killed civilians in defiance of the teachings of the Koran.  They are now being targeted and killed by Iraqis.

Military Action vs. Law Enforcement

Where military action may be effective in counter-insurgency operations over time, it will never be as effective in counterterrorist operations. The effectiveness of the military approach against terrorists depends entirely on the accuracy of one’s intelligence and weapons.  If the intelligence is bad, the target may turn out to be a grammar school.  If the target, however perfectly identified, is in an urban area and the missile isn’t accurate, the result may be the same.  The fact is that collateral damage is an integral and unavoidable part of military activity.

Terrorism is a criminal matter best dealt with using law enforcement methods.  In Iraq, Al Qaida has been heavily involved in fomenting violence between various sects and ethnic groups.  In that latter role, and unlike insurgencies, it works against the local population and thus cannot look to locals for any sort of support.  The reality of that sort of terrorism, whether directed against the local population, the local government, or a foreign occupier, is that it is a movement that lacks local support.  That makes dealing with terrorism significantly more straightforward than dealing with insurgencies and explains why terrorist movements are considerably shorter-lived and less successful than insurgencies.

On the other hand, insurgencies, by their nature, have fairly widespread support from their local populations, largely because they are normally fighting against a generally disliked or even hated ruler or occupier.  They tend to endure and succeed because of that support, and depriving them of it is a key element in defeating them.  The best way to approach an insurgency is to work to fragment, diminish, and weaken the movement’s base of support by alienating it from the local population.

We have successfully done this with Sunni tribes in Iraq’s Anbar province, supporting them in their desire to work with U.S. forces to control Al Qaida (who have been fomenting civil strife by killing Iraqis through ethnic- and sectarian-targeted operations).  This “Awakening” program has served us extremely well, at least in the short run, having put heavy pressure on Al Qaida and having removed the Sunni tribes (insurgents) in question from the body of Iraqis who have been devoted to killing American troops.

It should be said parenthetically here that in the long run, the results may not be so unequivocally favorable.  These tribes can, at any time, turn against us again, or join forces with other Sunni forces in any civil battle against the Shia.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

The issue in Afghanistan and Pakistan is extremely complicated because we are dealing with an insurgency (the Taliban) that for practical and historical reasons has allied itself with a terrorist organization (al Qaida) with which it has at least one common goal – a desire to force Western troops, particularly American, out of the area.  As long as we realize that there are two separate problems involved, we will be on the right track.  The basis of our policy should be to try to entice tribes that are now aligned with the Taliban out of that relationship and to do everything we can to turn the Taliban against Al Qaida.    As long as what we do is consistent with those two goals, we will have a chance.

That said, a similar effort in Afghanistan to entice Pashtun tribes away from the Taliban should be an integral part of our efforts to move the Afghan insurgency in a direction more favorable to us.  By splitting them off, we will accomplish far more than military activity will do for us.

Rulers and occupiers tend to protect themselves against insurgents under such conditions with a military response.  This approach is greatly complicated by the fact that insurgents have no uniforms, barracks, or bases.  They live and work in and around the rest of the civilian population, whether in Pakistan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, or Iraq.  Under attack, there is bound to be unintended collateral damage, which is likely to be seen by the local population as collective punishment and equally likely to encourage more indigenous support of the insurgency. We see this on a regular basis in, for example, the rocketing of a wedding party in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq.  These realities help make insurgency a difficult enemy to vanquish.

These differences in local population attitudes toward terrorism, as opposed to insurgencies, are key to the development of effective countermeasures, as they strongly underline the variance in levels of local support for such movements.  In order to develop successful strategies against insurgency and terrorism, governments have to treat the two totally differently.  What will succeed with terrorism is unlikely to succeed with insurgency.

If they cannot or do not discriminate between terror and insurgency, as America has in the past generally failed to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, governments simply focus their military might on the assumed enemy positions and pull the trigger.  That approach creates more problems than in solves.

So, it matters a great deal what you call these movements.  The label you give them will determine the nature and extent of international support you gain for your program and will, if it is to be successful, dictate the strategy and tactics you use against your enemy.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. A graduate of Dartmouth, he served three years in the Army Security Agency, spent two years in Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

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[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog.]

The Bush approach to counterterrorism has been counterproductive. But Obama may need to rethink a few things himself, writes a former CIA station chief.

During the seven years since the attacks of 9/11, America has gone through a difficult learning process in dealing with international terrorism. But that experience has done little to help us address the problem in any positive, meaningful way. Quite the contrary, our policies over those years have done serious damage to American national interests.

