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Feeding Russian paranoia

April 17, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]

Over the centuries, many in the West and in Russia itself, have found it convenient and relatively accurate to characterize the Russian people as paranoid. Over the centuries, Vikings, Tatars, Mongol hordes, Swedes, French and Germans have invaded Russia. Had that happened here, we might well have become paranoid ourselves.

This national paranoia persisted during the Cold War when the Soviets always referred to themselves as victims of “capitalist encirclement.” They have also used these foreign “threats” to keep a disparate country united and their peoples’ minds off the inadequacies of their lives. If you can acknowledge those realities, then their recent behaviors are more understandable.

At first glance, one might think the Cold War was starting up again. Presidents Bush and Putin have been arguing about issues in Central Europe and the dialogue does seem to have some of the old tone of the Cold War. But there is no resurgence of the Cold War. We are not about to have a nuclear holocaust. What’s happening here is that two powerful nations are flexing their muscles — with predictable results.

Since the relative instability of the 1990s and as a result of the increased social and political stability that Vladimir Putin’s policies have brought to Russia, as well as the very helpful rise in the value of vast quantities of Russian oil on world markets, Russia has become far more socially and economically healthy than it ever was during the Soviet era. Putin, despite the fact that some of his policies are patently anti-democratic, has become wildly popular in Russia. He has approval numbers that any American president would die for.

Russia probably feels better about itself today than it has at any time during the past century. It sees itself as a player on the world stage, one that should be treated with respect.

If you look at today’s events knowing that paranoia is a longtime part of the Russian psyche, you will see why they see only threats and problems in the current U.S. policy of further expanding NATO to include their former East European satellites. For the Soviets, in the worst case, NATO has remained a military threat. In the best case, its move into a former sphere of Russian influence in Central Europe is humiliating for a country that is increasingly feeling it should be respected. However, their oil and gas riches give them considerable leverage in Europe where those commodities are needed and they have used that need to persuade some NATO members to their side. Further NATO expansion has been shelved, at least for the moment.

Any indication that the United States is changing the rules that existed during the Cold War still brings apprehension to the Russians. Our withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the Bush administration’s drive to install a “missile shield” are precisely the rule changes they fear. Quite apart from the political, technical and military aspects of the development and feasibility of the missile shield, one has to wonder about the way in which this subject has been breached and pursued by our government since 9/11.

The 1972 ABM treaty, from which the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2001, was part of the structure of MAD (mutually assured destruction) that played an important role in keeping the Cold War from becoming hot. That treaty stipulated that its cosigners, the USSR and the U.S., would not develop anti- ballistic missile systems. This was based on the reality that if one country were to do that, the balance brought by MAD would be tipped in favor of the country that had the ABM system. If that system had been developed and deployed secretly, its owner would be in a position to initiate a preemptive strike, since it would have the ABM system needed to negate the counterattack. Thus the ABM treaty was important part of keeping the peace.

America has withdrawn from that treaty, is seeking to place the “missile shield” on the territory of Russia’s former satellites and to bring more of those countries into NATO, an organization created to counter Soviet power. If you were a paranoid Russian today, would you wonder about American motives?

The reality is that we have no objectively valid reason to build the missile shield at this time or to expand NATO further into what was previously a Soviet sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Russians have no objectively valid reason to fear those American moves.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Europe and the Middle East, working primarily on Soviet and East European targets. He lives in Williston.

Posted in Russia |

Searching for a New American Policy for Iraq

March 25, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published on AmericanDiplomacy.org.]

A retired CIA station chief and head of the Agency’s counterterrorism staff examines the Bush administration’s Iraq policy and finds that it cannot be successful. He calls for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, a “complete change” in U.S. goals and tactics in the Middle East, and rebuilding bridges to allies. — Ed.

America is fighting two distinctly different battles in Iraq that are mutually contradictory. We are fighting against an Iraqi insurgency which would like us out of Iraq and we are fighting against Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) which would like us to stay — only because they came there to kill our troops and foment chaos, which can only be accomplished if we are there. That alone is a pretty good reason for us to get out.

As justification for our invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration used a number of rationales. They cited Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi government ties to terrorism against the United States, and our desire to “spread democracy” in the region. Of course, there were no WMD and no Iraqi ties to terrorism prior to the invasion. “Spreading democracy” has proven to be very elusive.

The Bush White House as well as Senator McCain, the putative Republican presidential nominee, and other supporters of the Administration’s Iraq policy have identified our goal in Iraq as “victory.” “Victory” is defined by the White House as the defeat of terrorism and the insurgency; the creation of a peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure state; the evolution of Iraq as a partner in U.S. foreign policy goals on terrorism, WMD, and weapons proliferation; and as an economic and political example to the region of all that is good about democracy.

“Victory” or Stability

Rather than seeking “victory” in Iraq, the United States might better seek stability for the region. Our military approach to both Iraqi terrorism and the insurgency will bring only further instability. Real stabilization will necessarily involve seeking a viable political solution for Iraq, requiring the participation of the neighborhood in the process. The neighborhood does not seek a regional conflict, yet as long as we are involved militarily there, we are so totally bereft of diplomatic power that none of those neighbors will participate with us in seeking and implementing the kind of solution that will be acceptable to all concerned. Our departure from Iraq is the only course that can provide an opportunity for such a solution, as well as the opportunity to seek solutions to other Middle East problems.

Such a change will require us to reconsider the overall effectiveness of our present military effort in Iraq. Anyone who accepts the likelihood that not even a militarily successful surge will bring voluntary resolution of Iraq’s internal sectarian and ethnic issues, will understand that the same civil conflicts that the surge is successfully suppressing today will simply wait until we have departed Iraq and then come to the forefront again. These animosities are so ancient, so ingrained, that they have not disappeared over the centuries and will not for centuries to come. Whether we leave now or in ten years, the same potential for conflict will be there.

The Bush administration has spoken often of the coming “long war” against terrorism. As long as we continue with their strategies and tactics which rely first and foremost on the Neocons’ beloved application of military power, it will indeed be a long war – a generational struggle. The invasion brought us chaos, and chaos has brought us the surge. The surge is a military response to terrorism and insurgency, and it ultimately will defeat our own goals for Iraq and the region.

America’s Tactical Goals

In response to the chaos which resulted from our virtually nonexistent post-invasion planning, we have undertaken the “surge.” Our tactical goal in Iraq is designed to successfully conclude that “surge,” which, in turn, is projected to facilitate political reconciliation between the different Iraqi factions. The problem here is that those Iraqi factions have little reason to reach such agreements, since doing so would force them to give up powers that are integral to their plans for the futures of their respective constituencies.

We know from statements from the Bush administration and the Pentagon that there is no potential for a military solution to the ongoing problem. Add to that the fact that in insurgent situations, successful military consolidation invariably depends on prior political reconciliation, and it would appear that we have approached this project not only backwards, but completely incorrectly!

Iraq Immutables

Our invasion and subsequent military presence in Iraq has let a number of genies out of their bottles. We are currently faced with a totally new set of realities which we ignore at our own peril.

It is really difficult to call Iraq a country. The British created Iraq strictly for their own convenience, and there really never has been sufficient common interest among the population of that ersatz state to maintain itself voluntarily and peacefully. As a result, it has been maintained since then by a succession of repressive regimes, the last of which was Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. Since the American invasion, that role has been precariously undertaken by the U.S. military. We have become the Iraq’s latest and perhaps least efficient enforcers.

The “surge” currently underway, however militarily successful, is unlikely to lead to political stability and far more likely to cause further destabilization. As integral parts of our surge policy, we tacitly acknowledge and support a level of autonomy for the Kurds which will likely lead ultimately to conflict among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen in the north. Further, we are supporting all sides in the ongoing low-key civil war. We are arming Sunni tribal militias in the “Awakening” program, but neglect to employ them as promised, leaving a group of battle hardened fighters whom we have armed and who are not only angry at the Shia and the Kurds, but at us as well. Before the “surge” these Sunni militias were in the forefront of the insurgency against our troops. Meanwhile, we ignore southern Iraq, where Shia militia battle over oil and power and where competing Shia groups are so fractious that they can’t even carry out elections within their own sect! Paradoxically, our military approach is directly threatening to our goals and long term national interests through the effects it is having on Iraq, terrorism, and the region.

The Koran provides a complete blueprint for a life which is very different from a life led under democracy. Many if not most observant Muslims find no reason to seek changes in their way of life. Despite that, deeply embedded in the psyche of the American people is the notion that they have the objectively most perfect economic system and form of government on the face of this earth and that they need to share it with others. Even with all its faults and inequities, that may well be true – at least for us Americans. However, for people who have different traditions and virtually no experience with the basic requirements of democracy – the established existence of the rule of law and a free press – democracy can be a really tough sell. One has to wonder if it is productive to have this as anything other than a passive foreign policy goal.

Current Problems Caused by America’s Iraq Policy

Our pursuit of “victory”, as defined above, has brought us three new realities:

  • We cannot totally prevent the chaos and killing regardless of how successful the surge proves to be.
  • We have lost all of our diplomatic flexibility – we are essentially alone in this struggle and will remain so as long as we remain in Iraq.
  • The primary beneficiaries of our policy are, and will continue to be, Iran and Al Qaida.

Further negative consequences of the invasion lie in a number of areas. After 9/11, when Al Qaida was suffering from our operations against its leadership and from waning popularity within the Muslim world, our invasion breathed new life into that terrorist movement. The invasion has almost certainly facilitated Al Qaida recruitments, and we have provided them with a training ground for their jihadis which will significantly increase their ability to mount further attacks against their enemies. We have made Israel and any other regional government not favored by Al Qaida more vulnerable by enabling this Al Qaida battlefield training of additional cadres, some of which will head toward Palestine when Iraq is over. Others may look more closely at Saudi Arabia and Egypt or at the Muslim regions of the old USSR. Wherever they go, they represent a destabilizing factor.

In our struggle with Al Qaida, we are proceeding precisely as Bin Laden would have wished. He must daily thank Allah for the ongoing U.S. policy against him, because, without our help, his movement would almost certainly be on the wane. Historically, terrorist movements tend to last around a dozen years. The good news about them is that, unlike insurgencies, which seldom if ever lose, terrorism never seems to win. Terrorism is a short term, dramatically violent irritant. It has never deserved to have a war declared on it.

Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) will cease to exist after our departure from Iraq. Terrorist organizations cannot survive unless local populations support them. In Iraq, a recent focus of AQI has been to foment secular and ethnic chaos by purposefully killing Shia and pinning it on Sunnis or Kurds – or any permutation of that theme. The Iraqis are acutely aware of this. The only thing that keeps AQI personnel alive is the presence of American forces. As long as they are killing Americans it’s semi-OK with Iraqis. The minute we leave Iraq, the Iraqis, particularly the Shia, will turn on and eliminate AQI as the Sunnis have already done in Anbar province.

Quite apart from the effects that the invasion has had on Al Qaida and terrorism, we have done much to make the realization of our goals in the region far more difficult. The key to dealing with this new terrorism lies in maximizing our friends in the region and minimizing our enemies. The invasion and its chaotic aftermath have cost us much of our appeal to moderate Muslims on whose indifference to terrorism the terrorists rely for success.

We have changed the dynamic of the Arab/Persian rivalry for primacy in the Gulf in favor of Iran by removing the two most viable counterbalances to Iran, the Taliban and Iraq. We have taken the lid off the Sunni-Shia schism. All the old regional and national policemen are gone, and we have not been able to fill their shoes when it has come to suppressing the historic ethnic and secular conflicts in the area.

However, the worst consequence of this invasion has been that we have seriously strained our old international friendships and alliances, particularly and most importantly the Atlantic Alliance. Our invasion of Iraq is so strongly disapproved by our former allies that they are unwilling to help us deal with our Middle East issues at a time when we simply cannot cope on our own. Colin Powell was right. We did break it and we do own it, simply because we have lost all our diplomatic flexibility through our invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Finally, anti-Americanism is on the rise everywhere. We are viewed as hypocritical by most of Islam and much of the world. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, waterboarding, renditions, the CIA gulag, the abrogation of civil rights at home, and our rejection of the democratic election that brought Hamas to power at the expense of our Fatah friends in Palestine are but a few of the irritants. Furthermore, the anti-American pot will surely be kept boiling by press coverage of the coming military tribunals at Guantanamo.

A New American Policy for Iraq

The election cycle in the United States makes long term planning very difficult in foreign policy matters. As the gulf between the Republicans and Democrats has widened over the last few decades, the process has gotten more difficult. The answer to dealing with this current form of terrorism lies in a policy that, unlike our current policy, is built on a profound understanding of the phenomenon and of the geographic area in question, rather than on the political needs of the party in the White House. Those short-term needs have recently translated into the simplistic and counterproductive military response that got us into Iraq in the first place and that could involve us similarly elsewhere in the future.

America has no diplomatic flexibility in Iraq. The only way to gain the flexibility that will enable us to at least set new goals and pursue them is to withdraw from Iraq. Until we do withdraw, our only influence on the region will be limited by our military power or lack thereof. If we listen to our own military leadership, our ground war capabilities are being seriously threatened by the demands on our troops in Iraq.

If we decide to change our goal from “victory” in Iraq to regional stability, that decision will require us to reconsider the overall effectiveness of our present military effort in Iraq. Anyone who accepts the likelihood that not even a militarily successful surge will produce voluntary resolution of Iraq’s internal sectarian and ethnic issues, will understand that the same civil unrest that the surge is attempting to suppress today will simply wait until we have departed Iraq and then come to the forefront again. These animosities are so ancient, so ingrained, that they have not disappeared over the centuries and will not for centuries to come. If we leave now, there will be potential for conflict. If we leave in ten years, the same potential will be there.

The key element to recognize is that because the neighborhood really does not want a regional conflict, it will seek ways to avoid it. As soon as we are out of Iraq, America may well gain the potential to become a convening authority for a regional discussion. As long as we are in Iraq militarily and lacking any sort of diplomatic influence, we will not be allowed to play that role, and there probably is no other country in the world which could do it, either now or after our departure.