President-elect Obama is likely to reverse course is some significant ways. Based on his campaign promises, there is reason to believe he will return to a foreign policy that values international friendships, rather than continue the neoconservative policy of preemptive unilateralism that rejects diplomacy. He is likely to be more respectful of human rights and civil liberties. Hopefully, we will see an end to color-coded terrorism warnings and the constant hyping of the terrorist “threats” which only serve to put Americans on edge.

But Obama may want to rethink a few things as well.

Q. Is President-elect Obama willing to consider that increasing U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is not really a solution?

Military action against terrorism is unlikely to succeed. Terrorism is mostly a law enforcement and intelligence problem. A recent Rand Corporation study examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. During that period, 398 of those groups have ceased to exist. Forty-three percent (171) of those that ended were absorbed into the political systems of the countries in which they operated, while forty percent (159) were defeated by police activities. It is most significant to note that only seven percent (28) of those groups were defeated by military action.

Q. Will Obama recognize the difference between terrorists and insurgents?

We must more clearly distinguish between, rather than conflate, terrorism and insurgency, because in order to develop successful strategies we will have to treat the two totally differently. What will succeed with terrorism is unlikely to succeed with insurgency.

If we continue to fail to distinguish between terror and insurgency, as we have generally failed to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will create more problems than we solve, aiding terrorist recruitments and support and alienating the moderates whose opposition to terrorism we need so badly.

Q. Would Obama consider creating a domestic intelligence agency?

Vesting our domestic counterterrorism responsibility in the FBI is a real problem. The entire culture of the FBI is directed toward law enforcement. They are extremely competent in that task because it is consistent with their charter.  The problem with counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism operations, two disciplines that have major similarities, is that you can’t run such operations successfully with a statutory law enforcement mentality.

Counterterrorism in America is looked at as a law enforcement problem and so it is. But, particularly in the early stages of any terrorist operation, it is also very much an intelligence problem and thus totally at odds with the precepts of law enforcement. We should have something more like MI5, the British internal intelligence organization.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief, who served in Eastern and Western Europe, Lebanon and Tehran and as chief of the counter-terrorism staff.

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[Originally published in the Randolph Herald.]

Since 9/11, the Bush administration has changed the way America looks at the two phenomena of terrorism and insurgencies. It has blurred the lines between the two and in doing so, has created some long lasting foreign policy problems for the United States simply because there is a vast difference between a pure terrorist group like Al Qaida and an insurgency that practices terrorism.

The US Code defines international terrorism as “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state…. (and which)….appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. [18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)]

The Department of Defense defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.

It is important to carefully differentiate between terrorism and insurgency because, once classified into either group, a dissident movement will be given a level of treatment either formally or by general international consensus from which it will be difficult for it to extricate itself.

Historically, it has been easier to deal with terrorism than insurgencies.  When terrorist movements are left to run their course they tend to last around a dozen years. The good news about them is that, unlike insurgencies, which rarely lose, terrorism never seems to win. Terrorism is a short-term, dramatically violent irritant and not much more.

Terrorist organizations cannot survive unless local populations support them.  Recently Al Qaida has been losing support from mainstream Muslims because it indiscriminately kills civilians in defiance of the teachings of the Koran.

Insurgents, on the other hand, generally have fairly widespread support from their local populations, largely because they are normally fighting against a repressive ruler or occupier.  That is why they tend to endure and succeed.

How does any ruler or occupier protect itself under those conditions? They simply focus their military might on the assumed enemy positions and pull the trigger. Insurgents have no uniforms, barracks or bases.  They live and work in and around the rest of the civilian population, whether in Pakistan, Lebanon, Afghanistan or Iraq. Under attack, there is bound to be a lot of collateral damage which is likely to be seen as collective punishment and equally likely to encourage more indigenous support of the insurgency.  It is a difficult enemy to vanquish.

The Bush administration is prone to brand any group which threatens any status quo, including insurgencies, as a terrorist organization, without any thought to the origins of or reasons for the struggle being waged.  If a group of dissident Egyptians, tired of their repressive government, decided to try to overthrow the Mubarak regime, how would we label them?  How would we label indigenous dissidents trying to overthrow the “friendly”, but not necessarily democratic government of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or any other “friendly” country?  It’s not a stretch to say that they would be labeled terrorists overnight.

What this does is de-legitimize what are or could be legitimate national liberation movements involved in insurgencies, much like the American War of Independence in 1775-1783.  It goes back to the old saw, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.

If America wishes to be seen as a supporter of the democratic process in the world, which the Bush administration constantly avows it does, then it can’t pick and choose where and when to support it without risk of being immediately labeled as hypocritical.  Our decision to not even acknowledge the existence of Hamas in Palestine, even though they were elected as the result of a democratic process, is a perfect example of the pitfalls involved in the selective application of democratic principles.  It earned us a diplomatic black eye, as has our similar attitude toward Hizballah in Lebanon.