It is counterproductive for us to be shoving “democracy” down the throats of Muslims. “Spreading democracy” simply exacerbates Muslim concerns about a new crusade. America is yet another Western, Christian country which has attacked and is currently occupying an Arab/Muslim country. As such, most Muslims view this as the most recent edition of the Western crusades of the Middle Ages. If Muslims are ultimately to turn toward democracy, it will not be because it was forced on them, it will be because they see some real advantage in that form of government.

In the interim, we might do well to consider replacing the term “democratization” with “self-determination,” a term favorably mentioned in the United Nations Charter, but which has fallen into disuse under the Bush administration. Why indeed should people not have the right to choose their own form of government, whether “democratic” or not? A seemingly insignificant change like that can take much of the sting out of our Crusader reputation.

Shining City on the Hill

We will do far better to once again become a shining city on the hill. That will require that we give up all those activities instituted in response to 9/11 which have diminished us in the eyes of the world. We need to do this even if we risk another attack because we need to get away from the mentality of fear which has so assiduously been promoted by the Bush administration. The United States once more has to be a country worth emulating, and that includes restoring America to its pre-9/11 status and re-opening legitimate political and foreign policy discussions at home.

America is full of real experts on the Middle East whose views and ideas should not be marginalized with accusations of being “soft on terror” or “unpatriotic” simply because they disagree with policy decisions made for reasons having little to do with the objective facts in the Middle East. They can really help in this struggle.

Our public face needs revamping. It doesn’t matter what our leaders really think; what matters is what they say and how they say it. The “Axis of Evil,” our propensity to label our military operations with stirring, nationalistic names like “Operation Enduring Freedom” and all the other bits of cocky, macho braggadocio commonly used by the Bush administration, are truly counterproductive. They actually marshal otherwise neutral people around the world against us. In this context it would be wise to accept the premise that the vast majority of the world’s Muslims are not supporters of Al Qaida or radical terrorism. When we demonize Muslims, we create more enemies.

Maximizing Friends, Minimizing Enemies

America made it through the Cold War on the basis of containment of the Soviet Union through alliances with other governments that shared our values and goals. Our current disastrous experiment with preemptive unilateralism points the way toward a return to our old diplomatic strategies. The key element in this struggle with terrorism is maintaining and maximizing friends and minimizing enemies. We need to reestablish our old alliances around the world as well as strengthen those that have survived the Iraq adventure. That will permit us to enter into a new containment policy against terrorism with all those other nations that feel threatened.

We overcame our political divisions during the Cold War when we successfully contained the Soviet Union through five decades of both Republican and Democrat administrations. Any new policy for dealing with Iraq, the Middle East, Islam, or terrorism needs to start with U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, a complete change in our goals and tactics in the Middle East, and the rebuilding of broken bridges to our old allies. Only then will we be able to begin to identify and achieve goals that are in our real national interest in the region.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief. He was educated at Exeter and Dartmouth, served three years in the Army Security Agency, spent two years in Russian regional studies doctoral program at London University, and then joined the CIA. He served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations, recruiting and handling agents or managing that process. He was also chief of the counterterrorism staff and executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

Posted in Iraq |

Leaving Iraq is only option

March 16, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]

America is fighting two mutually contradictory battles in Iraq. We are fighting against an Iraqi insurgency that wants us out of Iraq, and we are fighting against al-Qaida in Iraq which wants us to stay because they came there after our invasion to kill our troops and foment chaos and that can only be continued if we stay. That alone is a pretty good reason for us to get out.

The Bush White House, Sen. John McCain, the prospective Republican presidential nominee, and other supporters of the administration’s Iraq policy have identified our goal in Iraq as “victory.” “Victory” is defined as the defeat of terrorism and the insurgency; the creation of a peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure state; the evolution of Iraq as a partner in U.S. foreign policy goals on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and weapons proliferation; and as an economic and political example to the region of all that is good about democracy.

A policy of promoting regional stability would be far better. Our military approach to both Iraqi terrorism and its insurgency will bring only further instability. Real stabilization will necessarily involve seeking a viable political solution for Iraq, requiring the participation of the neighborhood in the process. The neighborhood does not seek a regional conflict, yet as long as we are involved militarily there, we are so totally bereft of diplomatic power that none of those neighbors will participate with us in seeking and implementing the kind of solution that will be acceptable to all concerned. Our departure from Iraq, however, is the only course that can provide an opportunity for such a solution, as well as an opportunity to seek solutions to other Middle East problems.

Anyone who accepts the likelihood that not even a militarily successful surge will bring a voluntary resolution of Iraq’s internal sectarian and ethnic issues, will understand that the same civil conflicts that the surge is successfully suppressing today will simply wait until we have departed Iraq and then come to the forefront again. These animosities are so ancient, so ingrained, that they have not disappeared over the centuries and will not for centuries to come. Whether we leave now or in 10 years, the same potential for conflict will be there.

The Bush administration has spoken often of the coming “long war” against terrorism. As long as we continue with their tactics, which rely first and foremost on the neocons’ beloved application of military instead of diplomatic power, it will indeed be a long war – perhaps decades long.

Our pursuit of “victory,” as defined above, through the “surge” has brought us three new realities: We cannot totally prevent the chaos and killing regardless of how successful the surge proves to be; we have lost all of our diplomatic flexibility (we are essentially alone in this struggle and will remain so as long as we remain in Iraq); and the primary beneficiaries of our policy are, and will continue to be, Iran and al-Qaida.

The “surge” currently under way, however militarily successful, is unlikely to lead to political stability and far more likely to cause further destabilization. As integral parts of our surge policy, we tacitly acknowledge and support a level of autonomy for the Kurds which will likely lead ultimately to conflict between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in the north. Further, we are supporting all sides in the ongoing low-key civil war. We are arming Sunni tribal militias in the Awakening program, but neglect to employ them as promised, leaving a group of battle-hardened fighters whom we have armed and who are not only angry the Shia and the Kurds, but at us as well. Meanwhile, we ignore southern Iraq where Shia militia battle over oil and power and where competing Shia groups are so fractious that they can’t even carry out elections within their own sect!

The policies that make the surge militarily successful weaken us in our struggle with terrorism. Historically, when terrorist movements are left to run their course they tend to last around a dozen years. The good news about them is that, unlike insurgencies, which rarely lose, terrorism never seems to win. Terrorism is a short-term, dramatically violent irritant. It has never warranted having a war declared on it.

Unfortunately, in our struggle with al-Qaida, we are proceeding precisely as bin Laden would have wished. He must daily thank Allah for the ongoing U.S. policy against him, because, without our invasion and occupation, al-Qaida was in the process of deterioration. It is now reinvigorated.

We have made Israel and any other regional government not favored by al-Qaida more vulnerable by enabling the battlefield training of additional cadres, some of which will head south toward Palestine when Iraq is over. Others may look more closely at Saudi Arabia and Egypt or at the Muslim regions of the old USSR. Wherever they go, they represent a destabilizing factor.

Terrorist organizations cannot survive unless local populations support them. In Iraq, a recent focus of al-Qaida in Iraq has been to foment secular and ethnic chaos by purposefully killing Shia and pinning it on Sunnis or Kurds – or any permutation of that theme. The Iraqis are acutely aware of this. The minute we leave Iraq, the Iraqis will turn on this al-Qaida faction as the Sunnis have already begun to do in Anbar province.

Even more profoundly, however, we have changed the dynamic of the Arab/Persian rivalry for primacy in the Gulf in favor of Iran by removing the two most viable counterbalances to Iran, the Taliban and Iraq. Iran is now a real regional player to our detriment. We have taken the lid off the Sunni-Shia schism leading to secular strife in Iraq. But, the worst consequence of this invasion has been that we have seriously strained our old international friendships and alliances, particularly and most importantly, the Atlantic Alliance. Our invasion of Iraq is so strongly disapproved of by our former allies that they are unwilling to help us deal with our Middle East issues at a time when we simply cannot cope on our own.

So, we have no diplomatic flexibility in Iraq. We are essentially alone in this struggle and will remain so as long as we remain in Iraq. The only way to gain the flexibility that will enable us to at least set new goals and pursue them is to withdraw from Iraq. Until we do withdraw, our only influence on the region will be limited by our military power which already is seriously strained. If we listen to our own generals, our ability to wage ground warfare is already seriously threatened by the demands on our troops in Iraq.

Finally, anti-Americanism is on the rise everywhere. We are viewed as hypocritical by most of Islam and much of the world. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, waterboarding, renditions, the CIA gulag and the abrogation of civil rights at home are but a few of the irritants. Furthermore, the anti-American pot will surely be kept boiling by press coverage of the coming military tribunals at Guantanamo.

The neighborhood really does not want a regional conflict. As soon as we are out of Iraq, America should gain the potential to become a convening authority for a regional discussion on Iraq’s future. As long as we are in Iraq militarily, lacking any sort of diplomatic influence, we will not be allowed to play that role.

The Koran provides a complete blueprint for a life which is very different from a life led under democracy. Many if not most observant Muslims find no reason to seek changes in their way of life. In the interim, we might do well to replace “democratization” with “self-determination,” a term which has fallen into disuse under the Bush administration. Why indeed should people not have the right to choose their own form of government, whether “democratic” or not? Forcefully “spreading democracy” exacerbates Muslim concerns about a new crusade. If Muslims are ultimately to turn toward democracy, it will not be because it was forced on them, it will be because they see some real advantage in that form of government.

We will do far better to once again become a “shining city on the hill.” That will require that we give up all those activities instituted in response to Sept. 11, which have diminished us in the eyes of the world. The United States once more has to be a country worth emulating and that means restoring America to its pre-Sept. 11 world reputation.

Any new policy for dealing with Iraq, the Middle East, Islam or terrorism needs to start with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, a complete change in our goals and tactics in the Middle East, the rebuilding of broken bridges to our old allies and the renunciation of our policy of pre-emptive unilateralism. Only then will we be able to begin to identify strategies and achieve goals that are in our national interest in the region.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Posted in Iraq |

Peace negotiations a charade

March 6, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]

In a recent presentation at Princeton, Jordan’s King Abdullah II made the following points: Fifty-seven out of 193 countries in the world with a total population greater than Europe and the United States combined, representing one-third of the members of the United Nations and for whose citizens the conflict in Palestine is the issue of their time, are not at peace with Israel today. He made no judgment, but simply asked, “What are the implications for global stability if this continues?”

In a subsequent comment Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made another strong pitch for the two-state solution of the Palestine problem. Given recent events, it would appear that this is simply another bit of wishful thinking from the Bush administration.

Israel professes to support a two-state solution, but don’t believe it. Their policy is driven by a desire not only to hold onto their existing West Bank settlements, which have been judged illegal under international law, but to continue to expand those settlements farther into the West Bank.

Palestinian policy is driven by Hamas, the group that wants bring an end to the existence of Israel — “to throw them into the sea.” The only party that really wants a solution to the problem is Fatah. They are the Palestinian group recognized by Israel and the United States as the rightful leaders of Palestine. As such, they are empowered, as far as the Israelis are concerned, to negotiate with them.

It’s important here not to forget or overlook the fact that Hamas won the most recent Palestine election, an election pushed on the reluctant Palestinians by the Bush administration. One might also recall that the Bush administration rejected the results, despite the fact that the election was judged independently to have been completely fair and democratic.

Fatah advocates the two-state solution, but they have a real problem. Hamas, which rules in Gaza, would prefer the end of the Jewish state and oppose negotiations. That means that any time Hamas feels threatened by what it sees to be progress toward the two-state solution, all it has to do is lob a few missiles into Israel, await the inevitable retaliatory Israeli air and ground attacks, and watch Fatah, the main negotiators with Israel, call off further negotiations. As much as they might like to continue the negotiations, under such conditions, Fatah has to call them off or appear totally insensitive to the woes of their Gazan cousins. Hamas has a de facto veto over the negotiations.

And we sit back and tell the antagonists that they have to negotiate a solution — preferably a two-state solution. We say this to the two main players, Israel and Hamas, neither of which wants any kind of solution at all. We do this because just about everyone in the world who cares what is really going on knows that the Palestine impasse, replete with rocketing and retaliatory incursions, is, as King Abdullah says, a major threat to global security. It is a threat because they are using live ammunition and killing each other. These kinds of spats have a way of getting out of hand, and they are happening in a part of the word where all of the people see these events as existential threats. None of that is a good bet for peace.

From an American perspective, this situation, with all its attendant emotionalism, is highly threatening to our interests in the region. It also fuels Muslim hatred of the United States, as they view us, rightly or wrongly, as the main protector of Israel. This is always listed as one of the major factors that spurred al-Qaida to its 9/11 attacks, so it really is in our interest to try to reach an equitable settlement.

The problem is that the antagonists will not negotiate a peace themselves. They will accept peace only if it is forced on them. There is no country in the world other than America that has the clout with Israel to urge them into a fair agreement, but it is difficult to see how, given the realities of our own internal politics, we would be prepared to do that. It seems strange to say, but unless we are prepared to act totally uncharacteristically, the world is probably doomed to an indefinite continuation of the highly dangerous and threatening status quo in the Palestine situation.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Posted in Israel/Palestine |

The Wrong Track on Terror

January 25, 2008 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Baltimore Sun.]

America needs to develop a rational policy for dealing with terrorism.

Almost everything we are doing today is counterproductive. Our actions and attitudes create more radical Muslim terrorists and encourage moderate Muslim passivity toward those terrorists and their operations.

Let us accept, for a moment, as true the Bush administration’s claim that the techniques and tools that diminish our civil liberties at home and our reputation abroad are worth it because they have stopped terrorist attacks. Even then the argument fails, for such actions represent a tactical response to a strategic threat. They may stop the occasional attack, but they won’t address the fundamental issue.

Unless we find ways to counter not just the attacks but the movement that spawns them, there will be no foreseeable end to this problem.

Of course, we should continue to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. But the key to long-term success against fundamentalist Muslim terrorism is to weaken our enemies and empower our moderate friends in the Islamic world. One priority should be strengthening our intelligence liaison relationships.