If we are going to support the democratic process, we will not be able to randomly label indigenous insurrections as terrorist movements simply because we don’t like their politics or because we think that the status quo government in power in their country, however repressive or undemocratic, is a better alternative.  The rest of the world is not dumb enough to let us get away with that kind of hypocrisy.  And yet, we continue to try!

Haviland Smith is a retired CIÅ station chief who served in East and West Europe, the Middle east and as Chief of the counterterrorism staff.  A longtime resident of Brookfield, he now lives in Williston.

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[Originally published on Nieman Watchdog, written by Steven Kleinman and Haviland Smith.]

Two veteran intelligence officials write that this country has a long history of successful interrogations – based on seduction, not coercion. Torture not only violates our core values, but leads to misinformation.

Fifteen former interrogators and senior intelligence officials with more than 350 years collective field experience in the military, the FBI and the CIA, spanning the period from World War II to Afghanistan and Iraq, gathered last month for a two-day conference in Washington D.C. organized by Human Rights First. When it was done, we agreed on the following set of principles related to on torture and interrogation:

1. Non-coercive, traditional, rapport-based interviewing approaches provide the best possibility for obtaining accurate and complete intelligence.
2. Torture and other inhumane and abusive interview techniques are unlawful, ineffective and counterproductive. We reject them unconditionally.
3. The use of torture and other inhumane and abusive treatment results in false and misleading information, loss of critical intelligence, and has caused serious damage to the reputation and standing of the United States. The use of such techniques also facilitates enemy recruitment, misdirects or wastes scarce resources, and deprives the United States of the standing to demand humane treatment of captured Americans.
4. There must be a single well-defined standard of conduct across all U.S. agencies to govern the detention and interrogation of people anywhere in U.S. custody, consistent with our values as a nation.
5. There is no conflict between adhering to our nation’s essential values, including respect for inherent human dignity, and our ability to obtain the information we need to protect the nation.

Interrogation is the process of obtaining intelligence and/or information from detainees.  Over the many years it has been practiced by this country in World War II, Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, it has become clear that coercive interrogation techniques not only do not work, but are often counterproductive.

Once a detainee is in our custody, the process of successfully obtaining what intelligence he has, is at its very best, a process of seduction during which the detainee is developed as a potential source of information.  This involves a solid understanding of what motivates the detainee and an ability to use that motivation to the interrogator’s advantage.

For anyone who has been involved in a seduction, it will be immediately clear that coercion simply will not work. What works is the exact opposite – a careful and thoughtful exchange of ideas and attitudes that will help the interrogator find a path to the desired intelligence.

Coercive techniques do not build mutual understanding, rapport and respect, the bases of successful interrogation.  In the world of terrorism, terrorists are taught to expect that the US will torture them.  Coercive techniques of any sort will be confirmation of that expectation and will thus harden their resolve not to divulge anything of value.  On the other hand, humane handling will be disarming and disorienting for any such detainee, leaving him open to non-coercive manipulation

Careful, non-coercive handling of the detainee from the moment of his apprehension is critical. Once in our custody, if any sort of coercion is applied to a detainee, the likelihood of a subsequent non-coercive approach being successful is just about over.

The FBI has never sought permission to use coercion on its detainees simply because they know it does not work and they can succeed without it.  The same is true with the Pentagon for the same reason and also because military use of coercive methods it is in violation of the Geneva Conventions and invites torture when and if its own personnel are detained by an enemy.

When people are tortured they will tell the interrogator what they believe he wants to hear, or lie, simply to put an end to the torture.  That puts the interrogator at the mercy of the detainee.  Misinformation and disinformation are logical, often dangerous outcomes of coercive techniques.

We are now often told that coercive interrogation has produced actionable information, however, some of what has been produced under torture may have been at best inaccurate and at worst, deliberately false.

There is no way of knowing what results could have been achieved if a detainee who has been tortured had been humanely handled with non-coercive interrogation techniques from the moment of his capture.  Such detainees often have the kind of massive, messianic ego that is easily manipulated by a really good interrogator.

Finally, there is the question of who we Americans really are.  It is simply inconsistent with everything we say we stand for to indulge in coercive interrogation techniques.  Even if they worked, which they do not, what kind of nation have we become in the eyes of the rest of the world as practitioners of torture?  That is not an image that is likely to produce significant intelligence, let alone promote our worldwide interests.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief, who served in Eastern and Western Europe, Lebanon and Tehran and as chief of the counter-terrorism staff.

Steven Kleinman is a military intelligence officer with twenty-five years of operational and leadership experience in human intelligence and special operations. He served as an interrogator in three major military campaigns in addition to teaching advanced interrogation and resistance to interrogation courses.

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