It is extremely difficult to maintain productive ties with foreign intelligence services if relations between the two countries involved are not strong and mutually respectful. Our post-9/11 policies have turned many of our former friends against us. When we re-establish and strengthen our traditional alliances, our intelligence liaison relationships will prosper – and our ability to fight terrorism will be much improved.

In an increasingly decentralized terrorist environment, our intelligence liaison colleagues can penetrate terrorist organizations far more easily than Americans can. After all, they look, think and speak like the people they’re targeting.

It may take many years to soften the appeal of Muslim fundamentalism and diminish moderate Muslim indifference to that phenomenon. But when moderate Muslims begin to perceive the radicals to be a threat to them, the radicals will lose – and this can happen fairly quickly. Note how abruptly Iraqi Sunnis turned against al-Qaida in Iraq in 2007.

But Iraq presents a problem for us in this endeavor. As long as we have a military presence there, we will catalyze radical Muslim anger and suspicions about our motives. President Bush’s talk of “bringing democracy” to the Middle East doesn’t help, as it is often perceived as a further example of Western imperialism. And wherever we go in the Muslim world, we tote the unwelcome baggage of renditions, overseas CIA prisons, waterboarding, Guantanamo and military tribunals.

Thus, we cannot deal with Muslim attitudes by telling them how to behave. It will be more productive for us to get our own house in order through the restoration of full civil rights and the cessation of “enhanced interrogation techniques.” We can then present ourselves to the world as a model worth emulating.

Because of our long history of commercial, educational and diplomatic relations with the Muslim world, there are many Americans who know a great deal about terrorism and Islam. They can be of great service in this cause, and we need to listen to and learn from them in a climate that doesn’t intimidate them.

That requires new national leadership that will not only entertain but also encourage dissenting views and differing ideas. Any other approach will serve only to impoverish our search for the best policies.

In the meantime, our domestic counterterrorism programs concentrate on what happened on 9/11. What are we doing to protect an increasingly vulnerable national infrastructure? Like old generals, we are fighting the last war in a world that is rapidly changing. We have created a bloated and inefficient homeland security apparatus and have vested primary responsibility for our security from terrorism in the FBI – a law enforcement organization that does not have the culture or the structure for the counterterrorism job. We still need a domestic intelligence agency along the lines of Britain’s MI5.

There is much to do, and no time to lose.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Europe and the Middle East, as executive assistant in the director’s office and as chief of the counterterrorism staff.

Posted in terrorism |

Chronicle of a mess foretold

December 27, 2007 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]

The recent crossborder Turkish attacks on Kurdish (PKK) rebels in Northern Iraq provide stark proof that the Bush Administration’s foreign policy is based on its own ideology rather than on any imperatives presented by the objective facts that exist on the ground in Kurdish Iraq.

Many past administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have made foreign policy decisions not only on the basis of the objective facts in the area under consideration, but rather on the basis of their domestic political needs or their own ideology. It is difficult, however, to recall an administration that has so blatantly ignored objective realities as this one.

There is a long U.S. history of diplomatic, academic, commercial, journalistic and intelligence involvement in the Middle East. America has been engaged in that part of the world throughout its history, starting with the Barbary Pirates in the 18th Century. In today’s world, we have been heavily involved since the end of the Second World War, the creation of Israel, and the exponential increase of the importance of oil to the world economy. In that time, America has developed a cadre of citizens who really are expert in matters concerning the Middle East.

It is not a recent phenomenon that there are fundamental conflicts between Shia and Sunni, between Kurd and Turk, between Arab and Persian (Iranian), between Iraq and Iran, between the Taliban and Iraq. Some of those conflicts have been going on for millennia, some for centuries, the rest for decades. In fact, virtually all of them are well known to a broad swath of American experts and all of them strongly influenced American policy in the Middle East until the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Under the Bush Senior, we saw the most recent example of area knowledge and understanding of the complicated crosscurrents and nuances of the Middle East helping us avoid a catastrophe. He stuck to his guns in early 1991 by not continuing on to Baghdad and in the process avoided all the problems that beset us today in the area.

Careful reading of the reasons why we did not go on to Baghdad under Bush Senior provides a primer on realities in the Middle East.

At the time, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said, “So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him (Saddam) from Kuwait, but also when the president made the decision that we’d achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.”

Those problems were well known to American experts at the time and even better known on the eve of the U.S. invasion of lraq in 2003.

They represent the crux of the problems we now face. They were simply ignored by the Bush administration. All the bad things that have happened were predictable and predicted: The Sunni/Shia carnage in Iraq was and remains part of the 15-century-old schism between those two branches of Islam and remains at the heart of the intractable struggle between them for the control of Iraq.

The meddling of Iran (Persia) was inevitable. Iran is a country that has sought hegemony over the Persian Gulf since it was lost by them to the Arab Caliphate in the 7th Century. The rebirth of this quest was enabled by the U.S. invasion and the rise of the power of Iraqi Shia who are their co-religionists and whose increasing influence in Iraq blunted the power of one of their major competitors for Gulf hegemony — Iraq.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq removed two major Iranian competitors in the region, Taliban-governed Afghanistan and Saddam’s Iraq, with whom they had fought an eight-year war. That, in turn, diminished the power and influence of the Gulf Arabs, including Saudi Arabia and made Iranian Gulf hegemony more likely.

The increasing independence of Iraqi Kurdistan brought on by our invasion and Saddam’s downfall virtually guaranteed conflict between the Turkey and the Kurds who have millions of Kurdish brethren living as second-class citizens in Turkey.

Some governmental and nongovernmental experts predicted all of these consequences of our Invasion. The problem is that the Administration did not listen to them. In fact, those critics of the Bush policy were shouted down, belittled, humiliated and attacked as “unpatriotic” by the Administration.

So, we are in this Middle East mess not because of a failure of intelligence and expertise, but because of the Bush Administration’s refusal to listen to the voices of the many real experts on the area. America can do better.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in East and West Europe and the Middle East and as chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. He lives in Williston, Vt.

Posted in Iraq |

Settlements stand in way of peace

November 28, 2007 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in the Rutland Herald.]

Here we are in the midst of yet another Middle East summit meeting, the purpose of which, as always, is to find a solution to the persistent Palestine problem. So far, for a variety of reasons, nothing conclusive has come from these meetings. Nevertheless, it does present the United States with one more opportunity to look at its national interests in the region and then, hopefully, decide on a policy that serves those interests.

U.S. policy on the Palestine issue has been pretty consistent, at least since the 1967 war. We have supported Israel on virtually every substantive issue of importance. We have vetoed over two dozen resolutions in the U.N. Security Council that have condemned Israel for one thing or another, and we have supported or at least turned a blind eye to their Gaza and West Bank settlement policies, which have been deemed illegal under international law.

The “land for peace” solution is still on the table. That idea was incorporated in 1967 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 in the aftermath of the six day Arab-Israeli War. Under “land for peace,” the Palestinians would get back roughly their pre-1967 borders, and the Israelis would get peace, security and recognition of their national legitimacy. The West Bank settlements are important in the upcoming summit meeting because in order to satisfy “land for peace,” Israel would have to give them up. There is broad traditional support for such a solution in Europe and in the U.N. General Assembly.

Some Palestinians who would like to throw the Israelis into the sea and some Israelis, particularly Israeli settlers, oppose that formula. They are supported here in America by the more fervent Israeli supporters, including many American Jewish Zionists, as well as substantial numbers of fundamentalist Christians — the “Christian Zionists” — who believe the second coming of Christ will not happen until Israel occupies the entire West Bank. The settlements lead to just such a situation.

Israelis are far better informed on this issue than Americans simply because there is a passionate, ongoing, public debate in Israel on the subject. There is virtually no discussion of it here in America. The issue of the settlements is at the heart of Israeli national interests. The real question here is whether or not continued American support for the settlements is in the U.S. national interest.

Osama bin Laden probably doesn’t care much about the plight of the Palestinians. What he cares about is the eradication of western influence in the lands of Islam. And yet, the resolution of the Palestine issue is at the heart of America’s issues, not only in the Middle East, but in its overall dealings with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism. The Palestine issue is not a cause of our problems with terrorism, but it is a constant irritant. As long as Muslims continue to believe that the Palestinians are being wronged by the Israelis and by extension by a pro-Israel ally, the United States, the Muslim world will remain a rich recruiting ground for terrorist foot soldiers as well as for political and financial support from a sector of the moderate Muslim world which is not naturally aligned with the fundamentalists.

President Bush has consistently supported the two-state solution- of Israeli and Palestinian states living side by side, undergirded by the precept of “land for peace.” He seems to be politically isolated in that position. In the recent debates between both Republicans and Democrats, no candidate comes to mind who supports “land for peace.” This may well be because none of those individuals believes in such a solution. It also may be because of the generally held perception in American politics that a candidate who is not 100 percent supportive of Israeli national interests cannot be elected to significant national public office.

Israeli and American national interests, where they often coincide, are not always identical. In the case of “land for peace,” and despite varying but persistent support in Israel over the past 40 years, they are quite divergent. If a settlement of the Palestine issue leads to a two-state solution in which both states are absolutely guaranteed the right to exist in peace and security, then it is in American national interest to support that solution with more than words. Anything we can do to diminish support for Muslim terrorism is in our national interest. The Israeli settlements are not.

This kind of opportunity doesn’t come around very often, and it is critical to support it when it does, particularly when non-support is likely to increase our problems with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who served in Eastern and Western Europe, Lebanon and Iran and as chief of the agency’s counterterrorism staff. He lives in Williston.

Posted in Israel/Palestine |

The U.S Response to Terrorism: A Fundamentally Flawed Strategy

November 13, 2007 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published on AmericanDiplomacy.org.]

In this broad condemnation of the Bush administration’s response to radical Muslim terrorism since 9/11, a retired CIA station chief and head of the Agency’s counterterrorism staff brings an intelligence professional’s perspective to bear on the nature of the terrorist threat we face and effective ways of countering it. — Ed

During the Cold War, American foreign policy was built on the twin bases of containment and alliances: containment of the Soviet Union and her allies and alliances with our friends in support of that containment. The critical element in the success of that policy was acceptance by both sides that the nuclear weaponry of the day would preclude any preemptive strike of one against the other. We called that MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction. An additional important element in that policy was the fact that our allies, and to a somewhat lesser extent the allies of the Soviet Union, were able to exercise constraints on the policies and activities of both of the principals. Say what you will, even with a couple of very close calls, that policy prevailed and the Cold War never turned hot.

The role of the intelligence community during the Cold War, as it is (or should be) at any given time, was to provide policy makers with finished intelligence designed to help with the decision making process. Whether or not the collection and analytical processes succeed, all the intelligence-producing organizations in the intelligence community are designed to provide that product.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the accompanying threat of Soviet nuclear weaponry brought a close to that era. The events of 9/11 set us on a completely different path. Since that horrible moment, we have embarked on a totally new foreign policy of preemptive unilateralism and an equally new domestic policy of intolerance for dissent and of creating and maintaining fear and anxiety in the American public. The question for examination is whether or not those changes and these new policies serve us well in the ongoing struggle with radical Muslim terrorism.

A Radical Revolution in Foreign Policy

Preemptive unilateralism represents a radical revolution in foreign policy. After a whole string of “reasons” for the attack on Iraq, we are now told that we needed to preemptively attack Iraq because they had the “intellectual capability” to create a nuclear weapon. Is that to be the basis for future foreign preemptions? The constraints placed on previous administrations by our Cold War alliances have gone completely out the window. The “unilateral” part of this new policy, as mirrored in our established refusal to listen to anyone about our plans for invading Iraq, has ruled out moderating counsel from any of our former friends and allies, leaving us almost friendless in today’s world. As we saw in the run-up to the Iraq invasion, it has been more important to the Bush administration to go ahead with its plans than to listen to its (former) friends and allies.

Although it is extremely difficult to sort out the true motivation behind that policy, what we have learned from the “kiss and tell” revelations of former members of this administration is that the decision to invade Iraq had been made well before 9/11. Given the fact that none of the litany of “justifications” (WMD, Iraqi ties to Al-Qaida, bringing democracy to the Arabs, etc.) for the invasion has held up to scrutiny, that decision would now appear to be based primarily on ideological imperatives.

For intelligence professionals, both active and retired, that raises the question of the role, if any, for finished intelligence in today’s foreign policy deliberations. The Bush administration’s disinclination to listen to counsel from the State Department, the unprecedented visits of the Vice President to CIA analysts, the creation of the Office for Special Plans in the Pentagon to “relook” old intelligence, and the willingness to listen to “Curveball,” a known fabricator, and Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraq National Congress, whose goal of overthrowing the Baathists in Iraq could only be achieved through misleading the United States into war, give a clear picture of an administration that was only interested in seeing intelligence that supported an already settled policy decision. The only conceivably worse basis for action would be if someone in the administration were listening to extraterrestrial voices!

Many past administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have made foreign policy decisions not only on the basis of the objective facts in the area under consideration, but also on the basis of their domestic political needs. It is difficult, however, to recall an administration that has so blatantly ignored objective realities as this one. As long as this is the way foreign policy is formulated, there will be little to no role for input from the intelligence community. However imperfect intelligence may be at any given moment or on any given issue, it does have a potentially constructive role to play in support of foreign policy. At minimum, intelligence deserves to be heard, not summarily dismissed.

Domestic Policy Problems

The administration’s domestic policy during this same period has been based solely on ensuring the “security of the American people.” That has brought us the Patriot Acts, wireless wiretapping, the abrogation of habeas corpus, torture, rendition, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, etc. And those are only the things we know about! We have been given a color coded terrorist threat warning system and daily hammering on what constitutional rights Americans have to give up to be “safe.” Most importantly, this administration and its supporters in the Congress, the media, and the public have resorted to the worst kinds of character assassination and name calling to maintain the atmosphere of fear and anxiety they have so adroitly created. If you disagree with the policy they support, you are “soft on terror,” “unpatriotic,” or, even worse, a traitor. In short, dissent is intimidated — a process never approved by our founding fathers.

These are results that must gladden the heart of Osama bin Laden. He has to know that without our inadvertent complicity in the Middle East and at home in America, he would not have come out looking nearly as successful as has been the case. The facts are that we are on the verge of creating chaos in the Middle East, and that we can hardly look like a “shining city on the hill” to people who once admired us. What more could he possibly ask, and how much of the result stems directly from our own policies?

The Terrorist World Today

Our preoccupation with fundamentalist Muslim terrorism will probably last a generation or more. That gives us plenty of time to continue to make mistakes, or to get it right. Certainly today we have got it wrong, probably because, as a result of 9/11, which was essentially a paramilitary operation, this administration concluded that we needed a military response. Afghanistan was the first response. In many respects, it satisfied America’s domestic emotional and political needs as well as our regional Middle East and general foreign policy needs. Our big mistake was in not carrying it through to a more favorable conclusion when we shifted our attention to Iraq.

Unfortunately, the threat from this kind of terrorism cannot be successfully challenged militarily. There can be no conventional war with these people. Our military might is not mighty. The real struggle is for minds, and we are hardly addressing that issue.

Because with our remaining allies we have focused on Al Qaida, much of the leadership of that organization has been killed or captured. This has weakened the “center,” and power has flowed outward to the more dispersed elements of fundamentalist Muslim terrorism. There has almost been a McDonald’s type franchising of the movement. This has meant that more recruiting, planning, and implementation has devolved to local organizations. There is less central control and probably less central knowledge of what is going on around the world. That changes the target for us.

All organizations change as they age. In the 1940s and 50s Soviets were hardly ever seen outside their embassies, and when they were, they were clannish and seldom mixed with foreigners. As time went on and Soviet goals and personnel changed, they became more approachable and engageable. The dispersal of Al Qaida has hastened this same process for that organization. Now, absent continuing central control, attitudes are changing. There is increasing friction between the “old hands” and the young Turks about what sort of activity is appropriate. This is reportedly true in Yemen, and it presents us with some opportunities wherever it obtains. It was at this stage of ageing that the Soviet system, for a variety of human reasons, produced “flawed” citizens who were susceptible to blandishments from the United States.

Muslims range from brown-eyed, black-skinned straight through to blond, fair-skinned and blue-eyed. They are everywhere in East Asia, the Subcontinent, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Not only do they look different from each other, they are different. In the world of terrorism, they range from types like Al Qaida, who really are terrorists in the truest sense of the word, to groups who use unconventional warfare (terrorist tactics) in pursuit of their own freedom from repressive rulers. It is important to keep them separately in mind and not equate Chechens with Al Qaida. When we do that, we create all kinds of credibility problems for ourselves.

Strategic Goals

Al Qaida has very simple strategic goals. They want to push us and our influence out of the Middle East and replace repressive secular Muslim regimes with theocracies.

American strategic goals are far more difficult to identify. It is simply too easy (and inaccurate) to say that our strategy is about oil. Sadly, we have lost our way in Afghanistan. Where our surge in Iraq seems predictably successful, our “strategy” of bringing harmony and democracy to a historically fractious “country” is daily more precarious. Our occupation of Iraq looks like a war on Islam and catalyzes Muslims against us, daily creating new terrorists. In fact, to say we have no clear-cut strategic goals may be more accurate.

Fundamentalist Muslim terrorists attack us wherever they can find us. At this moment they are working to kill us mostly on their turf or in adjacent parts of the world. The events of 9/11 notwithstanding, repeating that sort of operation here in the United States is no easy task. That is not to say that it will not happen, but the odds are not in their favor.

America’s tactics are different. Our public face to the world is a direct reflection of what we do and say. We are seen as cocky and arrogant: “Bring ’em on!” The puerile braggadocio with which we alternately dehumanize and belittle the Muslims may make some of us feel better, but is directly counterproductive to our goals for dealing with terrorism. Equating all Muslims with terrorism is not only inaccurate, but also demeaning and infuriating for mainstream, moderate Muslims.

We are viewed as hypocritical, duplicitous, and self-serving. When we push for democratic elections in the Islamic world and Hamas wins in Palestine, our emotional rejection of the results proves our hypocrisy to the moderate Muslim. The point here is that it matters what you say and how you say it, particularly when, through injudicious behavior, the only cause you hurt is your own.

A Strategy For America

At home, we need to stop the policies that lead to anxiety over terrorism and security. Perhaps we might even consider reinstating our civil liberties in the knowledge that doing so might invite another attack here. In this regard, we need to foster civil discourse by ceasing to label those with divergent ideas as “unpatriotic” or “soft on terrorism.” There are a lot of very smart Americans who know a great deal about terrorism and Islam. We might do well to hear what they have to say in a climate that doesn’t intimidate them. Personal attacks and defamation serve only to impoverish our search for the best alternatives.

Right now, we are sitting here in America pointing our finger at the Iraqis, Afghanis, Turks, Syrians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians and telling them what they have to do, while in many cases, we have lost the moral credibility to make such pronouncements. While we preach democratization abroad, we diminish democracy at home. As long as the world associates us with torture and renditions, we will have little credibility abroad. However, we do have the potential to once again become that shining city on the hill — a place that leads by example, by what it does and is, not by what it blusteringly says.

Our foreign policy today is not helping us. The key to success against fundamentalist Muslim terrorism is to minimize our enemies and maximize our friends. To do that we have to reestablish and strengthen our traditional alliances. The price for that will be to give them a say in what we do. That makes sense when their problem is identical with ours.

In this regard, we need to strengthen our intelligence liaison relationships. The best people to work against this target are the intelligence services of the countries in which they are operating. That is their home turf, and in the new “franchised” terrorist environment they are potentially far and away the most effective organizations to address those targets.

We need to soften the appeal of Muslim fundamentalism. To do that, we have to diminish the level of moderate Muslim indifference to that phenomenon. There are nearly 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. It takes only a tiny percentage of them to make major problems for us. The key to keeping those numbers down lies in the attitudes of moderate Islam.

In summary, it seems that just about everything we are doing in the so-called “Global War on Terrorism” is not helping. It is constantly claimed by Bush administration representatives that the techniques and tools to which so many Americans object (waterboarding, renditions, etc.) and which diminish our civil liberties, have spared us numerous terrorist attacks here in the homeland. Let’s just arbitrarily stipulate that that is true. Even if it is, it is only a tactical response to the threat. Optimally, it may stop the occasional attack, but it won’t solve the fundamental problem. We need a new strategy that deals with the weaknesses in this terrorist threat with a view to stopping the movement, not just the attacks. Without such a strategy, there will be no foreseeable end to this problem.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA station chief who was educated at Exeter and Dartmouth. After college, he served three years in the Army Security Agency as a Russian language intercept operator. After his discharge, he spent two years in Russian regional studies at London University, and then joined the CIA as a staff officer. He subsequently served in Prague, Berlin, Langley, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington. During those 25 years, he worked primarily in Soviet and East European operations, recruiting and handling agents or managing that process. His only ventures outside the Soviet operations arena were as chief of the counterterrorism staff and as executive assistant to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci. Since his retirement in 1980, he has lived in Vermont.

Posted in terrorism |

No Matter US Course, Iraq will Suffer

November 3, 2007 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in The Valley News.]

There are really only two options for America in Iraq. One is to “stay the course.” The other is to “cut and run.”  That stark choice stems from the fact that Iraq has never existed as a real country.

It is often stated that if the United States were to cut and run, the “country” would devolve into civil war.  That statement is quite true.  It’s also true that no matter when we leave, Iraq will devolve into civil war.  Our continued presence in Iraq will stifle, but will never end the longtime animosities that exist within that “country.”

The rationale for staying in Iraq is that the U.S. military surge, which does seem to be working, will give the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds time to settle their differences, create a harmonious government and find a way to establish and maintain the peace.  That is the bet on which the Bush administration is laying all its coin, including the most important American treasure, the well being of U.S. soldiers.

Anyone who has even the slightest understanding of Iraq knows that the three main groups are unlikely to settle their differences. They have no reason to. Each seeks power at the expense of the others. Each has demands that the others will not meet. None is prepared to compromise.  There will be no magical transformation of Iraq into a “democratic, Muslim state.”  Worse than that, the odds of today’s Iraq ever becoming a real country are nil.

After the Mongol invasion of Mesopotamia (roughly the geographic area now called Iraq) in the 13th century, order was maintained by a series of repressive foreign rulers.  A military coup in 1958 brought the first homegrown but still repressive, Iraqi rulers, and in 1968 the Arab Socialist (Bath) Party took over and controlled the country, still repressively, until the U.S. invasion in 2003. Throughout its history, order has been maintained by repressive governments — strictly by coercion and intimidation and often by terror.

This has been particularly true in the past century because leaders had to deal with the animosities between the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds.  Left to their own devices, they would have taken each other on in a heartbeat.  However, as long as America stays in Iraq, our presence will mitigate the conflict that is part of the historical fabric of life there. We are today’s purveyor of repressive order.  We forcefully intervene to try to keep that order.

When America leaves an Iraq in which ethnic and religious differences are unsettled, more conflict will come. It doesn’t really matter how long we wait to leave.  There is sure to be major loss of life. Iraq’s neighbors will get involved. Iran will support the Shia, Saudi Arabia and others will support the Sunnis.  God knows what will happen to the Kurds!  having already attacked the PKK, the Turks may well invade Iran’s Kurdish region.  Whatever finally happens there, It is unlikely that any one of the three entities will prevail at the expense of the others. Their foreign sponsors and enemies won’t permit that. Remember, neither side prevailed in the recent Iran-Iraq war.

Ultimately, the conflict will run out of steam and the antagonists will then, and only then, sort out their differences and reach some sort of settlement. It’s possible that such a settlement could be reached before the needed catalyst.  But that miracle can only happen with urging from the United States, something the Bush administration is clearly disinclined to do.

One can speculate endlessly on what such a solution would look like. It would almost certainly result in some sort of partition of what is today Iraq. It is equally certain not to be democratic and, given the IMPACTS of the U.S. invasion, it probably will be anti-American.  Certainly, the longer we stay, the worse it will get. Wishful thinking will not alter that reality.

As sad and as horrible as it is to say, unless suppressed by a strong internal power such as Saddam Hussein, or by external power like the United States, conflict between the three major groups in today’s Iraq is inevitable and will remain so for years if not decades to come.  The argument that we must maintain a military presence in Iraq until there is a “political solution” is absolutely absurd. If a solution is ever to come, which is highly unlikely, it will come only when there is no other alternative available.  Until that time, the only contribution provided by the American troops is that they represent precisely such an alternative to a real solution.

So, the choice is starkly simple.  Since the result is bound to be the same at virtually every point in the future, should we wait it out, or should we consider an early exit?

Posted in Iraq |

Hanging the Iraq War on the Democrats

September 29, 2007 by Haviland Smith

[Originally published in The Valley News.]

It is inconceivable that the president and his advisers have not reached the logical conclusion that their grandiose plans for lraq are unattainable. No serious expert on, or student of, this Iraq adventure—with the exception of those who are ideologically committed to the president’s goals—could conclude that there is any hope of political victory. At best, Iraq will become some sort of loose confederation.

It’s time to view the administration’s current Iraq policy, as well as its goals at home, very differently. Their new strategic goal must be to share responsibility for the Iraq disaster with the Democrats—or, better yet, to make them totally responsible for the disaster in the public eye.

Today’s Bush’s tactic consists of the militarily successful “surge” followed by the concerted effort now under way to convince Americans to wait, once again, for the surge to be followed by Iraqi political reconciliation—which is unlikely ever to come. “Wait” is the operative word. This policy is based on one simple premise: Bush simply is not prepared to see an “unsuccessful” conclusion of his Iraq adventure during his presidency. To do so would be an admission that the administration has no way to “succeed.” That is an unacceptable admission to a president who is inordinately concerned with his image and his legacy. This is all about presidential ego. So, he will do anything and everything to hand an unresolved Iraq over to his successor. Then the results will be the Democrats fault.

There are some Republicans in Washington who have openly stated their disagreement with Bush’s Iraq policy. There are undoubtedly others who also disagree with it but have not so declared.  It also seems likely that if that war persists until the November ‘08 elections, other Republicans will sign on against the Bush strategy. Why, then, would any congressional Republicans go along with this incredibly self-serving and dangerous Bush policy? Their only way out of the Iraq mess may be to hang it on the Democrats.

If this new Bush policy works and if Congressional Republicans hang tough and support the president, they may hope they will be able to land the entire mess in the lap of a new Democrat president.

Without support from Republicans in Congress, the Democrats do not have the votes to alter the Bush policy. President Bush is veto-proof. Despite that, the Democrats, probably in an attempt to prove to their constituents that they heard them in the last election, have refused to compromise on any issue.

Largely as a result of the Democrats’ political posturing, absolutely nothing has been accomplished, permitting Bush to push the process forward toward the desk of the next president. In the meantime, the war goes on with all the expenditures of American treasure.

The Democrats are faced with two options, both bad. They can refuse to fund the war, which would be political disaster, since that would leave our troops in limbo and would allow Republicans to claim the Democrats are unable or unwilling to deal with terrorism.

Alternatively, they can do nothing and see the war turned over to the next president—very likely to be a Democrat. And that is precisely the corner into which the Republicans are trying (so far, successfully) to paint the Democrats.

The Iraq war will very likely be judged America’s worst foreign policy disaster. In the beginning, it looked as if it would only take the Republicans down with it. But more and more, it looks as if it will be a disaster for the Democrats and our next, probably Democratic, president as well.

And that is almost certainly the Bush plan: Don’t perish alone on Iraq, take the Democrats down with you. If this proves to be the case, the Democrats will become victims of an incredibly cunning, underhanded, Machiavellian, Republican ploy that may serve the president’s interests and possibly Republican interests, but not those of the Republic.

Haviland Smith is a retired CIA Station Chief who served in Europe and the Middle East and as Chief of the Counterterrorism Staff. He lives in Williston, Vt.

Posted in Iraq |

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